philebus-第3节
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for some number； representing a certain quantity； and thus out of
all end in one。 And now let us return for an illustration of our
principle to the case of letters。
Pro。 What do you mean？
Soc。 Some god or divine man； who in the Egyptian legend is said to
have been Theuth； observing that the human voice was infinite； first
distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels； and then
other letters which had sound； but were not pure vowels （i。e。； the
semivowels）； these too exist in a definite number； and lastly； he
distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes；
without voice and without sound； and divided these； and likewise the
two other classes of vowels and semivowels； into the individual
sounds； told the number of them； and gave to each and all of them
the name of letters； and observing that none of us could learn any one
of them and not learn them all； and in consideration of this common
bond which in a manner united them； he assigned to them all a single
art； and this he called the art of grammar or letters。
Phi。 The illustration； Protarchus； has assisted me in
understanding the original statement； but I still feel the defect of
which I just now complained。
Soc。 Are you going to ask； Philebus； what this has to do with the
argument？
Phi。 Yes； that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long
asking。
Soc。 Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the
question which； as you say； you have been so long asking？
Phi。 How so？
Soc。 Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative
eligibility of pleasure and wisdom？
Phi。 Certainly。
Soc。 And we maintain that they are each of them one？
Phi。 True。
Soc。 And the precise question to which the previous discussion
desires an answer is； how they are one and also many ＇i。e。； how they
have one genus and many species＇； and are not at once infinite； and
what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they
pass into infinity。
Pro。 That is a very serious question； Philebus； to which Socrates
has ingeniously brought us round； and please to consider which of us
shall answer him； there may be something ridiculous in my being unable
to answer； and therefore imposing the task upon you； when I have
undertaken the whole charge of the argument； but if neither of us were
able to answer； the result methinks would be still more ridiculous。
Let us consider； then； what we are to do：…Socrates； if I understood
him rightly； is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure； and
what is the number and nature of them； and the same of wisdom。
Soc。 Most true； O son of Callias； and the previous argument showed
that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has
unity； likeness； sameness； or their opposites； none of us will be of
the smallest use in any enquiry。
Pro。 That seems to be very near the truth； Socrates。 Happy would the
wise man be if he knew all things； and the next best thing for him
is that he should know himself。 Why do I say so at this moment？ I will
tell you。 You； Socrates； have granted us this opportunity of
conversing with you； and are ready to assist us in determining what is
the best of human goods。 For when Philebus said that pleasure and
delight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good； you
answered…No； not those； but another class of goods； and we are
constantly reminding ourselves of what you said； and very properly； in
order that we may not forget to examine and compare the two。 And these
goods； which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to
pleasure； and are the true objects of pursuit； are mind and
knowledge and understanding and art and the like。 There was a
dispute about which were the best； and we playfully threatened that
you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled；
and you agreed； and placed yourself at our disposal。 And now； as
children say； what has been fairly given cannot be taken back； cease
then to fight against us in this way。
Soc。 In what way？
Phi。 Do not perplex us； and keep asking questions of us to which
we have not as yet any sufficient answer to give； let us not imagine
that a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our
discussion； but if we are unable to answer； do you answer； as you have
promised。 Consider； then； whether you will divide pleasure and
knowledge according to their kinds； or you may let the matter drop； if
you are able and willing to find some other mode of clearing up our
controversy。
Soc。 If you say that； I have nothing to apprehend； for the words 〃if
you are willing〃 dispel all my fear； and； moreover； a god seems to
have recalled something to my mind。
Phi。 What is that？
Soc。 I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about
pleasure and wisdom； whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell； they
were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was
the good； but some third thing； which was different from them； and
better than either。 If this be clearly established； then pleasure will
lose the victory； for the good will cease to be identified with
her：…Am I not right？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds
of pleasures； as I am inclined to think； but this will appear more
clearly as we proceed。
Pro。 Capital； Socrates； pray go on as you propose。
Soc。 But； let us first agree on some little points。
Pro。 What are they？
Soc。 Is the good perfect or imperfect？
Pro。 The most perfect； Socrates； of all things。
Soc。 And is the good sufficient？
Pro。 Yes； certainly； and in a degree surpassing all other things。
Soc。 And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and
hunt after good； and are eager to catch and have the good about
them； and care not for the attainment of anything which its not
accompanied by good。
Pro。 That is undeniable。
Soc。 Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of
wisdom； and pass them in review。
Pro。 How do you mean？
Soc。 Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure； nor any
pleasure in the life of wisdom； for if either of them is the chief
good； it cannot be supposed to want anything； but if either is shown
to want anything； then it cannot really be the chief good。
Pro。 Impossible。
Soc。 And will you help us to test these two lives？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Then answer。
Pro。 Ask。
Soc。 Would you choose； Protarchus； to live all your life long in the
enjoyment of the greatest pleasures？
Pro。 Certainly I should。
Soc。 Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you
if you had perfect pleasure？
Pro。 Certainly not。
Soc。 Reflect； would you not want wisdom and intelligence and
forethought； and similar qualities？ would you not at any rate want
sight？
Pro。 Why should I？ Having pleasure I should have all things。
Soc。 Living thus； you would always throughout your life enjoy the
greatest pleasures？
Pro。 I should。
Soc。 But if you had neither mind； nor memory； nor knowledge； nor
true opinion； you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of
whether you were pleased or not； because you would be entirely
devoid of intelligence。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And similarly； if you had no memory you would not recollect
that you had ever been pleased； nor would the slightest recollection
of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you； and if
you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when
you were； and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able
to calculate on future pleasure； and your life would be the life；
not of a man； but of an oyster or pulmo marinus。 Could this be
otherwise？
Pro。 No。
Soc。 But is such a life eligible？
Pro。 I cannot answer you； Socrates； the argument has taken away from
me the power of speech。
Soc。 We must keep up our spirits；…let us now take the life of mind
and examine it in turn。
Pro。 And what is this life of mind？
Soc。 I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live；
having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things； but
having no sense of pleasure or pain； and wholly unaffected by these
and the like feelings？
Pro。 Neither life； Socrates； appears eligible to me； or is likely；
as I should imagine； to be chosen by any one else。
Soc。 What would you say； Protarchus； to both of these in one； or
to one that was made out of the union of the two？
Pro。 Out of the union； that is； of pleasure with mind and wisdom？
Soc。 Yes； that is the life which I mean。
Pro。 There can be no difference of o
