shorter logic-第64节

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must；　by　its　negation；　give　itself　the　character　of　explicitness。　As　in　every　case；
speculative　identity　is　not　the　above…mentioned　triviality　of　an　implicit　identity　of
subject　and　object。　This　has　been　said　often　enough。　Yet　it　could　not　be　too　often
repeated；　if　the　intention　were　really　to　put　an　end　to　the　stale　and　purely
malicious　misconception　in　regard　to　this　identity　—　of　which　however　there　can
be　no　reasonable　expectation。　

Looking　at　that　unity　in　a　quite　general　way；　and　raising　no　objection　to　the
one…sided　form　of　its　implicitness；　we　find　it　as　the　well…known　presupposition　of
the　ontological　proof　for　the　existence　of　God。　There　it　appears　as　supreme
perfection。　Anselm；　in　whom　the　notable　suggestion　of　this　proof　first　occurs；　no
doubt　originally　restricted　himself　to　the　question　whether　a　certain　content　was　in
our　thinking　only。　His　words　are　briefly　these：　〃Certainly　that；　than　which　nothing
greater　can　be　thought；　cannot　be　in　the　intellect　alone。　For　even　if　it　is　in　the
intellect　alone；　it　can　also　be　thought　to　exist　in　fact：　and　that　is　greater。　If　then
that；　than　which　nothing　greater　can　be　thought；　is　in　the　intellect　alone；　then　the
very　thing；　which　is　greater　than　anything　which　can　be　thought；　can　be　exceeded
in　thought。　But　certainly　this　is　impossible〃。　The　same　unity　received　a　more
objective　expression　in　Descartes；　Spinoza；　and　others：　while　the　theory　of
immediate　certitude　or　faith　presents　it；　on　the　contrary；　in　somewhat　the　same
subjective　aspect　as　Anselm。　These　Intuitionalists　hold　that　in　our　consciousness
the　attribute　of　being　is　indissolubly　associated　with　the　conception　of　God。　The
theory　of　faith　brings　even　the　conception　of　external　finite　things　under　the　same
inseparable　nexus　between　the　consciousness　and　the　being　of　them；　on　the
ground　that　perception　presents　them　conjoined　with　the　attribute　of　existence：
and　in　so　saying；　it　is　no　doubt　correct。　It　would　be　utterly　absurd；　however；　to
suppose　that　the　association　in　consciousness　between　existence　and　our
conception　of　finite　things　is　of　the　same　description　as　the　association　between
existence　and　the　conception　of　God。　To　do　so　would　be　to　forget　that　finite
things　are　changeable　and　transient；　i。e。　that　existence　is　associated　with　them　for
a　season；　but　that　the　association　is　neither　eternal　nor　inseparable。　Speaking　in
the　phraseology　of　the　categories　before　us；　we　may　say　that；　to　call　a　thing　finite；
means　that　its　objective　existence　is　not　in　harmony　with　the　thought　of　it；　with　its
universal　calling；　its　kind；　and　its　end。　Anselm；　consequently；　neglecting　any　such
conjunction　as　occurs　in　finite　things；　has　with　good　reason　pronounced　that　only
to　be　the　Perfect　which　exists　not　merely　in　a　subjective；　but　also　in　an　objective
mode。　It　does　no　good　to　put　on　airs　against　the　Ontological　proof；　as　it　is　called；
and　against　Anselm　thus　defining　the　Perfect。　The　argument　is　one　latent　in　every
unsophisticated　mind；　and　it　recurs　in　every　philosophy；　even　against　its　wish　and
without　its　knowledge　—　as　may　be　seen　in　the　theory　of　immediate　belief。　

The　real　fault　in　the　argumentation　of　Anselm　is　one　which　is　chargeable　on
Descartes　and　Spinoza；　as　well　as　on　the　theory　of　immediate　knowledge。　It　is
this。　This　unity　which　is　enunciated　as　the　supreme　perfection　or；　it　may　be；
subjectively；　as　the　true　knowledge；　is　presupposed；　i。e。　it　is　assumed　only　as
potential。　This　identity；　abstract　as　it　thus　appears；　between　the　two　categories
may　be　at　once　met　and　opposed　by　their　diversity；　and　this　was　the　very　answer
given　to　Anselm　long　ago。　In　short；　the　conception　and　existence　of　the　finite　is
set　in　antagonism　to　the　infinite；　for；　as　previously　remarked；　the　finite　possesses
objectivity　of　such　a　kind　as　is　at　once　incongruous　with　and　different　from　the
end　or　aim；　its　essence　and　notion。　Or；　the　finite　is　such　a　conception　and　in　such
a　way　subjective；　that　it　does　not　involve　existence。　This　objection　and　this
antithesis　are　got　over；　only　by　showing　the　finite　to　be　untrue　and　these
categories　in　their　separation　to　be　inadequate　and　null。　Their　identity　is　thus　seen
to　be　one　into　which　they　spontaneously　pass　over；　and　in　which　they　are
reconciled。　




Third　Subdivision　of　The　Logic；　The　Doctrine　of　the　Notion
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　THE　OBJECT



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Development　of　the　Object
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Mechanism　…　Chemism　…　Teleology



