shorter logic-第16节

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thought　we　must　not　forget　the　difference　between　finite　or　discursive　thinking　and　the　thinking
which　is　infinite　and　rational。　The　categories；　as　they　meet　us　prima　facie　and　in　isolation；　are　finite
forms。　But　truth　is　always　infinite；　and　cannot　be　expressed　or　presented　to　consciousness　in　finite
terms。　The　phrase　infinite　thought　may　excite　surprise；　if　we　adhere　to　the　modern　conception
that　thought　is　always　limited。　But　it　is；　speaking　rightly；　the　very　essence　of　thought　to　be　infinite。
The　nominal　explanation　of　calling　a　thing　finite　is　that　it　has　an　end；　that　it　exists　up　to　a　certain
point　only；　where　it　comes　into　contact　with；　and　is　limited　by；　its　other。　The　finite　therefore
subsists　in　reference　to　its　other；　which　is　its　negation　and　presents　itself　as　its　limit。　Now　thought　is
always　in　its　own　sphere　its　relations　are　with　itself；　and　it　is　its　own　object。　In　having　a　thought　for
object；　I　am　at　home　with　myself。　The　thinking　power；　the　'I'；　is　therefore　infinite；　because；　when　it
thinks；　it　is　in　relation　to　an　object　which　is　itself。　Generally　speaking；　an　object　means　a　something
else；　a　negative　confronting　me。　But　in　the　case　where　thought　thinks　itself；　it　has　an　object　which　is
at　the　same　time　no　object：　in　other　words；　its　objectivity　is　suppressed　and　transformed　into　an
idea。　Thought；　as　thought；　therefore　in　its　unmixed　nature　involves　no　limits；　it　is　finite　only　when　it
keeps　to　limited　categories；　which　it　believes　to　be　ultimate。　Infinite　or　speculative　thought；　on　the
contrary；　while　it　no　less　defines；　does　in　the　very　act　of　limiting　and　defining　make　that　defect
vanish。　And　so　infinity　is　not；　as　most　frequently　happens；　to　be　conceived　as　an　abstract　away
and　away　for　ever　and　ever；　but　in　the　simple　manner　previously　indicated。　

The　thinking　of　the　old　metaphysical　system　was　finite。　Its　whole　mode　of　action　was　regulated　by
categories；　the　limits　of　which　it　believed　to　be　permanently　fixed　and　not　subject　to　any　further
negation。　Thus；　one　of　its　questions　was：　Has　God　existence？　The　question　supposes　that
existence　is　an　altogether　positive　term；　a　sort　of　ne　plus　ultra。　We　shall　see　however　at　a　later
point　that　existence　is　by　no　means　a　merely　positive　term；　but　one　which　is　too　low　for　the
Absolute　Idea；　and　unworthy　of　God。　A　second　question　in　these　metaphysical　systems　was：　Is
the　world　finite　or　infinite　？　The　very　terms　of　the　question　assume　that　the　finite　is　a　permanent
contradictory　to　the　infinite：　and　one　can　easily　see　that；　when　they　are　so　opposed；　the　infinite；
which　of　course　ought　to　be　the　whole；　only　appears　as　a　single　aspect　and　suffers　restriction　from
the　finite。　But　a　restricted　infinity　is　itself　only　a　finite。　In　the　same　way　it　was　asked　whether　the
soul　was　simple　or　composite。　Simpleness　was；　in　other　words；　taken　to　be　an　ultimate
characteristic；　giving　expression　to　a　whole　truth。　Far　from　being　so；　simpleness　is　the　expression
of　a　half…truth；　as　one…sided　and　abstract　as　existence　…　a　term　of　thought；　which；　as　we　shall
hereafter　see；　is　itself　untrue　and　hence　unable　to　hold　truth。　If　the　soul　be　viewed　as　merely　and
abstractly　simple；　it　is　characterised　in　an　inadequate　and　finite　way。　

It　was　therefore　the　main　question　of　the　pre…Kantian　metaphysic　to　discover　whether　predicates
of　the　kind　mentioned　were　to　be　ascribed　to　its　objects。　Now　these　predicates　are　after　all　only
limited　formulae　of　the　understanding　which；　instead　of　expressing　the　truth；　merely　impose　a　limit。
More　than　this；　it　should　be　noted　that　the　chief　feature　of　the　method　lay　in　'assigning'　or
'attributing'　predicates　to　the　object　that　was　to　be　cognised；　for　example；　to　God。　But　attribution
is　no　more　than　an　external　reflection　about　the　object：　the　predicates　by　which　the　object　is　to　be
determined　are　supplied　from　the　resources　of　picture…thought；　and　are　applied　in　a　mechanical
way。　Whereas；　if　we　are　to　have　genuine　cognition；　the　object　must　characterise　its　own　self　and
not　derive　its　predicates　from　without。　Even　supposing　we　follow　the　method　of　predicating；　the
mind　cannot　help　feeling　that　predicates　of　this　sort　fail　to　exhaust　the　object。　From　the　same　point
of　view　the　Orientals　are　quite　correct　in　calling　God　the　many…named　or　the　myriad…named　One。
One　after　another　of　these　finite　categories　leaves　the　soul　unsatisfied；　and　the　Oriental　sage　is
compelled　unceasingly　to　seek　for　more　and　more　of　such　predicates。　In　finite　things　it　is　no　doubt
the　case　that　they　have　to　be　characterised　through　finite　predicates：　and　with　these　things　the
understanding　finds　proper　scope　for　its　special　action。　Itself　finite；　it　knows　only　the　nature　of　the
finite。　Thus；　when　I　call　some　action　a　theft；　I　have　characterised　the　action　in　its　essential　facts；
and　such　a　knowledge　is　sufficient　for　the　judge。　Similarly；　finite　things　stand　to　each　other　as　cause
and　effect；　force　and　exercise；　and　when　they　are　apprehended　in　these　categories；　they　are
known　in　their　finitude。　But　the　objects　of　reason　cannot　be　defined　by　these　finite　predicates。　To
try　to　do　so　was　the　defect　of　the　old　metaphysic。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§29

