shorter logic-第69节

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notion　and　reality。　Even　bad　and　untrue　things　have　being；　in　so　far　as　their　reality　still；　somehow；
conforms　to　their　notion。　Whatever　is　thoroughly　bad　or　contrary　to　the　notion　is　for　that　very
reason　on　the　way　to　ruin。　It　is　by　the　notion　alone　that　the　things　in　the　world　have　their
subsistence；　or；　as　it　is　expressed　in　the　language　of　religious　conception；　things　are　what　they　are；
only　in　virtue　of　the　divine　and　thereby　Creative　thought　which　dwells　within　them。　

When　we　hear　the　Idea　spoken　of；　we　need　not　imagine　something　far　away　beyond　this　mortal
sphere。　The　Idea　is　rather　what　is　completely　present：　and　it　is　found；　however　confused　and
degenerated；　in　every　consciousness。　We　conceive　the　works　to　ourselves　as　a　great　totality　which
is　created　by　God；　and　so　created　that　in　it　God　has　manifested　himself　to　us。　We　regard　the
world　also　as　ruled　by　Divine　Providence：　implying　that　the　scattered　and　divided　parts　of　the
world　are　continually　brought　back；　and　made　conformable；　to　the　unity　from　which　they　have
issued。　

The　purpose　of　philosophy　has　always　been　the　intellectual　ascertainment　of　the　Ideal；　and
everything　deserving　the　name　of　philosophy　has　constantly　been　based　on　the　consciousness　of　an
absolute　unity　where　the　understanding　sees　and　accepts　only　separation。　It　is　too　late　now　to　ask
for　proof　that　the　Idea　is　the　truth。　The　proof　of　that　is　contained　in　the　whole　deduction　and
development　of　thought　up　to　this　point。　The　Idea　is　the　result　of　this　course　of　dialectic。　Not　that　it
is　to　he　supposed　that　the　idea　is　mediate　only；　i。e。　mediated　through　something　else　than　itself。　It　is
rather　its　own　result；　and　being　so；　is　no　less　immediate　than　mediate。　

The　stages　hitherto　considered；　viz。　those　of　Being　and　Essence；　as　well　as　those　of　Notion　and　of
Objectivity；　are　not；　when　so　distinguished；　something　permanent；　resting　upon　themselves。　They
have　proved　to　be　dialectical；　and　their　only　truth　is　that　they　are　dynamic　elements　of　the　idea。　
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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　214

The　Idea　may　be　described　in　many　ways。　It　may　be　called　reason；　（and　this　is
the　proper　philosophical　signification　of　reason）；　subject…object；　the　unity　of　the
ideal　and　the　real；　of　the　finite　and　the　infinite；　of　soul　and　body；　the　possibility
which　has　its　actuality　in　its　own　self；　that　of　which　the　nature　can　be　thought
only　as　existent；　etc。　All　these　descriptions　apply；　because　the　Idea　contains　all　the
relations　of　understanding；　but　contains　them　in　their　infinite　self…return　and
self…identity。　

It　is　easy　work　for　the　understanding　to　show　that　everything　said　of　the　Idea　is
self…contradictory。　But　that　can　quite　as　well　be　retaliated；　or　rather　in　the　Idea　the
retaliation　is　actually　made。　And　this　work；　which　is　the　work　of　reason；　is
certainly　not　so　easy　as　that　of　the　understanding。　Understanding　may
demonstrate　that　the　Idea　is　self…contradictory：　because　the　subjective　is
subjective　only　and　is　always　confronted　by　the　objective；　because　being　is
different　from　notion　and　therefore　cannot　be　picked　out　of　it；　because　the　finite
is　finite　only；　the　exact　antithesis　of　the　infinite；　and　therefore　not　identical　with　it；
and　so　on　with　every　term　of　the　description。　The　reverse　of　all　this　however　is
the　doctrine　of　Logic。　Logic　shows　that　the　subjective　which　is　to　be　subjective
only；　the　finite　which　would　be　finite　only；　the　infinite　which　would　be　infinite
only；　and　so　on；　have　no　truth；　but　contradict　themselves；　and　pass　over　into　their
opposites。　Hence　this　transition；　and　the　unity　in　which　the　extremes　are　merged
and　become　factors；　each　with　a　merely　reflected　existence；　reveals　itself　as　their
truth。　

The　understanding；　which　addresses　itself　to　deal　with　the　Idea；　commits　a　double
misunderstanding。　It　takes　first　the　extremes　of　the　Idea　（be　they　expressed　as
they　will；　so　long　as　they　are　in　their　unity）；　not　as　they　are　understood　when
stamped　with　this　concrete　unity；　but　as　if　they　remained　abstractions　outside　of
it。　It　no　less　mistakes　the　relation　between　them；　even　when　it　has　been　expressly
stated。　Thus；　for　example；　it　overlooks　even　the　nature　of　the　copula　in　the
judgement；　which　affirms　that　；　the　individual；　or　subject；　is　after　all　not
individual；　but　universal。　

