shorter logic-第60节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


assertion。　The　truth　when　it　is　thought　must　as　such　verify　itself　to　thought。　If　the　notion　were　put　at
the　head　of　Logic；　and　defined；　quite　correctly　in　point　of　content；　as　the　unity　of　Being　and
Essence；　the　following　question　would　come　up：　What　are　we　to　think　under　the　terms　'Being'　and
'Essence'；　and　how　do　they　come　to　be　embraced　in　the　unity　of　the　Notion？　But　if　we　answered
these　questions；　then　our　beginning　with　the　notion　would　merely　be　nominal。　The　real　start　would
be　made　with　Being；　as　we　have　here　done：　with　this　difference；　that　the　characteristics　of　Being　as
well　as　those　of　Essence　would　have　to　be　accepted　uncritically　from　figurate　conception；　whereas
we　have　observed　Being　and　Essence　in　their　own　dialectical　development　and　learnt　how　they
lose　themselves　in　the　unity　of　the　notion。　




Third　Subdivision　of　The　Logic；
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　IX。　NOTION
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　160

The　Notion　is　the　principle　of　freedom；　the　power　of　substance　self…realised。　It　is
a　systematic　whole；　in　which　each　of　its　constituent　functions　is　the　very　total
which　the　notion　is；　and　is　put　as　indissolubly　one　with　it。　Thus　in　its　self…identity
it　has　original　and　complete　determinateness。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　160n

The　position　taken　up　by　the　notion　is　that　of　absolute　idealism。　Philosophy　is　a　knowledge　through
notions　because　it　sees　that　what　on　other　grades　of　consciousness　is　taken　to　have　Being；　and　to
be　naturally　or　immediately　independent；　is　but　a　constituent　stage　in　the　Idea。　In　the　logic　of
understanding；　the　notion　is　generally　reckoned　a　mere　form　of　thought；　and　treated　as　a　general
conception。　It　is　to　this　inferior　view　of　the　notion　that　the　assertion　refers；　so　often　urged　on　behalf
of　the　heart　and　sentiment；　that　notions　as　such　are　something　dead；　empty；　and　abstract。　The　case
is　really　quite　the　reverse。　

The　notion　is；　on　the　contrary；　the　principle　of　all　life；　and　thus　possesses　at　the　same　time　a
character　of　thorough　concreteness。　That　it　is　so　follows　from　the　whole　logical　movement　up　to
this　point；　and　need　not　be　here　proved。　The　contrast　between　form　and　content；　which　is　thus
used　to　criticise　the　notion　when　it　is　alleged　to　be　merely　formal；　has；　like　all　the　other　contrasts
upheld　by　reflection；　been　already　left　behind　and　overcome　dialectically　or　through　itself。　The
notion；　in　short；　is　what　contains　all　the　earlier　categories　of　thought　merged　in　it。　It　certainly　is　a
form；　but　an　infinite　and　creative　form　which　includes；　but　at　the　same　time　releases　from　itself；　the
fullness　of　all　content。　And　so　too　the　notion　may；　if　it　be　wished；　be　styled　abstract；　if　the　name
concrete　is　restricted　to　the　concrete　facts　of　sense　or　of　immediate　perception。　For　the　notion　is
not　palpable　to　the　touch；　and　when　we　are　engaged　with　it；　hearing　and　seeing　must　quite　fail　us。
And　yet；　as　it　was　before　remarked；　the　notion　is　a　true　concrete；　for　the　reason　that　it　involves
Being　and　Essence；　and　the　total　wealth　of　these　two　spheres　with　them；　merged　in　the　unity　of
thought。　

？

If；　as　was　said　at　an　earlier　point；　the　different　stages　of　the　logical　idea　are　to　be　treated　as　a
series　of　definitions　of　the　Absolute；　the　definition　which　now　results　for　us　is　that　the　Absolute　is
the　Notion。　That　necessitates　a　higher　estimate　of　the　notion；　however；　than　is　found　in　formal
conceptualist　Logic；　where　the　notion　is　a　mere　form　of　our　subjective　thought；　with　no　original
content　of　its　own。　But　if　Speculative　Logic　thus　attaches　a　meaning　to　the　term　notion　so　very
different　from　that　usually　given；　it　may　be　asked　why　the　same　word　should　be　employed　in　two
contrary　acceptations；　and　an　occasion　thus　given　for　confusion　and　misconception。　The　answer　is
that；　great　as　the　interval　is　between　the　speculative　notion　and　the　notion　of　Formal　Logic；　a
closer　examination　shows　that　the　deeper　meaning　is　not　so　foreign　to　the　general　usages　of
language　as　it　seems　at　first　sight。　We　speak　of　the　deduction　of　a　content　from　the　notion；　e。g。　of
the　specific　provisions　of　the　law　of　property　from　the　notion　of　property；　and　so　again　we　speak
of　tracing　back　these　material　details　to　the　notion。　We　thus　recognise　that　the　notion　is　no　mere
form　without　a　content　of　its　own：　for　if　it　were；　there　would　be　in　the　one　case　nothing　to　deduce
from　such　a　form；　and　in　the　other　case　to　trace　a　given　body　of　fact　back　to　the　empty　form　of　the
notion　would　only　rob　the　fact　of　its　specific　character；　without　making　it　understood。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　161
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Development