Predicates　of　this　kind；　taken　individually；　have　but　a　limited　range　of　meaning；
and　no　one　can　fail　to　perceive　how　inadequate　they　are；　and　how　far　they　fall
below　the　fullness　of　detail　which　our　imaginative　thought　gives；　in　the　case；　for
example；　of　God；　Mind；　or　Nature。　Besides；　though　the　fact　of　their　being　all
predicates　of　one　subject　supplies　them　with　a　certain　connection；　their　several
meanings　keep　them　apart：　and　consequently　each　is　brought　in　as　a　stranger　in
relation　to　the　others。　

（1）　The　first　of　these　defects　the　Orientals　sought　to　remedy；　when；　for　example；
they　defined　God　by　attributing　to　Him　many　names；　but　still　they　felt　that　the
number　of　names　would　have　had　to　be　infinite。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§30

（2）　In　the　second　place；　the　metaphysical　systems　adopted　a　wrong　criterion。
Their　objects　were　no　doubt　totalities　which　in　their　own　proper　selves　belong　to
reason　that　is；　to　the　organised　and　systematically　developed　universe　of　thought。
But　these　totalities　…God；　the　Soul；　the　World…were　taken　by　the　metaphysician　as
subjects　made　and　ready；　to　form　the　basis　for　an　application　of　the　categories　of
the　understanding。　They　were　assumed　from　popular　conception。　Accordingly
popular　conception　was　the　only　canon　for　settling　whether　or　not　the　predicates
were　suitable　and　sufficient。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§31

The　common　conceptions　of　God；　the　Soul；　the　World；　may　be　supposed　to
afford　thought　a　firm　and　fast　footing。　They　do　not　really　do　so。　Besides　having　a
particular　and　subjective　character　clinging　to　them；　and　thus　leaving　room　for
great　variety　of　interpretation；　they　themselves　first　of　all　require　a　firm　and　fast
definition　by　thought。　This　may　be　seen　in　any　of　these　propositions　where　the
predicate；　or　in　philosophy　the　category；　is　needed　to　indicate　what　the　subject；　or
the　conception　we　start　with；　is。　

In　such　a　sentence　as　'God　is　eternal'；　we　begin　with　the　conception　of　God；　not
knowing　as　yet　what　he　is：　to　tell　us　that；　is　the　business　of　the　predicate。　In　the
principles　of　logic；　accordingly；　where　the　terms　formulating　the　subject…matter
are　those　of　thought　only；　it　is　not　merely　superfluous　to　make　these　categories
predicates　to　propositions　in　which　God；　or；　still　vaguer；　the　Absolute；　is　the
subject；　but　it　would　also　have　the　disadvantage　of　suggesting　another　canon　than
the　nature　of　thought。　Besides；　the　propositional　form　（and　for　proposition；　it
would　be　more　correct　to　substitute　judgement）　is　not　suited　to　express　the
concrete　…　and　the　true　is　always　concrete　…　or　the　speculative。　Every　judgement　is
by　its　form　one…sided　and；　to　that　extent；　false。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§31n

This　metaphysic　was　not　free　or　objective　thinking。　Instead　of　letting　the　object　freely　and
spontaneously　expound　its　own　characteristics；　metaphysic　presupposed　it　ready…made。　If　anyone
wishes　to　know　what　free　thought　means；　he　must　go　to　Greek　philosophy：　for　Scholasticism；　like
these　metaphysical　systems；　accepted　its　facts；　and　accepted　them　as　a　dogma　from　the　authority
of　the　Church。　We　moderns；　too；　by　our　whole　upbringing；　have　been　initiated　into　ideas　which　it
is　extremely　difficult　to　overstep；　on　account　of　their　far…reaching　significance。　But　the　ancient
philosophers　were　in　a　different　position。　They　were　men　who　lived　wholly　in　the　perceptions　of
the　senses；　and　who；　after　their　rejection　of　mythology　and　its　fancies；　presupposed　nothing　but　the
heaven　above　and　the　earth　around。　In　these　material；　non…metaphysical　surroundings；　thought　is
free　and　enjoys　its　own　privacy　…　cleared　of　everything　material　and　thoroughly　at　home。　This
feeling　that　we　are　all　our　own　is　characteristic　of　free　thought　…　of　that　voyage　into　the　open；
where　nothing　is　below　us　or　above　us；　and　we　stand　in　solitude　with　ourselves　alone。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§32

（3）　In　the　third　place；　this　system　of　metaph