But；　in　the　second　place；　the　understanding　believes　its　'reflection'　that　the
self…identical　Idea　contains　its　own　negative；　or　contains　contradiction—to　be　an
external　reflection　which　does　not　lie　within　the　Idea　itself。　But　the　reflection　is
really　no　peculiar　cleverness　of　the　understanding。　The　idea　itself　is　the　dialectic
which　for　ever　divides　and　distinguishes　the　self…identical　from　the　differentiated；
the　subjective　from　the　objective；　the　finite　from　the　infinite；　soul　from　body。
Only　on　these　terms　is　it　an　eternal　creation；　eternal　vitality；　and　eternal　spirit。　But
while　it　thus　passes　or　rather　translates　itself　into　the　abstract　understanding；　it　for
ever　remains　reason。　The　Idea　is　the　dialectic　which　again　makes　this　mass　of
understanding　and　diversity　understand　its　finite　nature　and　the
pseudo…independence　in　its　productions；　and　which　brings　the　diversity　back　to
unity。　Since　this　double　movement　is　not　separate　or　distinct　in　time；　nor　indeed
in　any　other　way　—　otherwise　it　would　be　only　a　repetition　of　the　abstract
understanding　—　the　Idea　is　the　eternal　vision　of　itself　in　the　other；　notion　which
in　its　objectivity　has　carried　out　itself；　object　which　is　inward　design；　essential
subjectivity。　

The　different　modes　of　apprehending　the　Idea　as　unity　of　ideal　and　real；　of　finite
and　infinite；　of　identity　and　difference；　etc；　are　more　or　less　formal。　They
designate　some　stage　of　the　specific　notion。　Only　the　notion　itself；　however；　is
free　and　the　genuine　universal：　in　the　Idea；　therefore；　the　specific　character　of　the
notion　is　only　the　notion　itself　—　an　objectivity；　viz。　into　which　it；　being　the
universal；　continues　itself；　and　in　which　it　has　only　its　own　character；　the　total
character。　The　Idea　is　the　infinite　judgement；　of　which　the　terms　are　severally　the
independent　totality；　and　in　which；　as　each　grows　to　the　fullness　of　its　own
nature；　it　has　thereby　at　the　same　time　passed　into　the　other。　None　of　the　other
specific　notions　exhibits　this　totality　complete　on　both　its　sides　as　the　notion　itself
and　objectivity。
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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　215

The　Idea　is　essentially　a　process；　because　its　identity　is　the　absolute　and　free
identity　of　the　notion；　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　absolute　negativity　and　for　that　reason
dialectical。　It　is　the　ground　of　movement；　in　which　the　notion；　in　the　capacity　of
universality　which　is　individuality；　gives　itself　the　character　of　objectivity　and　of
the　antithesis　thereto；　and　this　externality　which　has　the　notion　for　its　substance；
finds　its　way　back　to　subjectivity　through　its　immanent　dialectic　

As　the　idea　is　（a）　a　process；　it　follows　that　such　an　expression　for　the　Absolute　as
unity　of　thought　and　being；　of　finite　and　infinite；　etc。；　is　false；　for　unity　expresses
an　abstract　and　merely　quiescent　identity。　As　the　Idea　is　（b）　subjectivity；　it
follows　that　the　expression　is　equally　false　on　another　account。　That　unity　of
which　it　speaks　expresses　a　merely　virtual　or　underlying　presence　of　the　genuine
unity。　The　infinite　would　thus　seem　to　be　merely　neutralised　by　the　finite；　the
subjective　by　the　objective；　thought　by　being。　But　in　the　negative　unity　of　the
Idea；　the　infinite　overlaps　and　includes　the　finite；　thought　overlaps　being；
subjectivity　overlaps　objectivity。　The　unity　of　the　Idea　is　thought；　infinity；　and
subjectivity；　and　is　in　consequence　to　be　essentially　distinguished　from　the　Idea　as
substance；　just　as　this　overlapping　subjectivity；　thought；　or　infinity　is　to　be
distinguished　from　the　one…sided　subjectivity；　one…sided　thought；　one…sided
infinity　to　which　it　descends　in　judging　and　defining。
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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　215n

The　idea　as　a　process　runs　through　three　stages　in　its　development。　The　first　form　of　the　idea　is
Life：　that　is；　the　idea　in　the　form　of　immediacy。　The　second　form　is　that　of　mediation　or
differentiation；　and　this　is　the　idea　in　the　form　of　Knowledge；　which　appears　under　the　double
aspect　of　the　Theoretical　and　Practical　idea。　The　process　of　knowledge　eventuates　in　the
restoration　of　the　unity　enriched　by　difference。　This　gives　the　third　form　of　the　idea；　the　Absolute
Idea：　which　last　stage　of　the　logical　idea　evinces　itself　to　be　at　the　same　time　the　true　first；　and　to
have　a　being　due　to　itself　alone。　
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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（a）　Life
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　216

The　immediate　idea　is　Life。　As　soul；　the　notion　is　realised　in　a　body　of　whose
externality　the　soul　is　the　immediate　self…relating　universality。　But　the　soul　is　also
its　particularisation；　so　that　the　body　expresses　no　other　distinctions　than　follow
from　the　characterisations　of　its　notion。　And　finally　it　is　the　Individuality　of　the
body　as　infinite　negativity—the　dialectic　of　that　bodily　objectivity；　with　its　parts
lying　out　of　one　another；　conveying　them　away　fro