shorter logic-第27节

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here。　The　things　of　nature　are　limited　and　are　natural　things　only　to　such　extent　as
they　are　not　aware　of　their　universal　limit；　or　to　such　extent　as　their　mode　or
quality　is　a　limit　from　our　point　of　view；　and　not　from　their　own。　No　one　knows；
or　even　feels；　that　anything　is　a　limit　or　defect；　until　he　is　at　the　same　time　above
and　beyond　it。　Living　beings；　for　example；　possess　the　privilege　of　pain　which　is
denied　to　the　inanimate：　even　with　living　beings；　a　single　mode　or　quality　passes
into　the　feeling　of　a　negative。　For　living　beings　as　such　possess　within　them　a
universal　vitality；　which　overpasses　and　includes　the　single　mode；　and　thus；　as
they　maintain　themselves　in　the　negative　of　themselves；　they　feel　the
contradiction　to　exist　within　them。　But　the　contradiction　is　within　them　only　in　so
far　as　one　and　the　same　subject　includes　both　the　universality　of　their　sense　of
life；　and　the　individual　mode　which　is　in　negation　with　it。　This　illustration　will
show　how　a　limit　or　imperfection　in　knowledge　comes　to　be　termed　a　limit　or
imperfection；　only　when　it　is　compared　with　the　actually　present　Idea　of　the
universal；　of　a　total　and　perfect。　A　very　little　consideration　might　show　that　to　call
a　thing　finite　or　limited　proves　by　implication　the　very　presence　of　the　infinite　and
unlimited；　and　that　our　knowledge　of　a　limit　can　only　be　when　the　unlimited　is　on
this　side　in　consciousness。　

The　result　however　of　Kant's　view　of　cognition　suggests　a　second　remark。　The
philosophy　of　Kant　could　have　no　influence　on　the　method　of　the　sciences。　It
leaves　the　categories　and　method　of　ordinary　knowledge　quite　unmolested。
Occasionally；　it　may　be；　in　the　first　sections　of　a　scientific　work　of　that　period；　we
find　propositions　borrowed　from　the　Kantian　philosophy；　but　the　course　of　the
treatise　renders　it　apparent　that　these　propositions　were　superfluous　decoration；
and　that　the　few　first　pages　might　have　been　omitted　without　producing　the　least
change　in　the　empirical　contents。　

We　may　next　institute　a　comparison　of　Kant　with　the　metaphysics　of　the
empirical　school。　Natural　plain　Empiricism；　though　it　unquestionably　insists　most
upon　sensuous　perception；　still　allows　a　supersensible　world　or　spiritual　reality；
whatever　may　be　its　structure　and　constitution；　and　whether　derived　from
intellect；　or　from　imagination；　etc。　So　far　as　form　goes；　the　facts　of　this
supersensible　world　rest　on　the　authority　of　mind；　in　the　same　way　as　the　other
facts　embraced　in　empirical　knowledge　rest　on　the　authority　of　external
perception。　But　when　Empiricism　becomes　reflective　and　logically　consistent；　it
turns　its　arms　against　this　dualism　in　the　ultimate　and　highest　species　of　fact；　it
denies　the　independence　of　the　thinking　principle　and　of　a　spiritual　world　which
develops　itself　in　thought。　Materialism　or　Naturalism；　therefore；　is　the　consistent
and　thoroughgoing　system　of　Empiricism。　In　direct　opposition　to　such　an
Empiricism；　Kant　asserts　the　principle　of　thought　and　freedom；　and　attaches
himself　to　the　first　mentioned　form　of　empirical　doctrine；　the　general　principles　of
which　he　never　departed　from。　There　is　a　dualism　in　his　philosophy　also。　On　one
side　stands　the　world　of　sensation；　and　of　the　understanding　which　reflects　upon
it。　This　world；　it　is　true；　he　alleges　to　be　a　world　of　appearances。　But　that　is　only　a
title　or　formal　description；　for　the　source；　the　facts；　and　the　modes　of　observation
continue　quite　the　same　as　in　Empiricism。　On　the　other　side　and　independent
stands　a　self…apprehending　thought；　the　principle　of　freedom；　which　Kant　has　in
common　with　ordinary　and　bygone　metaphysic；　but　emptied　of　all　that　it　held；
and　without　his　being　able　to　infuse　into　it　anything　new。　For；　in　the　Critical
doctrine；　thought；　or；　as　it　is　there　called；　Reason；　is　divested　of　every　specific
form；　and　thus　bereft　of　all　authority。　The　main　effect　of　the　Kantian　philosophy
has　been　to　revive　the　consciousness　of　Reason；　or　the　absolute　inwardness　of
thought。　Its　abstractness　indeed　prevented　that　inwardness　from　developing　into
anything；　or　from　originating　any　special　forms；　whether　cognitive　principles　or
moral　laws；　but　nevertheless　it　absolutely　refused　to　accept　or　indulge　anything
possessing　the　character　of　an　externality。　Henceforth　the　principle　of　the
independence　of　Reason；　or　of　its　absolute　self…subsistence；　is　made　a　general
principle　of　philosophy；　as　well　as　a　foregone　conclusion　of　the　time。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§60n

