shorter logic-第13节

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remain
sense…derived。　On　the　other　hand；　when　I　represent　God；　the　content　is　undeniably　a　product　of
pure　thought；　but　the　form　still　retains　the　sensuous　limitations　which　it　has　as　I　find　it　immediately
present　in　myself。　In　these　generalised　images　the　content　is　not　merely　and　simply　sensible；　as　it　is
in　a　visual　inspection；　but　either　the　content　is　sensuous　and　the　form　appertains　to　thought；　or　vice
versa。　In　the　first　case　the　material　is　given　to　us；　and　our　thought　supplies　the　form：　in　the　second
case　the　content　which　has　its　source　in　thought　is　by　means　of　the　form　turned　into　a　something
given；　which　accordingly　reaches　the　mind　from　without。　

（2）　Logic　is　the　study　of　thought　pure　and　simple；　or　of　the　pure　thought…forms。　In　the　ordinary
sense　of　the　term；　by　thought　we　generally　represent　to　ourselves　something　more　than　simple　and
unmixed　thought；　we　mean　some　thought；　the　material　of　which　is　from　experience。　Whereas　in
logic　a　thought　is　understood　to　include　nothing　else　but　what　depends　on　thinking　and　what
thinking　has　brought　into　existence。　It　is　in　these　circumstances　that　thoughts　are　pure　thoughts。
The　mind　is　then　in　its　own　home…element　and　therefore　free；　for　freedom　means　that　the　other
thing　with　which　you　deal　is　a　second　self　…　so　that　you　never　leave　your　own　ground　but　give　the
law　to　yourself。　In　the　impulses　or　appetites　the　beginning　is　from　something　else；　from　something
which　we　feel　to　be　external。　In　this　case　then　we　speak　of　dependence。　For　freedom　it　is
necessary　that　we　should　feel　no　presence　of　something　else　which　is　not　ourselves。　The　natural
man；　whose　motions　follow　the　rule　only　of　his　appetites；　is　not　his　own　master。　Be　he　as
self…willed　as　he　may；　the　constituents　of　his　will　and　opinion　are　not　his　own；　and　his　freedom　is
merely　formal。　But　when　we　think；　we　renounce　our　selfish　and　particular　being；　sink　ourselves　in
the　thing；　allow　thought　to　follow　its　own　course；　and　if　we　add　anything　of　our　own；　we　think　ill。　

If　in　pursuance　of　the　foregoing　remarks　we　consider　Logic　to　be　the　system　of　the　pure　types　of
thought；　we　find　that　the　other　philosophical　sciences；　the　Philosophy　of　Nature　and　the
Philosophy　of　Mind；　take　the　place；　as　it　were；　of　an　Applied　Logic；　and　that　Logic　is　the　soul
which　animates　them　both。　Their　problem　in　that　case　is　only　to　recognise　the　logical　forms　under
the　shapes　they　assume　in　Nature　and　Mind　…　shapes　which　are　only　a　particular　mode　of
expression　for　the　forms　of　pure　thought。　If　for　instance　we　take　the　syllogism　（not　as　it　was
understood　in　the　old　formal　logic；　but　as　its　real　value）；　we　shall　find　it　gives　expression　to　the　law
that　the　particular　is　the　middle　term　which　fuses　together　the　extremes　of　the　universal　and　the
singular。　The　syllogistic　form　is　a　universal　form　of　all　things。　Everything　that　exists　is　a　particular；
which　couples　together　the　universal　and　the　singular。　But　Nature　is　weak　and　fails　to　exhibit　the
logical　forms　in　their　purity。　Such　a　feeble　exemplification　of　the　syllogism　may　be　seen　in　the
magnet。　In　the　middle　or　point　of　indifference　of　a　magnet；　its　two　poles；　however　they　may　be
distinguished；　are　brought　into　one。　Physics　also　teaches　us　to　see　the　universal　or　essence　in
Nature：　and　the　only　difference　between　it　and　the　Philosophy　of　Nature　is　that　the　latter　brings
before　our　mind　the　adequate　forms　of　the　notion　in　the　physical　world。

It　will　now　be　understood　that　Logic　is　the　all…animating　spirit　of　all　the　sciences；　and　its　categories
the　spiritual　hierarchy。　They　are　the　heart　and　centre　of　things：　and　yet　at　the　same　time　they　are
always　on　our　lips；　and；　apparently　at　least；　perfectly　familiar　objects。　But　things　thus　familiar　are
usually　the　greatest　strangers。　Being；　for　example；　is　a　category　of　pure　thought：　but　to　make　'is'　an
object　of　investigation　never　occurs　to　us。　Common　fancy　puts　the　Absolute　far　away　in　a　world
beyond。　The　Absolute　is　rather　directly　before　us；　so　present　that　so　long　as　we　think；　we　must；
though　without　express　consciousness　of　it；　always　carry　it　with　us　and　always　use　it。　Language　is
the　main　depository　of　these　types　of　thought；　and　one　use　of　the　grammatical　instruction　which
children　receive　is　unconsciously　to　turn　their　attention　to　distinctions　of　thought。

