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meditations on first philosophy-第19节

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I have just spoken of; and there is therefore nothing in them which does not give testimony to the power and goodness of the God 'who has produced them28'。  Thus; for example; when the nerves which are in the feet are violently or more than usually moved; their movement; passing through the medulla of the spine29 to the inmost parts of the brain; gives a sign to the mind which makes it feel somewhat; to wit; pain; as though in the foot; by which the mind is excited to do its utmost to remove the cause of the evil as dangerous and hurtful to the foot。  It is true that God could have constituted the nature of man in such a way that this same movement in the brain would have conveyed something quite different to the mind; for example; it might have produced consciousness of itself either in so far as it is in the brain; or as it is in the foot; or as it is in some other place between the foot and the brain; or it might finally have produced consciousness of anything else whatsoever; but none of all this would have contributed so well to the conservation of the body。  Similarly; when we desire to drink; a certain dryness of the throat is produced which moves its nerves; and by their means the internal portions of the brain; and this movement causes in the mind the sensation of thirst; because in this case there is nothing more useful to us than to become aware that we have need to drink for the conservation o our health; and the same holds good in other instances。      From this it is quite clear that; notwithstanding the supreme goodness of God; the nature of man; inasmuch as it is composed of mind and body; cannot be otherwise than sometimes a source of deception。  For if there is any cause which excites; not in the foot but in some part of the nerves which are extended between the foot and the brain; or even in the brain itself; the same movement which usually is produced when the foot is detrimentally affected; pain will be experienced as though it were in the foot; and the sense will thus naturally be deceived; for since the same movement in the brain is capable of causing but one sensation in the mind; and this sensation is much more frequently excited by a cause which hurts the foot than by another existing in some other quarter; it is reasonable that it should convey to the mind pain in the foot rather than in any other part of the body。 And although the parchedness of the throat does not always proceed; as it usually does; from the fact that drinking is necessary for the health of the body; but sometimes comes from quite a different cause; as is the case with dropsical patients; it is yet much better that it should mislead on this occasion than if; on the other hand; it were always to deceive us when the body is in good health; and so on in similar cases。      And certainly this consideration is of great service to me; not only in enabling me to recognise all the errors to which my nature is subject; but also in enabling me to avoid them or to correct them more easily。  for knowing that all my senses more frequently indicate to me truth than falsehood respecting the things which concern that which is beneficial to the body; and being able almost always to avail myself of many of them in order to examine one particular thing; and; besides that; being able to make use of my memory in order to connect the present with the past; and of my understanding which already has discovered all the causes of my errors; I ought no longer to fear that falsity may be found in matters every day presented to me by my senses。  And I ought to set aside all the doubts of these past days as hyperbolical and ridiculous; particularly that very common uncertainty respecting sleep; which I could not distinguish from the waking state; for at present I find a very notable difference between the two; inasmuch as our memory can never connect our dreams one with the other; or with the whole course of our lives; as it unites events which happen to us while we are awake。  And; as a matter of fact; if someone; while I was awake; quite suddenly appeared to me and disappeared as fast as do the images which I see in sleep; so that I could not know from whence the form came nor whither it went; it would not be without reason that I should deem it a spectre or a phantom formed by my brain 'and similar to those which I form in sleep'; rather than a real man。  But when I perceive things as to which I know distinctly both the place from which they proceed; and that in which they are; and the time at which they appeared to me; and when; without any interruption; I can connect the perceptions which I have of them with the whole course of my life; I am perfectly assured that these perceptions occur while I am waking and not during sleep。  And I ought in no wise to doubt the truth of such matters; if; after having called up all my senses; my memory; and my understanding; to examine them; nothing is brought to evidence by any one of them which is repugnant to what is set forth by the others。  For because God is in no wise a deceiver; it follows that I am not deceived in this。  But because the exigencies of action often oblige us to make up our minds before having leisure to examine matters carefully; we must confess that the life of man is very frequently subject to error in respect to individual objects; and we must in the end acknowledge the infirmity of our nature。





Notes:


2For convenience sake the 〃Objections and Replies〃 are published in the second volume of this edition。 3The French version is followed here。 4The French version is followed here。 5When it is thought desirable to insert additional readings from the French version this will be indicated by the use of square brackets。 6Between the Praefatio ad Lectorem and the Synopsis; the Paris Edition (1st Edition) interpolates an Index which is not found in the Amsterdam Edition (2nd Edition)。  Since Descartes did not reproduce it; he was doubtless not its author。  Mersenne probably composed it himself; adjusting it to the paging of the first Edition。 (Note in Adam and Tannery's Edition。) 7intellectio。 8imaginatio。 9In place of this long title at the head of the page the first Edition had immediately after the Synopsis; and on the same page 7; simply 〃First Meditation。〃  (Adam's Edition。) 10Or 〃form an image〃 (effingo)。 11Sentire。 12entendement F。; mens L。 13inspectio。 14sensus communis。 15Percipio; F。 nous concevons。 16The French version is followed here as being more explicit。 In it 〃action de mon esprit〃 replaces 〃mea cogitatio。〃 17In the Latin version 〃similitudinem。〃 18Not in the French version。 19percipio。 20perceptio。 21〃In the idea of whom alone necessary or eternal existence is comprised。〃  French version。 22〃From the moment that。〃  French version。 23〃Conception;〃 French version。  〃intellectionem;〃 Latin version。 24intueor。 25acie mentis。 26intellectionem。 27sensus communis。 28Latin version only。 29spini dorsae medullam。

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