shorter logic-第19节

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the　initial　step。　The　relation　of　the　two　things　is　reversed；　and　what　came　as　a　consequence　being
shown　to　be　an　antecedent；　the　original　antecedent　is　reduced　to　a　consequence。　This　is　always
the　way；　moreover；　whenever　reason　demonstrates。　

If　in　the　light　of　the　present　discussion　we　cast　one　glance　more　on　the　metaphysical　method　as　a
whole；　we　find　its　main　characteristic　was　to　make　abstract　identity　its　principle　and　to　try　to
apprehend　the　objects　of　reason　by　the　abstract　and　finite　categories　of　the　understanding。　But　this
infinite　of　the　understanding；　this　pure　essence；　is　still　finite：　it　has　excluded　all　the　variety　of
particular　things；　which　thus　limit　and　deny　it。　Instead　of　winning　a　concrete；　this　metaphysic　stuck
fast　on　an　abstract；　identity。　Its　good　point　was　the　perception　that　thought　alone　constitutes　the
essence　of　all　that　is。　It　derived　its　materials　from　earlier　philosophers；　particularly　the　Schoolmen。
In　speculative　philosophy　the　understanding　undoubtedly　forms　a　stage；　but　not　a　stage　at　which
we　should　keep　for　ever　standing。　Plato　is　no　metaphysician　of　this　imperfect　type；　still　less
Aristotle；　although　the　contrary　is　generally　believed。　




III。　Second　Attitude　of　Thought　to　Objectivity
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ONE。　EMPIRICISM


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§37

Under　these　circumstances　a　double　want　began　to　be　felt。　Partly　it　was　the　need
of　a　concrete　subject…matter；　as　a　counterpoise　to　the　abstract　theories　of　the
understanding；　which　is　unable　to　advance　unaided　from　its　generalities　to
specialisation　and　determination。　Partly；　too；　it　was　the　demand　for　something
fixed　and　secure；　so　as　to　exclude　the　possibility　of　proving　anything　and
everything　in　the　sphere；　and　according　to　the　method　of　the　finite　formulae　of
thought。　Such　was　the　genesis　of　Empirical　philosophy；　which　abandons　the
search　for　truth　in　thought　itself；　and　goes　to　fetch　it　from　Experience；　the
outward　and　the　inward　present。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§37n

The　rise　of　Empiricism　is　due　to　the　need　thus　stated　of　concrete　contents；　and　a　firm　footing　…
needs　which　the　abstract　metaphysic　of　the　understanding　failed　to　satisfy。　Now　by　concreteness
of　contents　it　is　meant　that　we　must　know　the　objects　of　consciousness　as　intrinsically　determinate
and　as　the　unity　of　distinct　characteristics。　But；　as　we　have　already　seen；　this　is　by　no　means　the
case　with　the　metaphysic　of　understanding；　if　it　conform　to　its　principle。　With　the　mere
understanding；　thinking　is　limited　to　the　form　of　an　abstract　universal；　and　can　never　advance　to　the
particularisation　of　this　universal。　Thus　we　find　the　metaphysicians　engaged　in　an　attempt　to　elicit
by　the　instrumentality　of　thought　what　was　the　essence　or　fundamental　attribute　of　the　Soul。　The
Soul；　they　said；　is　simple。　The　simplicity　thus　ascribed　to　the　Soul　meant　a　mere　and　utter
simplicity；　from　which　difference　is　excluded：　difference；　or　in　other　words　composition；　being
made　the　fundamental　attribute　of　body；　or　of　matter　in　general。　Clearly；　in　simplicity　of　this　narrow
type　we　have　a　very　shallow　category；　quite　incapable　of　embracing　the　wealth　of　the　soul　or　of
the　mind。　When　it　thus　appeared　that　abstract　metaphysical　thinking　was　inadequate；　it　was　felt
that　resource　must　be　had　to　empirical　psychology。　The　same　happened　in　the　case　of　Rational
Physics。　The　current　phrases　there　were；　for　instance；　that　space　is　infinite；　that　Nature　makes　no
leap；　etc。　Evidently　this　phraseology　was　wholly　unsatisfactory　in　presence　of　the　plenitude　and　life
of　nature。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　38

To　some　extent　this　source　from　which　Empiricism　draws　is　common　to　it　with
metaphysic。　It　is　in　our　materialised　conceptions；　i。e。　in　facts　which　emanate；　in
the　first　instance；　from　experience；　that　metaphysic　also　finds　the　guarantee　for
the　correctness　of　its　definitions　（including　both　its　initial　assumptions　and　its
more　detailed　body　of　doctrine）。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　it　must　be　noted　that　the
single　sensation　is　not　the　same　thing　as　experience；　and　that　the　Empirical　School
elevates　the　facts　included　under　sensation；　feeling；　and　perception　into　the　form
of　general　ideas　propositions；　or　laws。　This；　however；　it　does　with　the　reservation
that　these　general　principles　（such　as　force）　are　to　have　no　further　import　or
validity　of　their　own　beyond　that　taken　from　the　sense　impression；　and　that　no
connection　shall　be　deemed　legitimate　except　what　can　be　shown　to　exist　in
phenomena。　And　on　the　subjective　side　Empirical　cognition　has　its　stable　footing
in　the　fact　that　in　a　sensation　consciousness　is　directly　present　and　certain　of
itself。　