The　onward　movement　of　the　notion　is　no　longer　either　a　transition　into；　or　a
reflection　on　something　else；　but　Development。　For　in　the　notion；　the　elements
distinguished　are　without　more　ado　at　the　same　time　declared　to　be　identical　with
one　another　and　with　the　whole；　and　the　specific　character　of　each　is　a　free　being
of　the　whole　notion。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　161n

Transition　into　something　else　is　the　dialectical　process　within　the　range　of　Being：　reflection
（bringing　something　else　into　light）；　in　the　range　of　Essence。　The　movement　of　the　Notion　is
development：　by　which　that　only　is　explicit　which　is　already　implicitly　present。　In　the　world　of
nature　it　is　organic　life　that　corresponds　to　the　grade　of　the　notion。　Thus　e。g。　the　plant　is　developed
from　its　germ。　The　germ　virtually　involves　the　whole　plant；　but　does　so　only　ideally　or　in　thought：
and　it　would　therefore　be　a　mistake　to　regard　the　development　of　the　root；　stem；　leaves；　and　other
different　parts　of　the　plant；　as　meaning　that　they　were　realiter　present；　but　in　a　very　minute　form；
in　the　germ。　That　is　the　so…called　'box…within…box'　hypothesis；　a　theory　which　commits　the　mistake
of　supposing　an　actual　existence　of　what　is　at　first　found　only　as　a　postulate　of　the　completed
thought。　The　truth　of　the　hypothesis　on　the　other　hand　lies　in　its　perceiving　that　in　the　process　of
development　the　notion　keeps　to　itself　and　only　gives　rise　to　alteration　of　form；　without　making　any
addition　in　point　of　content。　It　is　this　nature　of　the　notion　…　this　manifestation　of　itself　in　its　process
as　a　development　of　its　own　self　which　is　chiefly　in　view　with　those　who　speak　of　innate　ideas；　or
who；　like　Plato；　describe　all　learning　merely　as　reminiscence。　Of　course　that　again　does　not　mean
that　everything　which　is　embodied　in　a　mind；　after　that　mind　has　been　formed　by　instructions　had
been　present　in　that　mind　beforehand；　in　its　definitely　expanded　shape。　

The　movement　of　the　notion　is　as　it　were　to　be　looked　upon　merely　as　plan：　the　other　which　it　sets
up　is　in　reality　not　an　other。　Or；　as　it　is　expressed　in　the　teaching　of　Christianity：　not　merely　has
God　created　a　World　which　confronts　him　as　an　other；　he　has　also　from　all　eternity　begotten　a　Son
in　whom　he；　a　Spirit；　is　at　home　with　himself。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　162

The　doctrine　of　the　notion　is　divided　into　three　parts。　

（1）　The　first　is　the　doctrine　of　the　Subjective　or　Formal　Notion。　

（2）　The　second　is　the　doctrine　of　the　notion　invested　with　the　character　of
immediacy；　or　of　Objectivity。　

（3）　The　third　is　the　doctrine　of　the　Idea；　the　subject…object；　the　unity　of　notion
and　objectivity；　the　absolute　truth。　

The　Common　Logic　covers　only　the　matters　which　come　before　us　here　as　a
portion　of　the　third　part　of　the　whole　system；　together　with　the　so…called　Laws　of
Thought；　which　we　have　already　met；　and　in　the　Applied　Logic　it　adds　a　little
about　cognition。　This　is　combined　with　psychological；　metaphysical；　and　all　sorts
of　empirical　materials；　which　were　introduced　because；　when　all　was　done；　those
forms　of　thought　could　not　be　made　to　do　all　that　was　required　of　them。　But　with
these　additions　the　science　lost　its　unity　of　aim。　Then　there　was　a　further
circumstance　against　the　Common　Logic。　Those　forms；　which　at　least　do　belong
to　the　proper　domain　of　Logic；　are　supposed　to　be　categories　of　conscious
thought　only；　of　thought　too　in　the　character　of　understanding；　not　of　reason。　

The　preceding　logical　categories；　those　viz。　of　Being　and　Essence；　are；　it　is　true；
no　mere　logical　modes　or　entities：　they　are　proved　to　be　notions　in　their　transition
or　their　dialectical　element；　and　in　their　return　into　themselves　and　totality。　But
they　are　only　in　a　modified　form　notions　（cf。　§§　84　and　112）；　notions
rudimentary；　or；　what　is　the　same　thing；　notions　for　us。　The　antithetical　term　into
which　each　category　passes；　or　in　which　it　shines；　so　producing　correlation；　is　not
characterised　as　a　particular。　The　third；　in　which　they　return　to　unity；　is　not
characterised　as　a　subject　or　a　individual：　nor　is　there　any　explicit　statement　that
the　category　is　identical　in　its　antithesis　…　in　other　words；　its　freedom　is　not
expressly　stated：　and　all　this　because　the　category　is　not　universality。　What
generally　passes　current　under　the　name　of　a　notion　is　a　mode　of　understanding；
or　even　a　mere　general　representation；　and　therefore；　in　short；　a　finite　mode　of
thought　（cf。　§　62）。　

The　Logic　of　the　Notion　is