（1）　The　Critical　philosophy　has　one　great　negative　merit。　It　has　brought　home　the　conviction　that
the　categories　of　understanding　are　finite　in　their　range；　and　that　any　cognitive　process　confined
within　their　pale　falls　short　of　the　truth。　But　Kant　had　only　a　sight　of　half　the　truth。　He　explained　the
finite　nature　of　the　categories　to　mean　that　they　were　subjective　only；　valid　only　for　our　thought；
from　which　the　thing…in…itself　was　divided　by　an　impassable　gulf。　In　fact；　however；　it　is　not　because
they　are　subjective　that　the　categories　are　finite：　they　are　finite　by　their　very　nature；　and　it　is　on　their
own　selves　that　it　is　requisite　to　exhibit　their　finitude。　Kant　however　holds　that　what　we　think　is
false；　because　it　is　we　who　think　it。　A　further　deficiency　in　the　system　is　that　it　gives　only　a
historical　description　of　thought；　and　a　mere　enumeration　of　the　factors　of　consciousness。　The
enumeration　is　in　the　main　correct：　but　not　a　word　touches　upon　the　necessity　of　what　is　thus
empirically　colligated。　The　observations　made　on　the　various　stages　of　consciousness　culminant　in
the　summary　statement　that　the　content　of　all　we　are　acquainted　with　is　only　an　appearance。　And
as　it　is　true　at　least　that　all　finite　thinking　is　concerned　with　appearances；　so　far　the　conclusion　is
justified。　This　stage　of　'appearance'　however　…　the　phenomenal　world　…　is　not　the　terminus　of
thought：　there　is　another　and　a　higher　region。　But　that　region　was　to　the　Kantian　philosophy　an
inaccessible　'other　world'。　

（2）　After　all　it　was　only　formally　that　the　Kantian　system　established　the　principle　that　thought　is
spontaneous　and　self…determining。　Into　details　of　the　manner　and　the　extent　of　this
self…determination　of　thought；　Kant　never　went。　It　was　Fichte　who　first　noticed　the　omission；　and
who；　after　he　had　called　attention　to　the　want　of　a　deduction　for　the　categories；　endeavoured　really
to　supply　something　of　the　kind。　With　Fichte；　the　'Ego'　is　the　starting…point　in　the　philosophical
development：　and　the　outcome　of　its　action　is　supposed　to　be　visible　in　the　categories。　But　in
Fichte　the　'Ego'　is　not　really　presented　as　a　free；　spontaneous　energy；　it　is　supposed　to　receive　its
first　excitation　by　a　shock　or　impulse　from　without。　Against　this　shock　the　'Ego'　will；　it　is　assumed；
react；　and　only　through　this　reaction　does　it　first　become　conscious　of　itself。　Meanwhile；　the　nature
of　the　impulse　remains　a　stranger　beyond　our　pale：　and　the　'Ego'；　with　something　else　always
confronting　it；　is　weighted　with　a　condition。　Fichte；　in　consequence；　never　advanced　beyond
Kant's　conclusion；　that　the　finite　only　is　knowable；　while　the　infinite　transcends　the　range　of
thought。　What　Kant　calls　the　thing…by…itself；　Fichte　calls　the　impulse　from　without　…　that　abstraction
of　something　else　than　'I'；　not　otherwise　describable　or　definable　than　as　the　negative　or　non…Ego
in　general。　The　'I'　is　thus　looked　at　as　standing　in　essential　relation　with　the　not…I；　through　which　its
act　of　self…determination　is　first　awakened。　And　in　this　manner　the　'I'　is　but　the　continuous　act　of
self…liberation　from　this　impulse；　never　gaining　a　real　freedom；　because　with　the　surcease　of　the
impulse　the　'I'；　whose　being　is　its　action；　would　also　cease　to　be。　Nor　is　the　content　produced　by
the　action　of　the　'　I'　at　all　different　from　the　ordinary　content　of　experience；　except　by　the
supplementary　remark；　that　this　content　is　mere　appearance。　




III。　Third　Attitude　of　Thought　to　Objectivity
　　　　　　　IMMEDIATE　OR　INTUITIVE　KNOWLEDGE


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　61

If　we　are　to　believe　the　Critical　philosophy；　thought　is　subjective；　and　its　ultimate
and　invincible　mode　is　abstract　universality　or　formal　identity。　Thought　is　thus
set　in　opposition　to　Truth；　which　is　no　abstraction；　but　concrete　universality。　In
this　highest　mode　of　thought；　which　is　entitled　Reason；　the　Categories　are　left　out
of　account。　The　extreme　theory　on　the　opposite　side　holds　thought　to　be　an　act　of
the　particular　only；　and　on　that　ground　declares　it　incapable　of　apprehending　the
Truth。　This　is　the　Intuitional　theory。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§62

According　to　this　theory；　thinking；　a　private　and　particular　operation；　has　its　whole
scope　and　product　in　the　Categories。　But　these　Categories；　as　arrested　by　the
understanding；　are　limited　vehicles　of　thought；　forms　of　the　conditioned；　of　the
dependent　and　derivative。　A　thought　limited　to　these　modes　has　no　sense　of　the
Infinite　and　the　True；　and　cannot　bridge　over　the　gulf　that　separates　it　from　them。
（This　stricture　refers　to　the　proofs　of　God's　existence。）　These　inadequate　modes
or　categories　are　also　spoken　of