meditations on first philosophy-第12节
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d non…being； that there is in truth nothing in me that can lead to error in so far as a sovereign Being has formed me； but that； as I in some degree participate likewise in nought or in non…being； i。e。 in so far as I am not myself the supreme Being； and as I find myself subject to an infinitude of imperfections； I ought not to be astonished if I should fall into error。 Thus do I recognise that error； in so far as it is such； is not a real thing depending on God； but simply a defect； and therefore； in order to fall into it； that I have no need to possess a special faculty given me by God for this very purpose； but that I fall into error from the fact that the power given me by God for the purpose of distinguishing truth from error is not infinite。 Nevertheless this does not quite satisfy me； for error is not a pure negation ＇i。e。 is not the dimple defect or want of some perfection which ought not to be mine＇； but it is a lack of some knowledge which it seems that I ought to possess。 And on considering the nature of God it does not appear to me possible that He should have given me a faculty which is not perfect of its kind； that is； which is wanting in some perfection due to it。 For if it is true that the more skilful the artizan； the more perfect is the work of his hands； what can have been produced by this supreme Creator of all things that is not in all its parts perfect？ And certainly there is no doubt that God could have created me so that I could never have been subject to error； it is also certain that He ever wills what is best； is it then better that I should be subject to err than that I should not？ In considering this more attentively； it occurs to me in the first place that I should not be astonished if my intelligence is not capable of comprehending why God acts as He does； and that there is thus no reason to doubt of His existence from the fact that I may perhaps find many other things besides this as to which I am able to understand neither for what reason nor how God has produced them。 For； in the first place； knowing that my nature is extremely feeble and limited； and that the nature of God is on the contrary immense； incomprehensible； and infinite； I have no further difficulty in recognising that there is an infinitude of matter in His power； the causes of which transcend my knowledge； and this reason suffices to convince me that the species of cause termed final； finds no useful employment in physical ＇or natural＇ things； for it does not appear to me that I can without temerity seek to investigate the ＇inscrutable＇ ends of God。 It further occurs to me that we should not consider one single creature separately； when we inquire as to whether the works of God are perfect； but should regard all his creations together。 For the same thing which might possibly seem very imperfect with some semblance of reason if regarded by itself； is found to be very perfect if regarded as part of the whole universe； and although； since I resolved to doubt all things； I as yet have only known certainly my own existence and that of God； nevertheless since I have recognised the infinite power of God； I cannot deny that He may have produced many other things； or at least that He has the power of producing them； so that I may obtain a place as a part of a great universe。 Whereupon； regarding myself more closely； and considering what are my errors （for they alone testify to there being any imperfection in me）； I answer that they depend on a combination of two causes； to wit； on the faculty of knowledge that rests in me； and on the power of choice or of free will￥that is to say； of the understanding and at the same time of the will。 For by the understanding alone I ＇neither assert nor deny anything； but＇ apprehend19 the ideas of things as to which I can form a judgment。 But no error is properly speaking found in it； provided the word error is taken in its proper signification； and though there is possibly an infinitude of things in the world of which I have no idea in my understanding； we cannot for all that say that it is deprived of these ideas ＇as we might say of something which is required by its nature＇； but simply it does not possess these； because in truth there is no reason to prove that God should have given me a greater faculty of knowledge than He has given me； and however skillful a workman I represent Him to be； I should not for all that consider that He was bound to have placed in each of His works all the perfections which He may have been able to place in some。 I likewise cannot complain that God has not given me a free choice or a will which is sufficient； ample and perfect； since as a matter of fact I am conscious of a will so extended as to be subject to no limits。 And what seems to me very remarkable in this regard is that of all the qualities which I possess there is no one so perfect and so comprehensive that I do not very clearly recognise that it might be yet greater and more perfect。 For； to take an example； if I consider the faculty of comprehension which I possess； I find that it is of very small extent and extremely limited； and at the same time I find the idea of another faculty much more ample and even infinite； and seeing that I can form the idea of it； I recognise from this very fact that it pertains to the nature of God。 If in the same way I examine the memory； the imagination； or some other faculty； I do not find any which is not small and circumscribed； while in God it is immense ＇or infinite＇。 It is free…will alone or liberty of choice which I find to be so great in me that I can conceive no other idea to be more great； it is indeed the case that it is for the most part this will that causes me to know that in some manner I bear the image and similitude of God。 For although the power of will is incomparably greater in God than in me； both by reason of the knowledge and the power which； conjoined with it； render it stronger and more efficacious； and by reason of its object； inasmuch as in God it extends to a great many things； it nevertheless does not seem to me greater if I consider it formally and precisely in itself： for the faculty of will consists alone in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it （that is； to affirm or deny； to pursue or to shun it）； or rather it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm or deny； pursue or shun those things placed before us by the understanding； we act so that we are unconscious that any outside force constrains us in doing so。 For in order that I should be free it is not necessary that I should be indifferent as to the choice of one or the other of two contraries； but contrariwise the more I lean to the one￥whether I recognise clearly that the reasons of the good and true are to be found in it； or whether God so disposes my inward thought￥the more freely do I choose and embrace it。 And undoubtedly both divine grace and natural knowledge； far from diminishing my liberty； rather increase it and strengthen it。 Hence this indifference which I feel； when I am not swayed to one side rather than to the other by lack of reason； is the lowest grade of liberty； and rather evinces a lack or negation in knowledge than a perfection of will： for if I always recognised clearly what was true and good； I should never have trouble in deliberating as to what judgment or choice I should make； and then I should be entirely free without ever being indifferent。 From all this I recognise that the power of will which I have received from God is not of itself the source of my errors￥for it is very ample and very perfect of its kind￥any more than is the power of understanding； for since I understand nothing but by the power which God has given me for understanding； there is no doubt that all that I understand； I understand as I ought； and it is not possible that I err in this。 Whence then come my errors？ They come from the sole fact that since the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding； I do not restrain it within the same bounds； but extend it also to things which I do not understand： and as the will is of itself indifferent to these； it easily falls into error and sin； and chooses the evil for the good； or the false for the true。 For example； when I lately examined whether anything existed in the world； and found that from the very fact that I considered this question it followed very clearly that I myself existed； I could not prevent myself from believing that a thing I so clearly conceived was true： not that I found myself compelled to do so by some external cause； but simply because from great clearness in my mind there followed a great inclination of my will； and I believed this with so much the greater freedom or spontaneity as I possessed the less indifference towards it。 Now； on the contrary； I not only know that I exist； inasmuch as I am a thinking thing； but a certain representation of corporeal nature is also presented to my mind； and it comes to pass that I doubt whether this thinking nature which is in me； or rather by which I am what I am； differs from this corporeal nature； or whether both are not simply the same thing； and I here suppose that I do not yet know any
