meditations on first philosophy-第13节
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nature； or whether both are not simply the same thing； and I here suppose that I do not yet know any reason to persuade me to adopt the one belief rather than the other。 From this it follows that I am entirely indifferent as to which of the two I affirm or deny； or even whether I abstain from forming any judgment in the matter。 And this indifference does not only extend to matters as to which the understanding has no knowledge； but also in general to all those which are not apprehended with perfect clearness at the moment when the will is deliberating upon them： for； however probable are the conjectures which render me disposed to form a judgment respecting anything； the simple knowledge that I have that those are conjectures alone and not certain and indubitable reasons； suffices to occasion me to judge the contrary。 Of this I have had great experience of late when I set aside as false all that I had formerly held to be absolutely true； for the sole reason that I remarked that it might in some measure be doubted。 But if I abstain from giving my judgment on any thing when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness； it is plain that I act rightly and am not deceived。 But if I determine to deny or affirm； I no longer make use as I should of my free will； and if I affirm what is not true； it is evident that I deceive myself； even though I judge according to truth； this comes about only by chance； and I do not escape the blame of misusing my freedom； for the light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding should always precede the determination of the will。 And it is in the misuse of the free will that the privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error is met with。 Privation； I say； is found in the act； in so far as it proceeds from me； but it is not found in the faculty which I have received from God； nor even in the act in so far as it depends on Him。 For I have certainly no cause to complain that God has not given me an intelligence which is more powerful； or a natural light which is stronger than that which I have received from Him； since it is proper to the finite understanding not to comprehend a multitude of things； and it is proper to a created understanding to be finite； on the contrary； I have every reason to render thanks to God who owes me nothing and who has given me all the perfections I possess； and I should be far from charging Him with injustice； and with having deprived me of； or wrongfully withheld from me； these perfections which He has not bestowed upon me。 I have further no reason to complain that He has given me a will more ample than my understanding； for since the will consists only of one single element； and is so to speak indivisible； it appears that its nature is such that nothing can be abstracted from it ＇without destroying it＇； and certainly the more comprehensive it is found to be； the more reason I have to render gratitude to the giver。 And； finally； I must also not complain that God concurs with me in forming the acts of the will； that is the judgment in which I go astray； because these acts are entirely true and good； inasmuch as they depend on God； and in a certain sense more perfection accrues to my nature from the fact that I can form them； than if I could not do so。 As to the privation in which alone the formal reason of error or sin consists； it has no need of any concurrence from God； since it is not a thing ＇or an existence＇； and since it is not related to God as to a cause； but should be termed merely a negation ＇according to the significance given to these words in the Schools＇。 For in fact it is not an imperfection in God that He has given me the liberty to give or withhold my assent from certain things as to which He has not placed a clear and distinct knowledge in my understanding； but it is without doubt an imperfection in me not to make a good use of my freedom； and to give my judgment readily on matters which I only understand obscurely。 I nevertheless perceive that God could easily have created me so that I never should err； although I still remained free； and endowed with a limited knowledge； viz。 by giving to my understanding a clear and distinct intelligence of all things as to which I should ever have to deliberate； or simply by His engraving deeply in my memory the resolution never to form a judgment on anything without having a clear and distinct understanding of it； so that I could never forget it。 And it is easy for me to understand that； in so far as I consider myself alone； and as if there were only myself in the world； I should have been much more perfect than I am； if God had created me so that I could never err。 Nevertheless I cannot deny that in some sense it is a greater perfection in the whole universe that certain parts should not be exempt from error as others are than that all parts should be exactly similar。 And I have no right to complain if God； having placed me in the world； has not called upon me to play a part that excels all others in distinction and perfection。 And further I have reason to be glad on the ground that if He has not given me the power of never going astray by the first means pointed out above； which depends on a clear and evident knowledge of all the things regarding which I can deliberate； He has at least left within my power the other means； which is firmly to adhere to the resolution never to give judgment on matters whose truth is not clearly known to me； for although I notice a certain weakness in my nature in that I cannot continually concentrate my mind on one single thought； I can yet； by attentive and frequently repeated meditation； impress it so forcibly on my memory that I shall never fail to recollect it whenever I have need of it； and thus acquire the habit of never going astray。 And inasmuch as it is in this that the greatest and principal perfection of man consists； it seems to me that I have not gained little by this day's Meditation； since I have discovered the source of falsity and error。 And certainly there can be no other source than that which I have explained； for as often as I so restrain my will within the limits of my knowledge that it forms no judgment except on matters which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding； I can never be deceived； for every clear and distinct conception20 is without doubt something； and hence cannot derive its origin from what is nought； but must of necessity have God as its author￥God； I say； who being supremely perfect； cannot be the cause of any error； and consequently we must conclude that such a conception ＇or such a judgment＇ is true。 Nor have I only learned to…day what I should avoid in order that I may not err； but also how I should act in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth； for without doubt I shall arrive at this end if I devote my attention sufficiently to those things which I perfectly understand； and if I separate from these that which I only understand confusedly and with obscurity。 To these I shall henceforth diligently give heed。 Meditation V。 Of the essence of material things； and； again； of God； that He exists。
Many other matters respecting the attributes of God and my own nature or mind remain for consideration； but I shall possibly on another occasion resume the investigation of these。 Now （after first noting what must be done or avoided； in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth） my principal task is to endeavour to emerge from the state of doubt into which I have these last days fallen； and to see whether nothing certain can be known regarding material things。 But before examining whether any such objects as I conceive exist outside of me； I must consider the ideas of them in so far as they are in my thought； and see which of them are distinct and which confused。 In the first place； I am able distinctly to imagine that quantity which philosophers commonly call continuous； or the extension in length； breadth； or depth； that is in this quantity； or rather in the object to which it is attributed。 Further； I can number in it many different parts； and attribute to each of its parts many sorts of size； figure； situation and local movement； and； finally； I can assign to each of these movements all degrees of duration。 And not only do I know these things with distinctness when I consider them in general； but； likewise ＇however little I apply my attention to the matter＇； I discover an infinitude of particulars respecting numbers； figures； movements； and other such things； whose truth is so manifest； and so well accords with my nature； that when I begin to discover them； it seems to me that I learn nothing new； or recollect what I formerly knew￥that is to say； that I for the first time perceive things which were already present to my mind； although I had not as yet applied my mind to them。 And what I here find to be most important is that I discover in myself an infinitude of ideas of certain things which cannot be esteemed as pure negations； although they may possibly have no existence outside of my thought； and which are not
