shorter logic-第61节

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or　even　a　mere　general　representation；　and　therefore；　in　short；　a　finite　mode　of
thought　（cf。　§　62）。　

The　Logic　of　the　Notion　is　usually　treated　as　a　science　of　form　only；　and
understood　to　deal　with　the　form　of　notion；　judgment；　and　syllogism　as　form；
without　in　the　least　touching　the　question　whether　anything　is　true。　The　answer　to
that　question　is　supposed　to　depend　on　the　content　only。　If　the　logical　forms　of
the　notion　were　really　dead　and　inert　receptacles　of　conceptions　and　thoughts；
careless　of　what　they　contained；　knowledge　about　them　would　be　an　idle　curiosity
which　the　truth　might　dispense　with。　On　the　contrary　they　really　are；　as　forms　of
the　notion；　the　vital　spirit　of　the　actual　world。　That　only　is　true　of　the　actual　which
is　true　in　virtue　of　these　forms；　through　them　and　in　them。　As　yet；　however；　the
truth　of　these　forms　has　never　been　considered　or　examined　on　their　own　account
any　more　than　their　necessary　interconnection。　？　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　A。　THE　SUBJECTIVE　NOTION



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Development　of　the　Subjective　Notion
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Notion　…　Judgment　…　Syllogism



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（a）　The　Notion　as　Notion
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　163

The　Notion　as　Notion　contains　the　three　following　'moments'　or　functional　parts。　

（1）　The　first　is　Universality…meaning　that　it　is　in　free　equality　with　itself　in　its
specific　character。　

（2）　The　second　is　Particularity…that　is；　the　specific　character；　in　which　the
universal　continues　serenely　equal　to　itself。　

（3）　The　third　is　Individuality…meaning　the　reflection…into…self　of　the　specific
characters　of　universality　and　particularity；　which　negative　self…unity　has　complete
and　original　determinateness；　without　any　loss　to　its　self…identity　or　universality。　

Individual　and　actual　are　the　same　thing：　only　the　former　has　issued　from　the
notion；　and　is　thus；　as　a　universal；　stated　expressly　as　a　negative　identity　with
itself。　The　actual；　because　it　is　at　first　no　more　than　a　potential　or　immediate　unity
of　essence　or　existence；　may　possibly　have　effect：　but　the　individuality　of　the
notion　is　the　very　source　of　effectiveness；　effective　moreover　no　longer　as　the
cause　is；　with　a　show　of　effecting　something　else；　but　effective　of　itself。
Individuality；　however；　is　not　to　be　understood　to　mean　the　immediate　or　natural
individual；　as　when　we　speak　of　individual　things　or　individual　men：　for　that
special　phase　of　individuality　does　not　appear　till　we　come　to　the　judgment。　Every
function　and　'moment'　of　the　notion　is　itself　the　whole　notion　（§　160）；　but　the
individual　or　subject　is　the　notion　expressly　put　as　a　totality。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　163n1

The　notion　is　generally　associated　in　our　minds　with　abstract　generality；　and　on　that　account　it　is
often　described　as　a　general　conception。　We　speak；　accordingly；　of　the　notions　of　colour；　plant；
animal；　etc。　They　are　supposed　to　be　arrived　at　by　neglecting　the　particular　features　which
distinguish　the　different　colours；　plants；　and　animals　from　each　other；　and　by　retaining　those
common　to　them　all。　This　is　the　aspect　of　the　notion　which　is　familiar　to　understanding；　and　feeling
is　in　the　right　when　it　stigmatises　such　hollow　and　empty　notions　as　mere　phantoms　and　shadows。
But　the　universal　of　the　notion　is　not　a　mere　sum　of　features　common　to　several　things；　confronted
by　a　particular　which　enjoys　an　existence　of　its　own。　It　is；　on　the　contrary；　self…particularising　or
self…specifying；　and　with　undimmed　clearness　finds　itself　at　home　in　its　antithesis。　For　the　sake　both
of　cognition　and　of　our　practical　conduct；　it　is　of　the　utmost　importance　that　the　real　universal
should　not　be　confused　with　what　is　merely　held　in　common。　All　those　charges　which　the　devotees
of　feeling　make　against　thought；　and　especially　against　philosophic　thought；　and　the　reiterated
statement　that　is　dangerous　to　carry　thought　to　what　they　call　too　great　lengths；　originate　in　the
confusion　of　these　two　things。　

