meditations on first philosophy-第16节
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But I am in the habit of imagining many other things besides this corporeal nature which is the object of pure mathematics； to wit； the colours； sounds； scents； pain； and other such things； although less distinctly。 And inasmuch as I perceive these things much better through the senses； by the medium of which； and by the memory； they seem to have reached my imagination； I believe that； in order to examine them more conveniently； it is right that I should at the same time investigate the nature of sense perception； and that I should see if from the ideas which I apprehend by this mode of thought； which I call feeling； I cannot derive some certain proof of the existence of corporeal objects。 And first of all I shall recall to my memory those matters which I hitherto held to be true； as having perceived them through the senses； and the foundations on which my belief has rested； in the next place I shall examine the reasons which have since obliged me to place them in doubt； in the last place I shall consider which of them I must now believe。 First of all； then； I perceived that I had a head； hands； feet； and all other members of which this body￥which I considered as a part； or possibly even as the whole； of myself￥is composed。 Further I was sensible that this body was placed amidst many others； from which it was capable of being affected in many different ways； beneficial and hurtful； and I remarked that a certain feeling of pleasure accompanied those that were beneficial； and pain those which were harmful。 And in addition to this pleasure and pain； I also experienced hunger； thirst； and other similar appetites； as also certain corporeal inclinations towards joy； sadness； anger； and other similar passions。 And outside myself； in addition to extension； figure； and motions of bodies； I remarked in them hardness； heat； and all other tactice qualities； and； further； light and colour； and scents and sounds； the variety of which gave me the means of distinguishing the sky； the earth； the sea； and generally all the other bodies； one from the other。 And certainly； considering the ideas of all these qualities which presented themselves to my mind； and which alone I perceived properly or immediately； it was not without reason that I believed myself to perceive objects quite different from my thought； to wit； bodies from which those ideas proceeded； for I found by experience that these ideas presented themselves to me without my consent being requisite； so that I could not perceive any object； however desirous I might be； unless it were present to the organs of sense； and it was not in my power not to perceive it； when it was present。 And because the ideas which I received through the senses were much more lively； more clear； and even； in their own way； more distinct than any of those which I could of myself frame in meditation； or than those I found impressed on my memory； it appeared as though they could not have proceeded from my mind； so that they must necessarily have been produced in me by some other things。 And having no knowledge of those objects excepting the knowledge which the ideas themselves gave me； nothing was more likely to occur to my mind than that the objects were similar to the ideas which were caused。 And because I likewise remembered that I had formerly made use of my senses rather than my reason； and recognised that the ideas which I formed of myself were not so distinct as those which I perceived through the senses； and that they were most frequently even composed of portions of these last； I persuaded myself easily that I had no idea in my mind which had not formerly come to me through the senses。 Nor was it without some reason that I believed that this body （which be a certain special right I call my own） belonged to me more properly and more strictly than any other； for in fact I could never be separated from it as from other bodies； I experienced in it and on account of it all my appetites and affections； and finally I was touched by the feeling of pain and the titillation of pleasure in its parts； and not in the parts of other bodies which were separated from it。 But when I inquired； why； from some； I know not what； painful sensation； there follows sadness of mind； and from the pleasurable sensation there arises joy； or why this mysterious pinching of the stomach which I call hunger causes me to desire to eat； and dryness of throat causes a desire to drink； and so on； I could give no reason excepting that nature taught me so； for there is certainly no affinity （that I at least can understand） between the craving of the stomach and the desire to eat； any more than between the perception of whatever causes pain and the thought of sadness which arises from this perception。 And in the same way it appeared to me that I had learned from nature all the other judgments which I formed regarding the objects of my senses； since I remarked that these judgments were formed in me before I had the leisure to weigh and consider any reasons which might oblige me to make them。 But afterwards many experiences little by little destroyed all the faith which I had rested in my senses； for I from time to time observed that those towers which from afar appeared to me to be round； more closely observed seemed square； and that colossal statues raised on the summit of these towers； appeared as quite tiny statues when viewed from the bottom； and so in an infinitude of other cases I found error in judgments founded on the external senses。 And not only in those founded on the external senses； but even in those founded on the internal as well； for is there anything more intimate or more internal than pain？ And yet I have learned from some persons whose arms or legs have been cut off； that they sometimes seemed to feel pain in the part which had been amputated； which made me think that I could not be quite certain that it was a certain member which pained me； even although I felt pain in it。 And to those grounds of doubt I have lately added two others； which are very general； the first is that I never have believed myself to feel anything in waking moments which I cannot also sometimes believe myself to feel when I sleep； and as I do not think that these things which I seem to feel in sleep； proceed from objects outside of me； I do not see any reason why I should have this belief regarding objects which I seem to perceive while awake。 The other was that being still ignorant； or rather supposing myself to be ignorant； of the author of my being； I saw nothing to prevent me from having been so constituted by nature that I might be deceived even in matters which seemed to me to be most certain。 And as to the grounds on which I was formerly persuaded of the truth of sensible objects； I had not much trouble in replying to them。 For since nature seemed to cause me to lean towards many things from which reason repelled me； I did not believe that I should trust much to the teachings of nature。 And although the ideas which I receive by the senses do not depend on my will； I did not think that one should for that reason conclude that they proceeded from things different from myself； since possibly some faculty might be discovered in me￥though hitherto unknown to me￥which produced them。 But now that I begin to know myself better； and to discover more clearly the author of my being； I do not in truth think that I should rashly admit all the matters which the senses seem to teach us； but； on the other hand； I do not think that I should doubt them all universally。 And first of all； because I know that all things which I apprehend clearly and distinctly can be created by God as I apprehend them； it suffices that I am able to apprehend one thing apart from another clearly and distinctly in order to be certain that the one is different from the other； since they may be made to exist in separation at least by the omnipotence of God； and it does not signify by what power this separation is made in order to compel me to judge them to be different： and； therefore； just because I know certainly that I exist； and that meanwhile I do not remark that any other thing necessarily pertains to my nature or essence； excepting that I am a thinking thing； I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thin ＇or a substance whose whole essence or nature is to think＇。 And although possibly （or rather certainly； as I shall say in a moment） I possess a body with which I am very intimately conjoined； yet because； on the one side； I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing； and as； on the other； I possess a distinct idea of body； inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing； it is certain that this I ＇that is to say； my soul by which I am what I am＇； is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body； and can exist without it。 I further find in myself faculties imploying modes of thinking peculiar to themselves； to wit； the faculties of imagination and feeling； without which I can easily conceive myself clearly and distinctly as a complete being； while； on the other hand； they cannot be so conceived apart from me； that is without an intellig
