philebus-第9节
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often have a vision of a heap of gold； and pleasures ensuing； and in
the picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over
his good fortune。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And may we not say that the good； being friends of the gods；
have generally true pictures presented to them； and the bad false
pictures？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 The bad； too； have pleasures painted in their fancy as well
as the good； but I presume that they are false pleasures。
Pro。 They are。
Soc。 The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures； and the
good in true pleasures？
Pro。 Doubtless。
Soc。 Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of
men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true； and there are pains
of a similar character？
Pro。 There are。
Soc。 And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a
real opinion； but often about things which had no existence either
in the past； present； or future？
Pro。 Quite true。
Soc。 And this was the source of false opinion and opining； am I
not right？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real
but illusory character？
Pro。 How do you mean？
Soc。 I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real
pleasure； who is pleased with anything or anyhow； and he may be
pleased about things which neither have nor have ever had any real
existence； and； more often than not； are never likely to exist。
Pro。 Yes； Socrates； that again is undeniable。
Soc。 And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like；
are they not often false？
Pro。 Quite so。
Soc。 And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are
true or false？
Pro。 In no other way。
Soc。 Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as
they are false。
Pro。 Nay； Socrates； that is the very opposite of truth； for no one
would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false； but by
reason of some other great corruption to which they are liable。
Soc。 Well； of pleasures which are and caused by corruption we will
hereafter speak； if we care to continue the enquiry； for the present I
would rather show by another argument that there are many false
pleasures existing or coming into existence in us； because this may
assist our final decision。
Pro。 Very true； that is to say； if there are such pleasures。
Soc。 I think that there are； Protarchus； but this is an opinion
which should be well assured； and not rest upon a mere assertion。
Pro。 Very good。
Soc。 Then now； like wrestlers； let us approach and grasp this new
argument。
Pro。 Proceed。
Soc。 We were maintaining a little while since； that when desires； as
they are termed； exist in us； then the body has separate feelings
apart from the soul…do you remember？
Pro。 Yes； I remember that you said so。
Soc。 And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the
bodily state； while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain
which was experienced。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 Then now you may infer what happens in such cases。
Pro。 What am I to infer？
Soc。 That in such cases pleasure and pains come simultaneously；
and there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which
correspond to them； as has been already shown。
Pro。 Clearly。
Soc。 And there is another point to which we have agreed。
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less； and that
they are of the class of infinites。
Pro。 Certainly； we said so。
Soc。 But how can we rightly judge of them？
Pro。 How can we？
Soc。 It is our intention to judge of their comparative importance
and intensity； measuring pleasure against pain； and pain against pain；
and pleasure against pleasure？
Pro。 Yes； such is our intention； and we shall judge of them
accordingly。
Soc。 Well； take the case of sight。 Does not the nearness or distance
of magnitudes obscure their true proportions； and make us opine
falsely； and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of
pleasures and pains？
Pro。 Yes； Socrates； and in a degree far greater。
Soc。 Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were
saying before。
Pro。 What was that？
Soc。 Then the opinions were true and false； and infected the
pleasures and pains with their own falsity。
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false
because they are seen at various distances； and subjected to
comparison； the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement
when placed side by side with the pains； and the pains when placed
side by side with the pleasures。
Pro。 Certainly； and for the reason which you mention。
Soc。 And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element
which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are：
you will acknowledge that this element is illusory； and you will never
say that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is
real or true。
Pro。 Certainly not。
Soc。 Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find
pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings； which are
still more false than these。
Pro。 What are they； and how shall we find them？
Soc。 If I am not mistaken； I have often repeated that pains and
aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a
corruption of nature caused by concretions； and dissolutions； and
repletions； and evacuations； and also by growth and decay？
Pro。 Yes； that has been often said。
Soc。 And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural
state is pleasure？
Pro。 Right。
Soc。 But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body
experiences none of these changes。
Pro。 When can that be； Socrates？
Soc。 Your question； Protarchus； does not help the argument。
Pro。 Why not； Socrates？
Soc。 Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine。
Pro。 And what was that？
Soc。 Why； Protarchus； admitting that there is no such interval； I
may ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were？
Pro。 You mean； what would happen if the body were not changed either
for good or bad？
Soc。 Yes。
Pro。 Why then； Socrates； I should suppose that there would be
neither pleasure nor pain。
Soc。 Very good； but still； if I am not mistaken； you do assert
that we must always be experiencing one of them； that is what the wise
tell us； for； say they； all things are ever flowing up and down。
Pro。 Yes； and their words are of no mean authority。
Soc。 Of course； for they are no mean authorities themselves； and I
should like to avoid the brunt of their argument。 Shall I tell you how
I mean to escape from them？ And you shall be the partner of my flight。
Pro。 How？
Soc。 To them we will say： 〃Good； but are we； or living things in
general； always conscious of what happens to us…for example； of our
growth； or the like？ Are we not； on the contrary； almost wholly
unconscious of this and similar phenomena？〃 You must answer for them。
Pro。 The latter alternative is the true one。
Soc。 Then we were not right in saying； just now； that motions
going up and down cause pleasures and pains？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be…
Pro。 What？
Soc。 If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains；
but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither。
Pro。 That； Socrates； is the more correct mode of speaking。
Soc。 But if this be true； the life to which I was just now referring
again appears。
Pro。 What life？
Soc。 The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of
joy。
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 We may assume then that there are three lives； one pleasant；
one painful； and the third which is neither； what say you？
Pro。 I should say as you do that there are three of them。
Soc。 But if so； the negation of pain will not be the same with
pleasure。
Pro。 Certainly not。
Soc。 Then when you hear a person saying； that always to live without
pain is the pleasantest of all things； what would you understand him
to mean by that statement？
Pro。 I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain。
Soc。 Let us take any three things； or suppose that we embellish a
little and call the first gold； the second silver； and there shall
be a third which is neither。
Pro。 Very good。
Soc。 Now； can that which is neither be either gold or silver？
Pro。 Impossible。
Soc。 No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or
reasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful。