In　Empiricism　lies　the　great　principle　that　whatever　is　true　must　be　in　the　actual
world　and　present　to　sensation。　This　principle　contradicts　that　'ought　to　be'　on　the
strength　of　which　'reflection'　is　vain　enough　to　treat　the　actual　present　with　scorn
and　to　point　to　a　scene　beyond　a　scene　which　is　assumed　to　have　place　and　being
only　in　the　understanding　of　those　who　talk　of　it。　No　less　than　Empiricism；
philosophy　（§　7）　recognises　only　what　is；　and　has　nothing　to　do　with　what　merely
ought　to　be　and　what　is　thus　confessed　not　to　exist。　On　the　subjective　side；　too；　it
is　right　to　notice　the　valuable　principle　of　freedom　involved　in　Empiricism。　For　the
main　lesson　of　Empiricism　is　that　man　must　see　for　himself　and　feel　that　he　is
present　in　every　fact　of　knowledge　which　he　has　to　accept。　

When　it　is　carried　out　to　its　legitimate　consequences；　Empiricism　being　in　its　facts
limited　to　the　finite　sphere　denies　the　supersensible　in　general；　or　at　least　any
knowledge　of　it　which　would　define　its　nature；　it　leaves　thought　no　powers　except
abstraction　and　formal　universality　and　identity。　But　there　is　a　fundamental
delusion　in　all　scientific　empiricism。　It　employs　the　metaphysical　categories　of
matter；　force；　those　of　one；　many；　generality；　infinity；　etc。；　following　the　clue
given　by　these　categories　it　proceeds　to　draw　conclusions；　and　in　so　doing
presupposes　and　applies　the　syllogistic　form。　And　all　the　while　it　is　unaware　that　it
contains　metaphysics　in　wielding　which；　it　makes　use　of　those　categories　and　their
combinations　in　a　style　utterly　thoughtless　and　uncritical。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§38n

From　Empiricism　came　the　cry：　'Stop　roaming　in　empty　abstractions　keep　your　eyes　open；　lay
hold　on　man　and　nature　as　they　are　here　before　you；　enjoy　the　present　moment。'　Nobody　can
deny　that　there　is　a　good　deal　of　truth　in　these　words。　The　everyday　world；　what　is　here　and　now
was　a　good　exchange　for　the　futile　other…world　…　for　the　mirages　and　the　chimeras　of　the　abstract
understanding。　And　thus　was　acquired　an　infinite　principle　…　that　solid　footing　so　much　missed　in
the　old　metaphysic。　Finite　principles　are　the　most　that　the　understanding　can　pick　out　…　and　these
being　essentially　unstable　and　tottering；　the　structure　they　supported　must　collapse　with　a　crash。
Always　the　instinct　of　reason　was　to　find　an　infinite　principle。　As　yet；　the　time　had　not　come　for
finding　it　in　thought。　Hence；　this　instinct　seized　upon　the　present；　the　Here；　the　This　…　where
doubtless　there　is　implicit　infinite　form；　but　not　in　the　genuine　existence　of　that　form。　The　external
world　is　the　truth；　it　if　could　but　know　it：　for　the　truth　is　actual　and　must　exist。　The　infinite　principle；
the　self…centred　truth；　therefore；　is　in　the　world　for　reason　to　discover：　though　it　exists　in　an
individual　and　sensible　shape；　and　not　in　its　truth。　

Besides；　this　school　makes　sense…perception　the　form　in　which　fact　is　to　be　apprehended；　and　in
this　consists　the　defect　of　Empiricism。　Sense　perception　as　such　is　always　individual；　always
transient：　not　indeed　that　the　process　of　knowledge　stops　short　at　sensation：　on　the　contrary；　it
proceeds　to　find　out　the　universal　and　permanent　element　in　the　individual　apprehended　by　sense。
This　is　the　process　leading　from　simple　perception　to　experience。　

In　order　to　form　experiences；　Empiricism　makes　especial　use　of　the　form　of　Analysis。　In　the
impression　of　sense　we　have　a　concrete　of　many　elements；　the　several　attributes　of　which　we　are
expected　to　peel　off　one　by　one；　like　the　coats　of　an　onion。　In　thus　dismembering　the　thing；　it　is
understood　that　we　disintegrate　and　take　to　pieces　these　attributes　which　have　coalesced；　and　add
nothing　but　our　own　act　of　disintegration。　Yet　analysis　is　the　process　from　the　immediacy　of
sensation　to　thought：　those　attributes；　which　the　object　analysed　contains　in　union；　acquire　the　form
of　universality　by　being　separated。　Empiricism　therefore　labours　under　a　delusion；　if　it　supposes
that；　while　analysing　the　objects；　it　leaves　them　as　they　were：　it　really　transforms　the　concrete　into
an　abstract。　And　as　a　consequence　of　this　change　the　living　thing　is　killed：　life　can　exist　only　in　the
concrete　and　one。　Not　that　we　can　do　without　this　division；　if　it　be　our　intention　to　comprehend。
Mind　itself　is　an　inherent　division。　The　error　lies　in　forgetting　that　this　is　only　one　half　of　the
process；　and　that　the　main　point　is　the　reunion　of　what　has　been　parted。