bentham-第11节
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ere does in fact prevail a much greater unanimity among thinking persons； than might be supposed from their diametrical divergence on the great questions of moral metaphysics。 As mankind are much more nearly of one nature； than of one opinion about their own nature； they are more easily brought to agree in their intermediate principles； vera illa et media axiomata； as Bacon says； than in their first principles： and the attempt to make the bearings of actions upon the ultimate end more evident than they can be made by referring them to the intermediate ends； and to estimate their value by a direct reference to human happiness； generally terminates in attaching most importance； not to those effects which are really the greatest； but to those which can most easily be pointed to and individually identified。 Those who adopt utility as a standard can seldom apply it truly except through the secondary principles； those who reject it； generally do no more than erect those secondary principles into first principles。 It is when two or more of the secondary principles conflict； that a direct appeal to some first principle becomes necessary； and then commences the practical importance of the utilitarian controversy； which is； in other respects； a question of arrangement and logical subordination rather than of practice； important principally in a purely scientific point of view； for the sake of the systematic unity and coherency of ethical philosophy。 It is probable； however； that to the principle of utility we owe all that Bentham did； that it was necessary for him to find a first principle which he could receive as self…evident； and to which he could attach all his other doctrines as logical consequences： that to him systematic unity was an indispensable condition of his confidence in his Own intellect。 And there is something further to be remarked。 Whether happiness be or be not the end to which morality should be referred that it be referred to an end of some sort； and not left in the dominion of vague feeling or inexplicable internal conviction； that it be made a matter of reason and calculation； and not merely of sentiment； is essential to the very idea of moral philosophy； is； in fact； what renders argument or discussion on moral questions possible。 That the morality of actions depends on the consequences which they tend to produce； is the doctrine of rational persons of all schools； that the good or evil of those consequences is measured solely by pleasure or pain； is all of the doctrine of the school of utility； which is peculiar to it。 In so far as Bentham's adoption of the principle of utility induced him to fix his attention upon the consequences of actions as the consideration determining their morality； so far he was indisputably in the right path： though to go far in it without wandering； there was needed a greater knowledge of the formation of character； and of the consequences of actions upon the agent's own frame of mind； than Bentham possessed。 His want of power to estimate this class of consequences； together with his want of the degree of modest deference which； from those who have not competent experience of their own； is due to the experience of others on that part of the subject； greatly limit the value of his speculations on questions of practical ethics。 He is chargeable also with another error； which it would be improper to pass over； because nothing has tended more to place him in opposition to the common feelings of mankind； and to give to his philosophy that cold； mechanical and ungenial air which characterizes the popular idea of a Benthamite。 This error； or rather one…sidedness； belongs to him not as a utilitarian； but as a moralist by profession； and in common with almost all professed moralists； whether religious or philosophical： it is that of treating the moral view of actions and characters； which is unquestionably the first and most important mode of looking at them； as if it were the sole one： whereas it is only one of three； by all of which our sentiments towards the human being may be； ought to be； and without entirely crushing our own nature cannot but be； materially influenced。 Every human action has three aspects： its moral aspect； or that of its right and wrong。 its aesthetic aspect； or that of its beauty； its sympathetic aspect； or that of its loveableness。 The first addresses itself to our reason and conscience； the second to our imagination； the third to our human fellow…feeling。 According to the first； we approve or disapprove； according to the second； we admire； or despise； according to the third； we love； pity or dislike。 The morality of an action depends on its foreseeable consequences； its beauty； and its loveableness； or the reverse； depend on the qualities which it is evidence of。 Thus； a lie is wrong； because its effect is to mislead； and because it tends to destroy the confidence of man in man； it is also mean； because it is cowardly because it proceeds from not daring to face the consequences of telling the truth or at best is evidence of want of that power to compass our ends by straightforward means； which is conceived as properly belonging to every person not deficient in energy or in understanding。 The action of Brutus in sentencing his sons was right； because it was executing a law essential to the freedom of his country； against persons of whose guilt there was no doubt： it was admirable； because it evinced a rare degree of patriotism； courage and self…control； but there was nothing loveable in it； it affords either no presumption in regard to loveable qualities； or a presumption of their deficiency。 If one of the sons had engaged in the conspiracy from affection for the other； his action would have been loveable； though neither moral nor admirable。 It is not possible for any sophistry to confound these three modes of viewing an action； but it is very possible to adhere to one of them exclusively； and lose sight of the rest。 Sentimentality consists in setting the last two of the three above the first； the error of moralists in general； and of Bentham； is to sink the two latter entirely。 This is pre…eminently the case with Bentham： he both wrote and felt as if the moral standard ought not only to be paramount （which it ought）； but to be alone； as if it ought to be the sole master of all our actions； and even of all our sentiments； as if either to admire or like； or despise or dislike a person for any action which neither does good nor harm； or which does not do a good or a harm proportioned to the sentiment entertained； were an injustice and a prejudice。 He carried this so far； that there were certain phrases which； being expressive of what he considered to be this groundless liking or aversion； he could not bear to hear pronounced in his presence。 Among these phrases were those of good and bad taste。 He thought it an insolent piece of dogmatism in one person to praise or condemn another in a matter of taste： as if men's likings and dislikings； on things in themselves indifferent； were not full of the most important inferences as to every point of their character； as if a person's tastes did not show him to be wise or a fool； cultivated or ignorant； gentle or rough； sensitive or callous； generous or sordid； benevolent or selfish； conscientious or depraved。 Connected with the same topic are Bentham's peculiar opinions on poetry。 Much more has been said than there is any foundation for； about his contempt for the pleasures of imagination； and for the fine arts。 Music was throughout life his favourite amusement； painting； sculpture and the other arts addressed to the eye； he was so far from holding in any contempt； that he occasionally recognizes them as means employable for important social ends； though his ignorance of the deeper springs of human character prevented him （as it prevents most Englishmen） from suspecting how profoundly such things enter into the moral nature of man； and into the education both of the individual and of the race。 But towards poetry in the narrower sense； that which employs the language of words； he entertained no favour。 Words； he thought； were perverted from their proper office when they were employed in uttering anything but precise logical truth。 He says； somewhere in his works； that； 'quantity of pleasure being equal； push…pin is as good as poetry' but this is only a paradoxical way of stating what he would equally have said of the things which he most valued and admired。 Another aphorism is attributed to him； which is much more characteristic of his view of this subject： 'All poetry is misrepresentation'。 Poetry； he thought； consisted essentially in exaggeration for effect： in proclaiming some one view of a thing very emphatically； and suppressing all the limitations and qualifications。 This trait of character seems to us a curious example of what Mr Carlyle strikingly calls 'the completeness of limited men'。 Here is a philosopher who is happy within his narrow boundary as no man of indefinite range ever was： who flatters himself that he is so completely emancipated from the essential law of poor human intellect； by which it can only see one thing at a time well； that he can even turn round upon the imperfection and lay a solemn interdict u