The　universal　in　its　true　and　comprehensive　meaning　is　a　thought　which；　as　we　know；　cost
thousands　of　years　to　make　it　enter　into　the　consciousness　of　men。　The　thought　did　not　gain　its　full
recognition　till　the　days　of　Christianity。　The　Greeks；　in　other　respects　so　advanced；　knew　neither
God　nor　even　man　in　their　true　universality。　The　gods　of　the　Greeks　were　only　particular　powers
of　the　mind；　and　the　universal　God；　the　God　of　all　nations；　was　to　the　Athenians　still　a　God
concealed。　They　believed　in　the　same　way　that　an　absolute　gulf　separated　themselves　from　the
barbarians。　Man　as　man　was　not　then　recognised　to　be　of　infinite　worth　and　to　have　infinite　rights。
The　question　has　been　asked；　why　slavery　has　vanished　from　modern　Europe。　One　special
circumstance　after　another　has　been　adduced　in　explanation　of　this　phenomenon。　But　the　real
ground　why　there　are　no　more　slaves　in　Christian　Europe　is　only　to　be　found　in　the　very　principle
of　Christianity　itself；　the　religion　of　absolute　freedom。　Only　in　Christendom　is　man　respected　as
man；　in　his　infinitude　and　universality。　What　the　slave　is　without；　is　the　recognition　that　he　is　a
person：　and　the　principle　of　personality　is　universality。　The　master　looks　upon　his　slave　not　as　a
person；　but　as　a　selfless　thing。　The　slave　is　not　himself　reckoned　an　'I'…his　'I'　is　his　master。　

The　distinction　referred　to　above　between　what　is　merely　in　common；　and　what　is　truly　universal；　is
strikingly　expressed　by　Rousseau　in　his　famous　Contrat　social；　when　he　says　that　the　laws　of　a
state　must　spring　from　the　universal　will　（volonte　generale）；　but　need　not　on　that　account　be　the
will　of　all　（volonte　de　tous）。　Rousseau　would　have　made　a　sounder　contribution　towards　a　theory
of　the　state；　if　he　had　always　kept　this　distinction　in　sight。　The　general　will　is　the　notion　of　the　will：
and　the　laws　are　the　special　clauses　of　this　will　and　based　upon　the　notion　of　it。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　163n2

We　add　a　remark　upon　the　account　of　the　origin　and　formation　of　notions　which　is　usually　given　in
the　Logic　of　Understanding。　It　is　not　we　who　frame　the　notions。　The　notion　is　not　something　which
is　originated　at　all。　No　doubt　the　notion　is　not　mere　Being；　or　the　immediate：　it　involves　mediation；
but　the　mediation　lies　in　itself。　In　other　words；　the　notion　is　what　is　mediated　through　itself　and　with
itself。　It　is　a　mistake　to　imagine　that　the　objects　which　form　the　content　of　our　mental　ideas　come
first　and　that　our　subjective　agency　then　supervenes；　and　by　the　aforesaid　operation　of　abstraction；
and　by　colligating　the　points　possessed　in　common　by　the　objects；　frames　notions　of　them。　Rather
the　notion　is　the　genuine　first；　and　things　are　what　they　are　through　the　action　of　the　notion；
immanent　in　them；　and　revealing　itself　in　them。　In　religious　language　we　express　this　by　saying　that
God　created　the　world　out　of　nothing。　In　other　words；　the　world　and　finite　things　have　issued　from
the　fullness　of　the　divine　thoughts　and　the　divine　decrees。　Thus　religion　recognises　thought　and
（more　exactly）　the　notion　to　be　the　infinite　form；　or　the　free　creative　activity；　which　can　realise　itself
without　the　help　of　a　matter　that　exists　outside　it。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　164

The　notion　is　concrete　out　and　out：　because　the　negative　unity　with　itself；　as
characterisation　pure　and　entire；　which　is　individuality；　is　just　what　constitutes　its
self…relation；　its　universality。　The　functions　or　'moments'　of　the　notion　are　to　this
extent　indissoluble。　The　categories　of　'reflection'　are　expected　to　be　severally
apprehended　and　separately　accepted　as　current；　apart　from　their　opposites。　But
in　the　notion；　where　their　identity　is　expressly　assumed；　each　of　its　functions　can
be　immediately　apprehended　only　from　and　with　the　rest。　

Universality；　particularity；　and　individuality　are；　taken　in　the　abstract；　the　same　as
identity；　difference；　and　ground。　But　the　universal　is　the　self…identical；　with　the
express　qualification；　that　it　simultaneously　contains　the　particular　and　the
individual。　Again；　the　particular　is　the　different　or　the　specific　character；　but　with
the　qualification　that　it　is　in　itself　universal　and　is　as　an　individual。　Similarly　the
individual　must　be　understood　to　be　a　subject　or　substratum；　which　involves　the
genus　and　species　in　itself　and　possesses　a　substantial　existence。　Such　is　the
explicit　or　realised　inseparability　of　the　functions　of　the　notion　in　their　difference
（§　160）…what　may　be　called　the　clearness　of　the　notion；　in　which　each　distinction
causes　no　dimness　or　interruption；　but　is　quite　as　much　transparent。　

No　complaint　is　oftener　made　against　the　notion　than　that　it　is　abstract。　Of　course
it　is　abstract；　if　abstract　means　that　the　medium　in　which　the　notion　exists　is
thought　in　general　and　not　the　sensible　thing　in　its　empirical　concreteness。　It　is
abstract　also；　because　the　notion　falls　short　of　the　idea。　To　this　extent　the
subjective　notion　is　still　formal。　This　however　does　not　mean　that　it　ought　to　have
or　receive　another　content　than　its　own。　It　is　itself　the　absolute　form；　and　so　is　all
specific　character；　but　as　that　character　is