philebus-第14节
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of doing all things for the sake of it； let us search into the pure
element of mind and intelligence； and then we shall be able to say
whether the science of which I have been speaking is most likely to
possess the faculty； or whether there be some other which has higher
claims。
Pro。 Well； I have been considering； and I can hardly think that
any other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this。
Soc。 Do you say so because you observe that the arts in general
and those engaged in them make use of opinion； and are resolutely
engaged in the investigation of matters of opinion？ Even he who
supposes himself to be occupied with nature is really occupied with
the things of this world； how created； how acting or acted upon。 Is
not this the sort of enquiry in which his life is spent？
Pro。 True。
Soc。 He is labouring； not after eternal being； but about things
which are becoming； or which will or have become。
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor
have been nor will be unchangeable； when judged by the strict rule
of truth； ever become certain？
Pro。 Impossible。
Soc。 How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no
fixedness？
Pro。 How indeed？
Soc。 Then mind and science when employed about such changing
things do not attain the highest truth？
Pro。 I should imagine not。
Soc。 And now let us bid farewell； a long farewell； to you or me or
Philebus or Gorgias； and urge on behalf of the argument a single
point。
Pro。 What point？
Soc。 Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed
has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and
unmixed； or if not； at any rate what is most akin to them has； and
that all other things are to be placed in a second or inferior class。
Pro。 Very true。
Soc。 And of the names expressing cognition； ought not the fairest to
be given to the fairest things？
Pro。 That is natural。
Soc。 And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be
honoured most？
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And these names may be said to have their truest； and most
exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of
true being？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of
pleasure？
Pro。 Very true； Socrates。
Soc。 In the next place； as to the mixture； here are the ingredients；
pleasure and wisdom； and we may be compared to artists who have
their materials ready to their hands。
Pro。 Yes。
Soc。 And now we must begin to mix them？
Pro。 By all means。
Soc。 But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our
memories？
Pro。 Of what？
Soc。 Of that which I have already mentioned。 Well says the
proverb； that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is
good。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Well then； by Zeus； let us proceed； and I will make what I
believe to be a fair summary of the argument。
Pro。 Let me hear。
Soc。 Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living
beings； at which all ought to aim； and moreover that it is the chief
good of all； and that the two names 〃good〃 and 〃pleasant〃 are
correctly given to one thing and one nature； Socrates； on the other
hand； begins by denying this； and further says； that in nature as in
name they are two； and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of
the good。 Is not and was not this what we were saying； Protarchus？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And is there not and was there not a further point which was
conceded between us？
Pro。 What was it？
Soc。 That the good differs from all other things。
Pro。 In what respect？
Soc。 In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in
all things has the most perfect sufficiency； and is never in need of
anything else。
Pro。 Exactly。
Soc。 And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of
wisdom and pleasure； assigning to each a distinct life； so that
pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom； and wisdom in like manner
had no part whatever in pleasure？
Pro。 We did。
Soc。 And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient？
Pro。 Certainly not。
Soc。 And if we erred in any point； then let any one who will； take
up the enquiry again and set us right； and assuming memory and
wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class； let
him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire…I will
not say pleasure； however abundant or intense； if he has no real
perception that he is pleased； nor any consciousness of what he feels；
nor any recollection； however momentary； of the feeling；…but would
he desire to have anything at all； if these faculties were wanting
to him？ And about wisdom I ask the same question； can you conceive
that any one would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of
pleasure； rather than with a certain degree of pleasure； or all
pleasure devoid of wisdom； rather than with a certain degree of
wisdom？
Pro。 Certainly not； Socrates； but why repeat such questions any
more？
Soc。 Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good
cannot possibly be either of them？
Pro。 Impossible。
Soc。 Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or
less accurately； in order； as we were saying； that the second place
may be duly assigned。
Pro。 Right。
Soc。 Have we not found a road which leads towards the good？
Pro。 What road？
Soc。 Supposing that a man had to be found； and you could discover in
what house he lived； would not that be a great step towards the
discovery of the man himself？
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 And now reason intimates to us； as at our first beginning； that
we should seek the good； not in the unmixed life but in the mixed。
Pro。 True。
Soc。 There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in
the life which is well mixed than in that which is not？
Pro。 Far greater。
Soc。 Then now let us mingle； Protarchus； at the same time offering
up a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus； or whoever is the god who
presides over the ceremony of mingling。
Pro。 By all means。
Soc。 Are not we the cup…bearers？ and here are two fountains which
are flowing at our side： one； which is pleasure； may be likened to a
fountain of honey； the other； wisdom； a sober draught in which no wine
mingles； is of water unpleasant but healthful； out of these we must
seek to make the fairest of all possible mixtures。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 Tell me first；…should we be most likely to succeed if we
mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom？
Pro。 Perhaps we might。
Soc。 But I should be afraid of the risk； and I think that I can show
a safer plan。
Pro。 What is it？
Soc。 One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another； and
one art to be more exact than another。
Pro。 Certainly。
Soc。 There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences； some of
them regarding only the transient and perishing； and others the
permanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable； and when
judged by the standard of truth； the latter； as we thought； were truer
than the former。
Pro。 Very good and right。
Soc。 If； then； we were to begin by mingling the sections of each
class which have the most of truth； will not the union suffice to give
us the loveliest of lives； or shall we still want some elements of
another kind？
Pro。 I think that we ought to do what you suggest。
Soc。 Let us suppose a man who understands justice； and has reason as
well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other
things。
Pro。 We will suppose such a man。
Soc。 Will he have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only
with the divine circle and sphere； and knows nothing of our human
spheres and circles； but uses only divine circles and measures in
the building of a house？
Pro。 The knowledge which is only superhuman； Socrates； is ridiculous
in man。
Soc。 What do you mean？ Do you mean that you are to throw into the
cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false
measure and the false circle？
Pro。 Yes； we must； if any of us is ever to find his way home。
Soc。 And am I to include music； which； as； I was saying just now； is
full of guesswork and imitation； and is wanting in purity？
Pro。 Yes； I think that you must； if human life is to be a life at
all。
Soc。 Well； then； suppose that I give way； and； like a doorkeeper who
is pushed and overborne by the mob； I open the door wide； and let
knowledge of every sort stream in； and the pure mingle with th
