meditations on first philosophy-第18节
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
e any reason to believe from this is； that there is something in it； whatever it may be； which excites in me these sensations of heat or of pain。 So also； although there are spaces in which I find nothing which excites my senses； I must not from that conclude that these spaces contain no body； for I see in this； as in other similar things； that I have been in the habit of perverting the order of nature； because these perceptions of sense having bee placed within me by nature merely for the purpose of signifying to my mind what things are beneficial or hurtful to the composite whole of which it forms a part； and being up to that point sufficiently clear and distinct； I yet avail myself of them as though they were absolute rules by which I might immediately determine the essence of the bodies which are outside me； as to which； in fact； they can teach me nothing but what is most obscure and confused。 But I have already sufficiently considered how； notwithstanding the supreme goodness of God； falsity enters into the judgments I make。 Only here a new difficulty is presented￥one respecting those things the pursuit or avoidance of which is taught me by nature； and also respecting the internal sensations which I possess； and in which I seem to have sometimes detected error ＇and thus to be directly deceived by my own nature＇。 To take an example； the agreeable taste of some food in which poison has been intermingled may induce me to partake of the poison； and thus deceive me。 It is true； at the same time； that in this case nature may be excused； for it only induces me to desire food in which I find a pleasant taste； and not to desire the poison which is unknown to it； and thus I can infer nothing from this fact； except that my nature is not omniscient； at which there is certainly no reason to be astonished； since man； being finite in nature； can only have knowledge the perfectness of which is limited。 But we not unfrequently deceive ourselves even in those things to which we are directly impelled by nature； as happens with those who when they are sick desire to drink or eat things hurtful to them。 It will perhaps be said here that the cause of their deceptiveness is that their nature is corrupt； but that does not remove the difficulty； because a sick man is none the less truly God's creature than he who is in health； and it is therefore as repugnant to God's goodness for the one to have a deceitful nature as it is for the other。 And as a clock composed of wheels and counter…weights no less exactly observes the laws of nature when it is badly made； and does not show the time properly； than when it entirely satisfies the wishes of its maker； and as； if I consider the body of a man as being a sort of machine so built up and composed of nerves； muscles； veins； blood and skin； that though there were no mind in it at all； it would not cease to have the same motions as at present； exception being made of those movements which are due to the direction of the will； and in consequence depend upon the mind ＇as apposed to those which operate by the disposition of its organs＇； I easily recognise that it would be as natural to this body； supposing it to be； for example； dropsical； to suffer the parchedness of the throat which usually signifies to the mind the feeling of thirst； and to be disposed by this parched feeling to move the nerves and other parts in the way requisite for drinking； and thus to augment its malady and do harm to itself； as it is natural to it； when it has no indisposition； to be impelled to drink for its good by a similar cause。 And although； considering the use to which the clock has been destined by its maker； I may say that it deflects from the order of its nature when it does not indicate the hours correctly； and as； in the same way； considering the machine of the human body as having been formed by God in order to have in itself all the movements usually manifested there； I have reason for thinking that it does not follow the order of nature when； if the throat is dry； drinking does harm to the conservation of health； nevertheless I recognise at the same time that this last mode of explaining nature is very different from the other。 For this is but a purely verbal characterisation depending entirely on my thought； which compares a sick man and a badly constructed clock with the idea which I have of a healthy man and a well made clock； and it is hence extrinsic to the things to which it is applied； but according to the other interpretation of the term nature I understand something which is truly found in things and which is therefore not without some truth。 But certainly although in regard to the dropsical body it is only so to speak to apply an extrinsic term when we say that its nature is corrupted； inasmuch as apart from the need to drink； the throat is parched； yet in regard to the composite whole； that is to say； to the mind or soul united to this body； it is not a purely verbal predicate； but a real error of nature； for it to have thirst when drinking would be hurtful to it。 And thus it still remains to inquire how the goodness of God does not prevent the nature of man so regarded from being fallacious。 In order to begin this examination； then； I here say； in the first place； that there is a great difference between mind and body； inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible； and the mind is entirely indivisible。 For； as a matter of fact； when I consider the mind； that is to say； myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing； I cannot distinguish in myself any parts； but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire； and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body； yet if a foot； or an arm； or some other part； is separated from my body； I am aware that nothing has been taken away from my mind。 And the faculties of willing； feeling； conceiving； etc。 cannot be properly speaking said to be its parts； for it is one and the same mind which employs itself in willing and in feeling and understanding。 But it is quite otherwise with corporeal or extended objects； for there is not one of these imaginable by me which my mind cannot easily divide into parts； and which consequently I do not recognise as being divisible； this would be sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body； if I had not already learned it from other sources。 I further notice that the mind does not receive the impressions from all parts of the body immediately； but only from the brain； or perhaps even from one of its smallest parts； to wit； from that in which the common sense27 is said to reside； which； whenever it is disposed in the same particular way； conveys the same thing to the mind； although meanwhile the other portions of the body may be differently disposed； as is testified by innumerable experiments which it is unnecessary here to recount。 I notice； also； that the nature of body is such that none of its parts can be moved by another part a little way off which cannot also be moved in the same way by each one of the parts which are between the two； although this more remote part does not act at all。 As； for example； in the cord ABCD ＇which is in tension＇ if we pull the last part D； the first part A will not be moved in any way differently from what would be the case if one of the intervening parts B or C were pulled； and the last part D were to remain unmoved。 And in the same way； when I feel pain in my foot； my knowledge of physics teaches me that this sensation is communicated by means of nerves dispersed through the foot； which； being extended like cords from there to the brain； when they are contracted in the foot； at the same time contract the inmost portions of the brain which is their extremity and place of origin； and then excite a certain movement which nature has established in order to cause the mind to be affected by a sensation of pain represented as existing in the foot。 But because these nerves must pass through the tibia； the thigh； the loins； the back and the neck； in order to reach from the leg to the brain； it may happen that although their extremities which are in the foot are not affected； but only certain ones of their intervening parts ＇which pass by the loins or the neck＇； this action will excite the same movement in the brain that might have been excited there by a hurt received in the foot； in consequence of which the mind will necessarily feel in the foot the same pain as if it had received a hurt。 And the same holds good of all the other perceptions of our senses。 I notice finally that since each of the movements which are in the portion of the brain by which the mind is immediately affected brings about one particular sensation only； we cannot under the circumstances imagine anything more likely than that this movement； amongst all the sensations which it is capable of impressing on it； causes mind to be affected by that one which is best fitted and most generally useful for the conservation of the human body when it is in health。 But experience makes us aware that all the feelings with which nature inspires us are such as I have just spoken of； and there is therefore nothing in them which does not give testimony to the p