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　194

The　Object　is　immediate　being；　because　insensible　to　difference；　which　in　it　has
suspended　itself。　It　is；　further；　a　totality　in　itself；　while　at　the　same　time　（as　this
identity　is　only　the　implicit　identity　of　its　dynamic　elements）　it　is　equally
indifferent　to　its　immediate　unity。　It　thus　breaks　up　into　distinct　parts；　each　of
which　is　itself　the　totality。　Hence　the　object　is　the　absolute　contradiction　between
a　complete　independence　of　the　multiplicity；　and　the　equally　complete
non…independence　of　the　different　pieces。　

The　definition；　which　states　that　the　Absolute　is　the　Object；　is　most　definitely
implied　in　the　Leibnitzian　Monad。　The　Monads　are　each　an　object；　but　an　object
implicitly　'representative'；　indeed　the　total　representation　of　the　world。　In　the
simple　unity　of　the　Monad；　all　difference　is　merely　ideal；　not　independent　or　real。
Nothing　from　without　comes　into　the　monad：　it　is　the　whole　notion　in　itself；　only
distinguished　by　its　own　greater　or　less　development。　None　the　less；　this　simple
totality　parts　into　the　absolute　multeity　of　differences；　each　becoming　an
independent　monad。　In　the　monad　of　monads；　and　the　Pre…established　Harmony
of　their　inward　developments；　these　substances　are　in　like　manner　again　reduced
to　'identity'　and　unsubstantiality。　The　philosophy　of　Leibnitz；　therefore；　represents
contradiction　in　its　complete　development。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　194n1

（1）　As　Fichte　in　modern　times　has　especially　and　with　justice　insisted；　the　theory　which　regards
the　Absolute　or　God　as　the　Object　and　there　stops；　expresses　the　point　of　view　taken　by
superstition　and　slavish　fear。　No　doubt　God　is　the　Object；　and；　indeed；　the　Object　out　and　out；
confronted　with　which　our　particular　or　subjective　opinions　and　desires　have　no　truth　and　no
validity。　As　absolute　object；　however；　God　does　not　therefore　take　up　the　position　of　a　dark　and
hostile　power　over　against　subjectivity。　He　rather　involves　it　as　a　vital　element　in　himself。　Such　also
is　the　meaning　of　the　Christian　doctrine；　according　to　which　God　has　willed　that　all　men　should　be
saved　and　all　attain　blessedness。　The　salvation　and　the　blessedness　of　men　are　attained　when　they
come　to　feel　themselves　at　one　with　God；　so　that　God；　on　the　other　hand；　ceases　to　be　for　them
mere　object；　and；　in　that　way；　an　object　of　fear　and　terror；　as　was　especially　the　case　with　the
religious　consciousness　of　the　Romans。　But　God　in　the　Christian　religion　is　also　known　as　Love；
because　in　his　Son；　who　is　one　with　him；　he　has　revealed　himself　to　men　as　a　man　among　men；　and
thereby　redeemed　them。　All　of　which　is　only　another　way　of　saying　that　the　antithesis　of　subjective
and　objective　is　implicitly　overcome；　and　that　it　is　our　affair　to　participate　in　this　redemption　by
laying　aside　our　immediate　subjectivity　（putting　off　the　old　Adam）；　and　learning　to　know　God　as
our　true　and　essential　self。　

Just　as　religion　and　religious　worship　consist　in　overcoming　the　antithesis　of　subjectivity　and
objectivity；　so　science　too　and　philosophy　have　no　other　task　than　to　overcome　this　antithesis　by
the　medium　of　thought。　The　aim　of　knowledge　is　to　divest　the　objective　world　that　stands　opposed
to　us　of　its　strangeness；　and；　as　the　phrase　is；　to　find　ourselves　at　home　in　it：　which　means　no　more
than　to　trace　the　objective　world　back　to　the　notion　…　to　our　innermost　self。　We　may　learn　from　the
present　discussion　the　mistake　of　regarding　the　antithesis　of　subjectivity　and　objectivity　as　an
abstract　and　permanent　one。　The　two　are　wholly　dialectical。　The　notion　is　at　first　only　subjective：
but　without　the　assistance　of　any　foreign　material　or　stuff　it　proceeds；　in　obedience　to　its　own
action；　to　objectify　itself。　So；　too；　the　object　is　not　rigid　and　processless。　Its　process　is　to　show
itself　as　what　is　at　the　same　time　subjective；　and　thus　form　the　step　onwards　to　the　idea。　Any　one
who；　from　want　of　familiarity　with　the　categories　of　subjectivity　and　objectivity；　seeks　to　retain
them　in　their　abstraction　will　find　that　the　isolated　categories　slip　through　his　fingers　before　he　is
aware；　and　that　he　says　the　exact　contrary　of　what　he　wanted　to　say。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　194n2

（2）　Objectivity　contains　the　three　forms　of　Mechanism；　Chemism；　and　Teleology。　The　object　of
mechanical　type　is　the　immediate　and　undifferentiated　object。　No　doubt　it　contains　difference；　but
the　different　pieces　stand；　as　it　were；　without　affinity　to　each　other；　and　their　connection　is　only
extraneous。　In　chemism；　on　the　contrary；　the　object　exhibits　an　essential　tendency　to
differentiation；　in　such　a　way　that　the　objects　are　what　they　are　only　by　their　relati