philebus-第8节
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inferred that the double experience was the single case possible。
Pro。 Quite true； Socrates。
Soc。 Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the
occasion of raising a question？
Pro。 What question？
Soc。 Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which
we are speaking are true or false？ or some true and some false？
Pro。 But how； Socrates； can there be false pleasures and pains？
Soc。 And how； Protarchus； can there be true and false fears； or true
and false expectations； or true and false opinions？
Pro。 I grant that opinions may be true or false； but not pleasures。
Soc。 What do you mean？ I am afraid that we are raising a very
serious enquiry。
Pro。 There I agree。
Soc。 And yet； my boy； for you are one of Philebus' boys； the point
to be considered； is； whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument。
Pro。 Surely。
Soc。 No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed； what is
said should be pertinent。
Pro。 Right。
Soc。 I am always wondering at the question which has now been
raised。
Pro。 How so？
Soc。 Do you deny that some pleasures are false； and others true？
Pro。 To be sure I do。
Soc。 Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did
not rejoice； or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain；
sleeping or waking； mad or lunatic？
Pro。 So we have always held； Socrates。
Soc。 But were you right？ Shall we enquire into the truth of your
opinion？
Pro。 I think that we should。
Soc。 Let us then put into more precise terms the question which
has arisen about pleasure and opinion。 Is there such a thing as
opinion？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And such a thing as pleasure？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And an opinion must of something？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And a man must be pleased by something？
Pro。 Quite correct。
Soc。 And whether the opinion be right or wrong； makes no difference；
it will still be an opinion？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And he who is pleased； whether he is rightly pleased or not
will always have a real feeling of pleasure？
Pro。 Yes； that is also quite true。
Soc。 Then； how can opinion be both true and false； and pleasure true
only； although pleasure and opinion are both equally real？
Pro。 Yes； that is the question。
Soc。 You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood； and
hence becomes not merely opinion； but opinion of a certain quality；
and this is what you think should be examined？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And further； even if we admit the existence of qualities in
other objects； may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of
quality？
Pro。 Clearly。
Soc。 But there is no difficulty in seeing that Pleasure and pain
as well as opinion have qualities； for they are great or small； and
have various degrees of intensity； as was indeed said long ago by us。
Pro。 Quite true。
Soc。 And if badness attaches to any of them； Protarchus； then we
should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure？
Pro。 Quite true； Socrates。
Soc。 And if rightness attaches to any of them； should we not speak
of a right opinion or right pleasure； and in like manner of the
reverse of rightness？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And if the thing opined be erroneous； might we not say that
opinion； being erroneous； is not right or rightly opined？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its
object； shall we call that right or good； or by any honourable name？
Pro。 Not if the pleasure is mistaken； how could we？
Soc。 And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which
is not true； but false？
Pro。 Certainly it does； and in that case； Socrates； as we were
saying； the opinion is false； but no one could call the actual
pleasure false。
Soc。 How eagerly； Protarchus； do you rush to the defence of
pleasure！
Pro。 Nay； Socrates； I only repeat what I hear。
Soc。 And is there no difference； my friend； between that pleasure
which is associated with right opinion and knowledge； and that which
is often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance？
Pro。 There must be a very great difference； between them。
Soc。 Then； now let us proceed to contemplate this difference。
Pro。 Lead； and I will follow。
Soc。 Well； then； my view is…
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 We agree…do we not？…that there is such a thing as false； and
also such a thing as true opinion？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And pleasure and pain； as I was just now saying； are often
consequent upon these upon true and false opinion； I mean。
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion
always spring from memory and perception？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature？
Pro。 Of what nature？
Soc。 An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly； and
the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees。
Pro。 Very likely。
Soc。 Soon he begins to interrogate himself。
Pro。 In what manner？
Soc。 He asks himself…〃What is that which appears to be standing by
the rock under the tree？〃 This is the question which he may be
supposed to put to himself when he sees such an appearance。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 To which he may guess the right answer； saying as if in a
whisper to himself…〃It is a man。〃
Pro。 Very good。
Soc。 Or again； he may be misled； and then he will say…〃No； it is a
figure made by the shepherds。〃
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And if he has a companion； he repeats his thought to him in
articulate sounds； and what was before an opinion； has now become a
proposition。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him； he
may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time。
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 Well； now； I wonder whether； you would agree in my
explanation of this phenomenon。
Pro。 What is your explanation？
Soc。 I think that the soul at such times is like a book。
Pro。 How so？
Soc。 Memory and perception meet； and they and their attendant
feelings seem to almost to write down words in the soul； and when
the inscribing feeling writes truly； then true opinion and true
propositions which are the expressions of opinion come into our
souls…but when the scribe within us writes falsely； the result is
false。
Pro。 I quite assent and agree to your statement their
Soc。 I must bespeak your favour also for another artist； who is busy
at the same time in the chambers of the soul。
Pro。 Who is he？
Soc。 The painter； who； after the scribe has done his work； draws
images in the soul of the things which he has described。
Pro。 But when and how does he do this？
Soc。 When a man； besides receiving from sight or some other sense
certain opinions or statements； sees in his mind the images of the
subjects of them；…is not this a very common mental phenomenom？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And the images answering to true opinions and words are true；
and to false opinions and words false； are they not？
Pro。 They are。
Soc。 If we are right so far； there arises a further question。
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only
in relation to the present and the past； or in relation to the
future also？
Pro。 I should say in relation to all times alike。
Soc。 Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described
already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones； from
which we may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do
with the future？
Pro。 Most true。
Soc。 And do all those writings and paintings which； as we were
saying a little while ago； are produced in us； relate to the past
and present only； and not to the future？
Pro。 To the future； very much。
Soc。 When you say； 〃Very much；〃 you mean to imply that all these
representations are hopes about the future； and that mankind are
filled with； hopes in every stage of existence？
Pro。 Exactly。
Soc。 Answer me another question。
Pro。 What question？
Soc。 A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods； is
he not？
Pro。 Certainly he is。
Soc。 And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 And all men； as we were saying just now； are always filled with
hopes？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And these hopes； as they are termed； are propositions which
exist in the minds of each of us？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us； a man may
often have a vision of a heap of gold； and pleasures ensuing； and in
the
