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 of the other。  And as regards God; if my mind were not pre…occupied with prejudices; and if my thought did not find itself on all hands diverted by the continual pressure of sensible things; there would be nothing which I could know more immediately and more easily than Him。  For is there anything more manifest than that there is a God; that is to say; a Supreme Being; to whose essence alone existence pertains?21      And although for a firm grasp of this truth I have need of a strenuous application of mind; at present I not only feel myself to be as assured of it as of all that I hold as most certain; but I also remark that the certainty of all other things depends on it so absolutely; that without this knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly。      For although I am of such a nature that as long as22 I understand anything very clearly and distinctly; I am naturally impelled to believe it to be true; yet because I am also of such a nature that I cannot have my mind constantly fixed on the same object in order to perceive it clearly; and as I often recollect having formed a past judgment without at the same time properly recollecting the reasons that led me to make it; it may happen meanwhile that other reasons present themselves to me; which would easily cause me to change my opinion; if I were ignorant of the facts of the existence of God; and thus I should have no true and certain knowledge; but only vague and vacillating opinions。  Thus; for example; when I consider the nature of a 'rectilinear' triangle; I who have some little knowledge of the principles of geometry recognise quite clearly that the three angles are equal to two right angles; and it is not possible for me not to believe this so long as I apply my mind to its demonstration; but so soon as I abstain from attending to the proof; although I still recollect having clearly comprehended it; it may easily occur that I come to doubt its truth; if I am ignorant of there being a God。  For I can persuade myself of having been so constituted by nature that I can easily deceive myself even in those matters which I believe myself to apprehend with the greatest evidence and certainty; especially when I recollect that I have frequently judged matters to be true and certain which other reasons have afterwards impelled me to judge to be altogether false。      But after I have recognised that there is a God¥because at the same time I have also recognised that all things depend upon Him; and that He is not a deceiver; and from that have inferred that what I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to be true¥although I no longer pay attention to the reasons for which I have judged this to be true; provided that I recollect having clearly and distinctly perceived it no contrary reason can be brought forward which could ever cause me to doubt of its truth; and thus I have a true and certain knowledge of it。  And this same knowledge extends likewise to all other things which I recollect having formerly demonstrated; such as the truths of geometry and the like; for what can be alleged against them to cause me to place them in doubt?  Will it be said that my nature is such as to cause me to be frequently deceived?  But I already know that I cannot be deceived in the judgment whose grounds I know clearly。 Will it be said that I formerly held many things to be true and certain which I have afterwards recognised to be false? But I had not had any clear and distinct knowledge of these things; and not as yet knowing the rule whereby I assure myself of the truth; I had been impelled to give my assent from reasons which I have since recognised to be less strong than I had at the time imagined them to be。  What further objection can then be raised?  That possibly I am dreaming (an objection I myself made a little while ago); or that all the thoughts which I now have are no more true than the phantasies of my dreams?  But even though I slept the case would be the same; for all that is clearly present to my mind is absolutely true。      And so I very clearly recognise that the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends alone on the knowledge of the true God; in so much that; before I knew Him; I could not have a perfect knowledge of any other thing。  And now that I know Him I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of an infinitude of things; not only of those which relate to God Himself and other intellectual matters; but also of those which pertain to corporeal nature in so far as it is the object of pure mathematics 'which have no concern with whether it exists or not'。                               Meditation VI。                                        Of the Existence of Material Things; and of the real         distinction between the Soul and Body of Man。

     Nothing further now remains but to inquire whether material things exist。  And certainly I at least know that these may exist in so far as they are considered as the objects of pure mathematics; since in this aspect I perceive them clearly and distinctly。  For there is no doubt that God possesses the power to produce everything that I am capable of perceiving with distinctness; and I have never deemed that anything was impossible for Him; unless I found a contradiction in attempting to conceive it clearly。  Further; the faculty of imagination which I possess; and of which; experience tells me; I make use when I apply myself to the consideration of material things; is capable of persuading me of their existence; for when I attentively consider what imagination is; I find that it is nothing but a certain application of the faculty of knowledge to the body which is immediately present to it; and which therefore exists。      And to render this quite clear; I remark in the first place the difference that exists between the imagination and pure intellection 'or conception23'。  For example; when I imagine a triangle; I do not conceive it only as a figure comprehended by three lines; but I also apprehend24 these three lines as present by the power and inward vision of my mind;25 and this is what I call imagining。  But if I desire to think of a chiliagon; I certainly conceive truly that it is a figure composed of a thousand sides; just as easily as I conceive of a triangle that it is a figure of three sides only; but I cannot in any way imagine the thousand sides of a chiliagon 'as I do the three sides of a triangle'; nor do I; so to speak; regard them as present 'with the eyes of my mind'。  And although in accordance with the habit I have formed of always employing the aid of my imagination when I think of corporeal things; it may happen that in imagining a chiliagon I confusedly represent to myself some figure; yet it is very evident that this figure is not a chiliagon; since it in no way differs from that which I represent to myself when I think of a myriagon or any other many…sided figure; nor does it serve my purpose in discovering the properties which go to form the distinction between a chiliagon and other polygons。 But if the question turns upon a pentagon; it is quite true that I can conceive its figure as well as that of a chiliagon without the help of my imagination; but I can also imagine it by applying the attention of my mind to each of its five sides; and at the same time to the space which they enclose。 And thus I clearly recognise that I have need of a particular effort of mind in order to effect the act of imagination; such as I do not require in order to understand; and this particular effort of mind clearly manifests the difference which exists between imagination and pure intellection。26      I remark besides that this power of imagination which is in one; inasmuch as it differs from the power of understanding; is in no wise a necessary element in my nature; or in 'my essence; that is to say; in' the essence of my mind; for although I did not possess it I should doubtless ever remain the same as I now am; from which it appears that we might conclude that it depends on something which differs from me。  And I easily conceive that if some body exists with which my mind is conjoined and united in such a way that it can apply itself to consider it when it pleases; it may be that by this means it can imagine corporeal objects; so that this mode of thinking differs from pure intellection only inasmuch as mind in its intellectual activity in some manner turns on itself; and considers some of the ideas which it possesses in itself; while in imagining it turns towards the body; and there beholds in it something conformable to the idea which it has either conceived of itself or perceived by the senses。  I easily understand; I say; that the imagination could be thus constituted if it is true that body exists; and because I can discover no other convenient mode of explaining it; I conjecture with probability that body does exist; but this is only with probability; and although I examine all things with care; I nevertheless do not find that from this distinct idea of corporeal nature; which I have in my imagination; I can derive any argument from which there will necessarily be deduced the existence of body。      But I am in the habit of imagining many other things besides this corporeal nature which is the 

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