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ng; while; on the other hand; they cannot be so conceived apart from me; that is without an intelligent substance in which they reside; for 'in the notion we have of these faculties; or; to use the language of the Schools' in their formal concept; some kind of intellection is comprised; from which I infer that they are distinct from me as its modes are from a thing。  I observe also in me some other faculties such as that of change of position; the assumption of different figures and such like; which cannot be conceived; any more than can the preceding; apart from some substance to which they are attached; and consequently cannot exist without it; but it is very clear that these faculties; if it be true that they exist; must be attached to some corporeal or extended substance; and not to an intelligent substance; since in the clear and distinct conception of these there is some sort of extension found to be present; but no intellection at all。  There is certainly further in me a certain passive faculty of perception; that is; of receiving and recognising the ideas of sensible things; but this would be useless to me 'and I could in no way avail myself of it'; if there were not either in me or in some other thing another active faculty capable of forming and producing these ideas。  But this active faculty cannot exist in me 'inasmuch as I am a thing that thinks' seeing that it does not presuppose thought; and also that those ideas are often produced in me without my contributing in any way to the same; and often even against my will; it is thus necessarily the case that the faculty resides in some substance different from me in which all the reality which is objectively in the ideas that are produced by this faculty is formally or eminently contained; as I remarked before。  And this substance is either a body; that is; a corporeal nature in which there is contained formally 'and really' all that which is objectively 'and by representation' in those ideas; or it is God Himself; or some other creature more noble than body in which that same is contained eminently。  But; since God is no deceiver; it is very manifest that He does not communicate to me these ideas immediately and by Himself; nor yet by the intervention of some creature in which their reality is not formally; but only eminently; contained。  For since He has given me no faculty to recognise that this is the case; but; on the other hand; a very great inclination to believe 'that they are sent to me or' that they are conveyed to me by corporeal objects; I do not see how He could be defended from the accusation of deceit if these ideas were produced by causes other than corporeal objects。  Hence we must allow that corporeal things exist。 However; they are perhaps not exactly what we perceive by the senses; since this comprehension by the senses is in many instances very obscure and confused; but we must at least admit that all things which I conceive in them clearly and distinctly; that is to say; all things which; speaking generally; are comprehended in the object of pure mathematics; are truly to be recognised as external objects。      As to other things; however; which are either particular only; as; for example; that the sun is of such and such a figure; etc。; or which are less clearly and distinctly conceived; such as light; sound; pain and the like; it is certain that although they are very dubious and uncertain; yet on the sole ground that God is not a deceiver; and that consequently He has not permitted any falsity to exist in my opinion which He has not likewise given me the faculty of correcting; I may assuredly hope to conclude that I have within me the means of arriving at the truth even here。  And first of all there is no doubt that in all things which nature teaches me there is some truth contained; for by nature; considered in general; I now understand no other thing than either God Himself or else the order and disposition which God has established in created things; and by my nature in particular I understand no other thing than the complexus of all the things which God has given me。      But there is nothing which this nature teaches me more expressly 'nor more sensibly' than that I have a body which is adversely affected when I feel pain; which has need of food or drink when I experience the feelings of hunger and thirst; and so on; nor can I doubt there being some truth in all this。      Nature also teaches me by these sensations of pain; hunger; thirst; etc。; that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel; but that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel; but that I am very closely united to it; and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to compose with it one whole。  For if that were not the case; when my body is hurt; I; who am merely a thinking thing; should not feel pain; for I should perceive this wound by the understanding only; just as the sailor perceives by sight when something is damaged in his vessel; and when my body has need of drink or food; I should clearly understand the fact without being warned of it by confused feelings of hunger and thirst。 For all these sensations of hunger; thirst; pain; etc。 are in truth none other than certain confused modes of thought which are produced by the union and apparent intermingling of mind and body。      Moreover; nature teaches me that many other bodies exist around mine; of which some are to be avoided; and others sought after。  And certainly from the fact that I am sensible of different sorts of colours; sounds; scents; tastes; heat; hardness; etc。; I very easily conclude that there are in the bodies from which all these diverse sense…perceptions proceed certain variations which answer to them; although possibly these are not really at all similar to them。  And also from the fact that amongst these different sense…perceptions some are very agreeable to me and others disagreeable; it is quite certain that my body (or rather myself in my entirety; inasmuch as I am formed of body and soul) may receive different impressions agreeable and disagreeable from the other bodies which surround it。      But there are many other things which nature seems to have taught me; but which at the same time I have never really received from her; but which have been brought about in my mind by a certain habit which I have of forming inconsiderate judgments on things; and thus it may easily happen that these judgments contain some error。  Take; for example; the opinion which I hold that all space in which there is nothing that affects 'or makes an impression on' my senses is void; that in a body which is warm there is something entirely similar to the idea of heat which is in me; that in a white or green body there is the same whiteness or greenness that I perceive; that in a bitter or sweet body there is the same taste; and so on in other instances; that the stars; the towers; and all other distant bodies are of the same figure and size as they appear from far off to our eyes; etc。  But in order that in this there should be nothing which I do not conceive distinctly; I should define exactly what I really understand when I say that I am taught somewhat by nature。  For here I take nature in a more limited signification than when I term it the sum of all the things given me by God; since in this sum many things are comprehended which only pertain to mind (and to these I do not refer in speaking of nature) such as the notion which I have of the fact that what has once been done cannot ever be undone and an infinitude of such things which I know by the light of nature 'without the help of the body'; and seeing that it comprehends many other matters besides which only pertain to body; and are no longer here contained under the name of nature; such as the quality of weight which it possesses and the like; with which I also do not deal; for in talking of nature I only treat of those things given by God to me as a being composed of mind and body。  But the nature here described truly teaches me to flee from things which cause the sensation of pain; and seek after the things which communicate to me the sentiment of pleasure and so forth; but I do not see that beyond this it teaches me that from those diverse sense… perceptions we should ever form any conclusion regarding things outside of us; without having 'carefully and maturely' mentally examined them beforehand。  For it seems to me that it is mind alone; and not mind and body in conjunction; that is requisite to a knowledge of the truth in regard to such things。  Thus; although a star makes no larger an impression on my eye than the flame of a little candle there is yet in me no real or positive propensity impelling me to believe that it is not greater than that flame; but I have judged it to be so from my earliest years; without any rational foundation。  And although in approaching fire I feel heat; and in approaching it a little too near I even feel pain; there is at the same time no reason in this which could persuade me that there is in the fire something resembling this heat any more than there is in it something resembling the pain; all that I have any reason to believe from this is; that there is something in it; whatever it may be; which excit

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