Logic　is　usually　said　to　be　concerned　with　forms　only　and　to　derive　the　material　for　them　from
elsewhere。　But　this　'only'；　which　assumes　that　the　logical　thoughts　are　nothing　in　comparison　with
the　rest　of　the　contents；　is　not　the　word　to　use　about　forms　which　are　the　absolutely　real　ground　of
everything。　Everything　else　rather　is　an　'only'　compared　with　these　thoughts。　To　make　such
abstract　forms　a　problem　presupposes　in　the　inquirer　a　higher　level　of　culture　than　ordinary；　and　to
study　them　in　themselves　and　for　their　own　sake　signifies　in　addition　that　these　thought…types　must
be　deduced　out　of　thought　itself；　and　their　truth　or　reality　examined　by　the　light　of　their　own　laws。
We　do　not　assume　them　as　data　from　without；　and　then　define　them　or　exhibit　their　value　and
authority　by　comparing　them　with　the　shape　they　take　in　our　minds。　If　we　thus　acted；　we　should
proceed　from　observation　and　experience；　and　should；　for　instance；　say　we　habitually　employ　the
term　'force'　in　such　a　case；　and　such　a　meaning。　A　definition　like　that　would　be　called　correct；　if　it
agreed　with　the　conception　of　its　object　present　in　our　ordinary　state　of　mind。　The　defect　of　this
empirical　method　is　that　a　notion　is　not　defined　as　it　is　in　and　for　itself；　but　in　terms　of　something
assumed；　which　is　then　used　as　a　criterion　and　standard　of　correctness。　No　such　test　need　be
applied：　we　have　merely　to　let　the　thought…forms　follow　the　impulse　of　their　own　organic　life。　

To　ask　if　a　category　is　true　or　not；　must　sound　strange　to　the　ordinary　mind：　for　a　category
apparently　becomes　true　only　when　it　is　applied　to　a　given　object；　and　apart　from　this　application　it
would　seem　meaningless　to　inquire　into　the　truth。　But　this　is　the　very　question　on　which　every　thing
turns。　We　must　however　in　the　first　place　understand　clearly　what　we　mean　by　Truth。　In　common
life　truth　means　the　agreement　of　an　object　with　our　conception　of　it。　We　thus　presuppose　an
object　to　which　our　conception　must　conform。　In　the　philosophical　sense　of　the　word；　on　the　other
hand；　truth　may　be　described；　in　general　abstract　terms；　as　the　agreement　of　a　thought…content
with　itself。　This　meaning　is　quite　different　from　the　one　given　above。　At　the　same　time　the　deeper
and　philosophical　meaning　of　truth　can　be　partially　traced　even　in　the　ordinary　usage　of　language。
Thus　we　speak　of　a　true　friend；　by　which　we　mean　a　friend　whose　manner　of　conduct　accords
with　the　notion　of　friendship。　In　the　same　way　we　speak　of　a　true　work　of　Art。　Untrue　in　this　sense
means　the　same　as　bad；　or　self…discordant。　In　this　sense　a　bad　state　is　an　untrue　state；　and　evil　and
untruth　may　be　said　to　consist　in　the　contradiction　subsisting　between　the　function　or　notion　and
the　existence　of　the　object。　Of　such　a　bad　object　we　may　form　a　correct　representation；　but　the
import　of　such　representation　is　inherently　false。　Of　these　correctnesses；　which　are　at　the　same
time　untruths；　we　may　have　many　in　our　heads。　God　alone　is　the　thorough　harmony　of　notion　and
reality。　All　finite　things　involve　an　untruth：　they　have　a　notion　and　an　existence；　but　their　existence
does　not　meet　the　requirements　of　the　notion。　For　this　reason　they　must　perish；　and　then　the
incompatibility　between　their　notion　and　their　existence　becomes　manifest。　It　is　in　the　kind　that　the
individual　animal　has　its　notion；　and　the　kind　liberates　itself　from　this　individuality　by　death。

The　study　of　truth；　or；　as　it　is　here　explained　to　mean；　consistency；　constitutes　the　proper　problem
of　logic。　In　our　everyday　mind　we　are　never　troubled　with　questions　about　the　truth　of　the　forms　of
thought。　We　may　also　express　the　problem　of　logic　by　saying　that　it　examines　the　forms　of　thought
touching　their　capability　to　hold　truth。　And　the　question　comes　to　this：　What　are　the　forms　of　the
infinite；　and　what　are　the　forms　of　the　finite　？　Usually　no　suspicion　attaches　to　the　finite　forms　of
thought；　they　are　allowed　to　pass　unquestioned。　But　it　is　from　conforming　to　finite　categories　in
thought　and　action　that　all　deception　originates。　

（3）　Truth　may　be　ascertained　by　several　methods；　each　of　which　however　is　no　more　than　a　form。
Experience　is　the　first　of　these　methods。　But　the　method　is　only　a　form：　it　has　no　intrinsic　value　of
its　own。　For　in　experience　everything　depends　upon　the　mind　we　bring　to　bear　upon　actuality。　A
great　mind　is　great　in　its　experience；　and　in　the　motley　play　of　phenomena　at　once　perceives　the
point　of　real　significance。　The　idea　is　present；　in　actual　shape；　not　something；　as　it　were；　over　the
hill　and　far　away。　The　genius　of　a　Goethe；　for　example；　looking　into　nature　or　history；　has　great
experiences；　catches　sight　of　the　living　principle；　and　gives　expression　to　it。　
A　second　method　of　apprehending　the　truth　is　Reflection；　which　defines　it　by　intellectual　relations
of　condition　and　conditioned。　But　in　these　two　mo