philebus-第4节
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Pro。 Out of the union； that is； of pleasure with mind and wisdom？
Soc。 Yes； that is the life which I mean。
Pro。 There can be no difference of opinion； not some but all would
surely choose this third rather than either of the other two； and in
addition to them。
Soc。 But do you see the consequence？
Pro。 To be sure I do。 The consequence is； that two out of the
three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor
eligible for man or for animal。
Soc。 Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the
good； for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and
perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was
able to live such a life； and if any of us had chosen any other； he
would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible； and
not of his own free will； but either through ignorance or from some
unhappy necessity。
Pro。 Certainly that seems to be true。
Soc。 And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus； goddess is
not to be regarded as identical with the good？
Phi。 Neither is your 〃mind〃 the good； Socrates； for that will be
open to the same objections。
Soc。 Perhaps； Philebus； you may be right in saying so of my
〃mind〃； but of the true； which is also the divine mind； far otherwise。
However； I will not at present claim the first place for mind as
against the mixed life； but we must come to some understanding about
the second place。 For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the
cause of the mixed life； and in that case although neither of them
would be the good； one of them might be imagined to be the cause of
the good。 And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to
Phoebus； that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and
good； is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure。 And if
this is true； pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the
first or second place； and does not； if I may trust my own mind；
attain even to the third。
Pro。 Truly； Socrates； pleasure appears to me to have had a fall；
in fighting for the palm； she has been smitten by the argument； and is
laid low。 I must say that mind would have fallen too； and may
therefore be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a
similar claim。 And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but
of the second place； she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of
her admirers； for not even to them would she still appear as fair as
before。
Soc。 Well； but had we not better leave her now； and not pain her
by applying the crucial test； and finally detecting her？
Pro。 Nonsense； Socrates。
Soc。 Why？ because I said that we had better not pain pleasure； which
is an impossibility？
Pro。 Yes； and more than that； because you do not seem to be aware
that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the
argument。
Soc。 Heavens！ Protarchus； that will be a tedious business； and
just at present not at all an easy one。 For in going to war in the
cause of mind； who is aspiring to the second prize； I ought to have
weapons of another make from those which I used before； some； however；
of the old ones may do again。 And must I then finish the argument？
Pro。 Of course you must。
Soc。 Let us be very careful in laying the foundation。
Pro。 What do you mean？
Soc。 Let us divide all existing things into two； or rather； if you
do not object； into three classes。
Pro。 Upon what principle would you make the division？
Soc。 Let us take some of our newly…found notions。
Pro。 Which of them？
Soc。 Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of
existence； and also an infinite？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Let us assume these two principles； and also a third； which
is compounded out of them； but I fear that am ridiculously clumsy at
these processes of division and enumeration。
Pro。 What do you mean； my good friend？
Soc。 I say that a fourth class is still wanted。
Pro。 What will that be？
Soc。 Find the cause of the third or compound； and add this as a
fourth class to the three others。
Pro。 And would you like to have a fifth dass or cause of
resolution as well as a cause of composition？
Soc。 Not； I think； at present； but if I want a fifth at some
future time you shall allow me to have it。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Let us begin with the first three； and as we find two out of
the three greatly divided and dispersed； let us endeavour to reunite
them； and see how in each of them there is a one and many。
Pro。 If you would explain to me a little more about them； perhaps
I might be able to follow you。
Soc。 Well； the two classes are the same which I mentioned before；
one the finite； and the other the infinite； I will first show that the
infinite is in a certain sense many； and the finite may be hereafter
discussed。
Pro。 I agree。
Soc。 And now consider well； for the question to which I invite
your attention is difficult and controverted。 When you speak of hotter
and colder； can you conceive any limit in those qualities？ Does not
the more and less； which dwells in their very nature； prevent their
having any end？ for if they had an end； the more and less would
themselves have an end。
Pro。 That is most true。
Soc。 Ever； as we say； into the hotter and the colder there enters
a more and a less。
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 Then； says the argument； there is never any end of them； and
being endless they must also be infinite。
Pro。 Yes； Socrates； that is exceedingly true。
Soc。 Yes； my dear Protarchus； and your answer reminds me that such
an expression as 〃exceedingly；〃 which you have just uttered； and
also the term 〃gently；〃 have the same significance as more or less；
for whenever they occur they do not allow of the existence of
quantity…they are always introducing degrees into actions； instituting
a comparison of a more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle；
and at each creation of more or less； quantity disappears。 For； as I
was just now saying； if quantity and measure did not disappear； but
were allowed to intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other
comparatives； these last would be driven out of their own domain。 When
definite quantity is once admitted； there can be no longer a
〃hotter〃 or a 〃colder〃 （for these are always progressing； and are
never in one stay）； but definite quantity is at rest； and has ceased
to progress。 Which proves that comparatives； such as the hotter； and
the colder； are to be ranked in the class of the infinite。
Pro。 Your remark certainly； has the look of truth； Socrates； but
these subjects； as you were saying； are difficult to follow at
first。 I think however； that if I could hear the argument repeated
by you once or twice； there would be a substantial agreement between
us。
Soc。 Yes； and I will try to meet your wish； but； as I would rather
not waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars； let me
know whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite…
Pro。 What？
Soc。 I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit
of more or less； or are denoted by the words 〃exceedingly；〃
〃gently；〃 〃extremely；〃 and the like； may not be referred to the
class of the infinite； which is their unity； for； as was asserted in
the previous argument； all things that were divided and dispersed
should be brought together； and have the mark or seal of some one
nature； if possible； set upon them…do you remember？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And all things which do not admit of more or less； but admit
their opposites； that is to say； first of all； equality； and the
equal； or again； the double； or any other ratio of number and
measure…all these may； I think； be rightly reckoned by us in the class
of the limited or finite； what do you say？
Pro。 Excellent； Socrates。
Soc。 And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound
kind？
Pro。 You； I think； will have to tell me that。
Soc。 Rather God will tell you； if there be any God who will listen
to my prayers。
Pro。 Offer up a prayer； then； and think。
Soc。 I am thinking； Protarchus； and I believe that some God has
befriended us。
Pro。 What do you mean； and what proof have you to offer of what
you are saying？
Soc。 I will tell you； and do you listen to my words。
Pro。 Proceed。
Soc。 Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 Add to them drier； wetter； more； less； swifter； slower；
greater； smaller； and all that in the preceding argument we placed
under the unity of more and less。
Pro。 In the class of the infinite； you mean？
Soc。 Yes； and now mingle this with the other。
