shorter logic-第12节
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simple universality; self…collected and removed from extraneous influences … in
one word; in my Freedom。
'Think for yourself' is a phrase which people often use as if it had some special
significance。 The fact is; no man can think for another; any more than he can eat
or drink for him and the expression is a pleonasm。 To think is in fact ipso facto to
be free; for thought as the action of the universal is an abstract relating of self to
self; where; being at home with ourselves; and as regards our subjectivity utterly
blank; our consciousness is; in the matter of its contents; only in the fact and its
characteristics。 If this be admitted; and if we apply the term humility or modesty
to an attitude where our subjectivity is not allowed to interfere by act or quality; it
is easy to appreciate the question touching the humility or modesty and pride of
philosophy。 For in point of contents; thought is only true in proportion as it sinks
itself in the facts; and in point of form it is no private or particular state or act of
the subject; but rather that attitude of consciousness where the abstract self; freed
from all the special limitations to which its ordinary states or qualities are liable;
restricts itself to that universal action in which it is identical with all individuals。 In
these circumstances philosophy may be acquitted of the charge of pride。 And
when Aristotle summons the mind to rise to the dignity of that attitude; the dignity
he seeks is won by letting slip all our individual opinions and prejudices; and
submitting to the sway of the fact。
The Objectivity of Thought
§ 24
With these explanations and qualifications; thoughts may be termed Objective
Thoughts … among which are also to be included the forms which are more
especially discussed in the common logic; where they are usually treated as forms
of conscious thought only。 Logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics; the
science of things set and held in thoughts … thoughts accredited able to express
the essential reality of things。
An exposition of the relation in which such forms as notion; judgment; and
syllogism stand to others; such as causality; is a matter for the science itself。 But
this much is evident beforehand。 If thought tries to form a notion of things; this
notion (as well as its proximate phases; the judgement and syllogism) cannot be
composed of articles and relations which are alien and irrelevant to the things。
Reflection; it was said above; conducts to the universal of things: which universal
is itself one of the constituent factors of a notion。 To say that Reason or
Understanding is in the world; is equivalent in its import to the phrase 'Objective
Thought'。 The latter phrase however has the inconvenience that thought is usually
confined to express what belongs to the mind or consciousness only; while
objective is a term applied; at least primarily; only to the non…mental。
§24n
(1) To speak of thought or objective thought as the heart and soul of the world; may seem to be
ascribing consciousness to the things of nature。 We feel a certain repugnance against making
thought the inward function of things; especially as we speak of thought as marking the divergence
of man from nature。 It would be necessary; therefore; if we use the term thought at all; to speak of
nature as the system of unconscious thought; or; to use Schelling's expression; a petrified
intelligence。 And in order to prevent misconception; 'thought…form' or 'thought…type' should be
substituted for the ambiguous term thought。
From what has been said the principles of logic are to be sought in a system of thought…types or
fundamental categories; in which the opposition between subjective and objective; in its usual
sense vanishes。 The signification thus attached to thought and its characteristic forms may be
illustrated by the ancient saying that 'nous governs the world'; or by our own phrase that 'Reason
is in the world'; which means that Reason is the soul of the world it inhabits; its immanent principle;
its most proper and inward nature; its universal。 Another illustration is offered by the circumstance
that in speaking of some definite animal we say it is (an) animal。 Now; the animal; qua animal;
cannot be shown; nothing can be pointed out excepting some special animal。 Animal; qua animal;
does not exist: it is merely the universal nature of the individual animals; while each existing animal
is a more concretely defined and particularised thing。 But to be an animal … the law of kind which is
the universal in this case … is the property of the particular animal; and constitutes its definite
essence。 Take away from the dog its animality; and it becomes impossible to say what it is。 All
things have a permanent inward nature; as well as an outward existence。 They live and die; arise
and pass away; but their essential and universal part is the kind; and this means much more than
something common to them all。
If thought is the constitutive substance of external things; it is also the universal substance of what is
spiritual。 In all human perception thought is present; so too thought is the universal in all the acts of
conception and recollection; in short; in every mental activity; in willing; wishing; and the like。 All
these faculties are only further specialisations of thought。 When it is presented in this light; thought
has a different part to play from what it has if we speak of a faculty of thought; one among a
crowd of other faculties; such as perception; conception; and will; with which it stands on the
same level。 When it is seen to be the true universal of all that nature and mind contain; it extends its
scope far beyond all these; and becomes the basis of everything。 From this view of thought; in its
objective meaning as nous; we may next pass to consider the subjective sense of the term。 We
say first; Man is a being that thinks; but we also say at the same time; Man is a being that
perceives and wills。 Man is a thinker; and is universal; but he is a thinker only because he feels his
own universality。 The animal too is by implication universal; but the universal is not consciously felt
by it to be universal: it feels only the individual。 The animal sees a singular object; for instance; its
food; or a man。 For the animal all this never goes beyond an individual thing。 Similarly; sensation
has to do with nothing but singulars; such as this pain or this sweet taste。 Nature does not bring its
nous into consciousness: it is man who first makes himself double so as to be a universal for a
universal。 This first happens when man knows that he is 'I'。 By the term 'I' I mean myself; a single
and altogether determinate person。 And yet I really utter nothing peculiar to myself; for every one
else is an 'I' or 'Ego'; and when I call myself 'I'; though I indubitably mean the single person myself;
I express a thorough universal。 'I'; therefore; is mere being…for…self; in which everything peculiar or
marked is renounced and buried out of sight; it is as it were the ultimate and unanalysable point of
consciousness。 We may say 'I' and thought are the same; or; more definitely; 'I' is thought as a
thinker。 What I have in my consciousness is for me。 'I' is the vacuum or receptacle for anything
and everything: for which everything is and which stores up everything in itself。 Every man is a
whole world of conceptions; that lie buried in the night of the 'Ego'。 It follows that the 'Ego' is the
universal in which we leave aside all that is particular; and in which at the same time all the
particulars have a latent existence。 In other words; it is not a mere universality and nothing more;
but the universality which includes in it everything。 Commonly we use the word 'I' without attaching
much importance to it; nor is it an object of study except to philosophical analysis。 In the 'Ego'; we
have thought before us in its utter purity。 While the brute cannot say 'I'; man can; because it is his
nature to think。 Now in the 'Ego' there are a variety of contents; derived both from within and from
without; and according to the nature of these contents our state may be described as perception;
or conception; or reminiscence。 But in all of them the 'I' is found: or in them all thought is present。
Man; therefore; is always thinking; even in his perceptions: if he observes anything; he always
observes it as a universal; fixes on a single point which he places in relief; thus withdrawing his
attention from other points; and takes it as abstract and universal; even if the universality be only in
form。
In the case of our ordinary conceptions; two things may happen。 Either the contents are moulded
by thought; but not the form; or; the form belongs to thought and not the contents。 In using such
terms; for instance; as anger; rose; hope; I am speaking of things which I have learnt in the way of
sensation; but I express these contents in a universal mode; that is; in the form of thought。 I have
left out much that is particular and given the contents in their generality: but still the contents remain
sense…der