meditations on first philosophy-第10节
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； immutable＇； independent； all…knowing； all…powerful； and by which I myself and everything else； if anything else does exist； have been created。 Now all these characteristics are such that the more diligently I attend to them； the less do they appear capable of proceeding from me alone； hence； from what has been already said； we must conclude that God necessarily exists。 For although the idea of substance is within me owing to the fact that I am substance； nevertheless I should not have the idea of an infinite substance￥since I am finite￥if it had not proceeded from some substance which was veritably infinite。 Nor should I imagine that I do not perceive the infinite by a true idea； but only by the negation of the finite； just as I perceive repose and darkness by the negation of movement and of light； for； on the contrary； I see that there is manifestly more reality in infinite substance than in finite； and therefore that in some way I have in me the notion of the infinite earlier then the finite￥to wit； the notion of God before that of myself。 For how would it be possible that I should know that I doubt and desire； that is to say； that something is lacking to me； and that I am not quite perfect； unless I had within me some idea of a Being more perfect than myself； in comparison with which I should recognise the deficiencies of my nature？ And we cannot say that this idea of God is perhaps materially false and that consequently I can derive it from nought ＇i。e。 that possibly it exists in me because I am imperfect＇； as I have just said is the case with ideas of heat； cold and other such things； for； on the contrary； as this idea is very clear and distinct and contains within it more objective reality than any other； there can be none which is of itself more true； nor any in which there can be less suspicion of falsehood。 The idea； I say； of this Being who is absolutely perfect and infinite； is entirely true； for although； perhaps； we can imagine that such a Being does not exist； we cannot nevertheless imagine that His idea represents nothing real to me； as I have said of the idea of cold。 This idea is also very clear and distinct； since all that I conceive clearly and distinctly of the real and the true； and of what conveys some perfection； is in its entirety contained in this idea。 And this does not cease to be true although I do not comprehend the infinite； or though in God there is an infinitude of things which I cannot comprehend； nor possibly even reach in any way by thought； for it is of the nature of the infinite that my nature； which is finite and limited； should not comprehend it； and it is sufficient that I should understand this； and that I should judge that all things which I clearly perceive and in which I know that there is some perfection； and possibly likewise an infinitude of properties of which I am ignorant； are in God formally or eminently； so that the idea which I have of Him may become the most true； most clear； and most distinct of all the ideas that are in my mind。 But possibly I am something more than I suppose myself to be； and perhaps all those perfections which I attribute to God are in some way potentially in me； although they do not yet disclose themselves； or issue in action。 As a matter of fact I am already sensible that my knowledge increases ＇and perfects itself＇ little by little； and I see nothing which can prevent it from increasing more and more into infinitude； nor do I see； after it has thus been increased ＇or perfected＇； anything to prevent my being able to acquire by its means all the other perfections of the Divine nature； nor finally why the power I have of acquiring these perfections； if it really exists in me； shall not suffice to produce the ideas of them。 At the same time I recognise that this cannot be。 For； in the first place； although it were true that every day my knowledge acquired new degrees of perfection； and that there were in my nature many things potentially which are not yet there actually； nevertheless these excellences do not pertain to ＇or make the smallest approach to＇ the idea which I have of God in whom there is nothing merely potential ＇but in whom all is present really and actually＇； for it is an infallible token of imperfection in my knowledge that it increases little by little。 and further； although my knowledge grows more and more； nevertheless I do not for that reason believe that it can ever be actually infinite； since it can never reach a point so high that it will be unable to attain to any greater increase。 But I understand God to be actually infinite； so that He can add nothing to His supreme perfection。 And finally I perceive that the objective being of an idea cannot be produced by a being that exists potentially only； which properly speaking is nothing； but only by a being which is formal or actual。 To speak the truth； I see nothing in all that I have just said which by the light of nature is not manifest to anyone who desires to think attentively on the subject； but when I slightly relax my attention； my mind； finding its vision somewhat obscured and so to speak blinded by the images of sensible objects； I do not easily recollect the reason why the idea that I possess of a being more perfect then I； must necessarily have been placed in me by a being which is really more perfect； and this is why I wish here to go on to inquire whether I； who have this idea； can exist if no such being exists。 And I ask； from whom do I then derive my existence？ Perhaps from myself or from my parents； or from some other source less perfect than God； for we can imagine nothing more perfect than God； or even as perfect as He is。 But ＇were I independent of every other and＇ were I myself the author of my being； I should doubt nothing and I should desire nothing； and finally no perfection would be lacking to me； for I should have bestowed on myself every perfection of which I possessed any idea and should thus be God。 And it must not be imagined that those things that are lacking to me are perhaps more difficult of attainment than those which I already possess； for； on the contrary； it is quite evident that it was a matter of much greater difficulty to bring to pass that I； that is to say； a thing or a substance that thinks； should emerge out of nothing； than it would be to attain to the knowledge of many things of which I am ignorant； and which are only the accidents of this thinking substance。 But it is clear that if I had of myself possessed this greater perfection of which I have just spoken ＇that is to say； if I had been the author of my own existence＇； I should not at least have denied myself the things which are the more easy to acquire ＇to wit； many branches of knowledge of which my nature is destitute＇； nor should I have deprived myself of any of the things contained in the idea which I form of God； because there are none of them which seem to me specially difficult to acquire： and if there were any that were more difficult to acquire； they would certainly appear to me to be such （supposing I myself were the origin of the other things which I possess） since I should discover in them that my powers were limited。 But though I assume that perhaps I have always existed just as I am at present； neither can I escape the force of this reasoning； and imagine that the conclusion to be drawn from this is； that I need not seek for any author of my existence。 For all the course of my life may be divided into an infinite number of parts； none of which is in any way dependent on the other； and thus from the fact that I was in existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence now； unless some cause at this instant； so to speak； produces me anew； that is to say； conserves me。 It is as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those who consider with attention the nature of time； that； in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures； a substance has need of the same power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew； supposing it did not yet exist； so that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a distinction of the reason。 All that I thus require here is that I should interrogate myself； if I wish to know whether I possess a power which is capable of bringing it to pass that I who now am shall still be in the future； for since I am nothing but a thinking thing； or at least since thus far it is only this portion of myself which is precisely in question at present； if such a power did reside in me； I should certainly be conscious of it。 But I am conscious of nothing of the kind； and by this I know clearly that I depend on some being different from myself。 Possibly； however； this being on which I depend is not that which I call God； and I am created either by my parents or by some other cause less perfect than God。 This cannot be； because； as I have just said； it is perfectly evident that there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect； and thus since I am a thinking thing； and possess an idea of God within me； whatever in the end be the cause assigned to my existence； it must be a
