memoirs of general william t. sherman-2-第12节
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； that General Schofield must be near by； in close support of Hooker's right flank。 General Thomas had before this occasion complained to me of General Hooker's disposition to 〃switch off；〃 leaving wide gaps in his line； so as to be independent； and to make glory on his own account。 I therefore resolved not to overlook this breach of discipline and propriety。 The rebel army was only composed of three corps； I had that very day ridden six miles of their lines； found them everywhere strongly occupied； and therefore Hooker could not have encountered 〃three entire corps。〃 Both McPherson and Schofield had also complained to me of this same tendency of Hooker to widen the gap between his own corps and his proper army （Thomas's）； so as to come into closer contact with one or other of the wings； asserting that he was the senior by commission to both McPherson and Schofield； and that in the event of battle he should assume command over them； by virtue of his older commission。
They appealed to me to protect them。 I had heard during that day some cannonading and heavy firing down toward the 〃Kulp House；〃 which was about five miles southeast of where I was； but this was nothing unusual； for at the same moment there was firing along our lines full ten miles in extent。 Early the next day （23d） I rode down to the 〃Kulp House；〃 which was on a road leading from Powder Springs to Marietta； about three miles distant from the latter。 On the way I passed through General Butterfield's division of Hooker's corps； which I learned had not been engaged at all in the battle of the day before； then I rode along Geary's and Williams's divisions； which occupied the field of battle； and the men were engaged in burying the dead。 I found General Schofield's corps on the Powder Springs road； its head of column abreast of Hooker's right； therefore constituting 〃a strong right flank；〃 and I met Generale Schofield and Hooker together。 As rain was falling at the moment； we passed into a little church standing by the road…side； and I there showed General Schofield Hooker's signal…message of the day before。 He was very angry； and pretty sharp words passed between them； Schofield saying that his head of column （Hascall's division） had been； at the time of the battle； actually in advance of Hooker's line； that the attack or sally of the enemy struck his troops before it did Hooker's； that General Hooker knew of it at the time； and he offered to go out and show me that the dead men of his advance division （Hascall's） were lying farther out than any of Hooker's。 General Hooker pretended not to have known this fact。 I then asked him why he had called on me for help； until he had used all of his own troops； asserting that I had just seen Butterfield's division； and had learned from him that he had not been engaged the day before at all； and I asserted that the enemy's sally must have been made by one corps （Hood's）； in place of three； and that it had fallen on Geary's and Williams's divisions； which had repulsed the attack handsomely。 As we rode away from that church General Hooker was by my side； and I told him that such a thing must not occur again； in other words； I reproved him more gently than the occasion demanded； and from that time he began to sulk。 General Hooker had come from the East with great fame as a 〃fighter；〃 and at Chattanooga he was glorified by his 〃battle above the clouds；〃 which I fear turned his head。 He seemed jealous of all the army commanders； because in years； former rank； and experience； he thought he was our superior。
On the 23d of June I telegraphed to General Halleck this summary； which I cannot again better state：
We continue to press forward on the principle of an advance against fortified positions。 The whole country is one vast fort； and Johnston must have at least fifty miles of connected trenches； with abatis and finished batteries。 We gain ground daily； fighting all the time。 On the 21st General Stanley gained a position near the south end of Kenesaw； from which the enemy attempted in vain to drive him； and the same day General T。 J。 Wood's division took a hill； which the enemy assaulted three times at night without success； leaving more than a hundred dead on the ground。 Yesterday the extreme right （Hooker and Schofield） advanced on the Powder Springs road to within three miles of Marietta。 The enemy made a strong effort to drive them away； but failed signally； leaving more than two hundred dead on the field。 Our lines are now in close contact； and the fighting is incessant； with a good deal of artillery…fire。 As fast as we gain one position the enemy has another all ready； but I think he will soon have to let go Kenesaw； which is the key to the whole country。 The weather is now better； and the roads are drying up faSt。 Our losses are light； and； not… withstanding the repeated breaks of the road to our rear； supplies are ample。
During the 24th and 25th of June General Schofield extended his right as far as prudent； so as to compel the enemy to thin out his lines correspondingly； with the intention to make two strong assaults at points where success would give us the greatest advantage。 I had consulted Generals Thomas； McPherson； and Schofield； and we all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any more； and therefore there was no alternative but to attack 〃fortified lines；〃 a thing carefully avoided up to that time。 I reasoned； if we could make a breach anywhere near the rebel centre； and thrust in a strong head of column； that with the one moiety of our army we could hold in check the corresponding wing of the enemy； and with the other sweep in flank and overwhelm the other half。 The 27th of June was fixed as the day for the attempt； and in order to oversee the whole； and to be in close communication with all parts of the army； I had a place cleared on the top of a hill to the rear of Thomas's centre； and had the telegraph…wires laid to it。 The points of attack were chosen； and the troops were all prepared with as little demonstration as possible。 About 9 A。M。 Of the day appointed； the troops moved to the assault； and all along our lines for ten miles a furious fire of artillery and musketry was kept up。 At all points the enemy met us with determined courage and in great force。 McPherson's attacking column fought up the face of the lesser Kenesaw； but could not reach the summit。 About a mile to the right （just below the Dallas road） Thomas's assaulting column reached the parapet； where Brigadier…General Barker was shot down mortally wounded； and Brigadier…General Daniel McCook （my old law…partner） was desperately wounded； from the effects of which he afterward died。 By 11。30 the assault was in fact over； and had failed。 We had not broken the rebel line at either point； but our assaulting columns held their ground within a few yards of the rebel trenches； and there covered themselves with parapet。 McPherson lost about five hundred men and several valuable officers； and Thomas lost nearly two thousand men。 This was the hardest fight of the campaign up to that date； and it is well described by Johnston in his 〃Narrative〃 （pages 342； 343）； where he admits his loss in killed and wounded as
Total 。。。。。。。。。。。。。 808
This； no doubt； is a true and fair statement； but； as usual； Johnston overestimates our loss； putting it at six thousand； whereas our entire loss was about twenty…five hundred； killed and wounded。
While the battle was in progress at the centre； Schofield crossed Olley's Creek on the right； and gained a position threatening Johnston's line of retreat； and； to increase the effect； I ordered Stoneman's cavalry to proceed rapidly still farther to the right； to Sweetwater。 Satisfied of the bloody cost of attacking intrenched lines； I at once thought of moving the whole army to the railroad at a point （Fulton） about ten miles below Marietta； or to the Chattahoochee River itself； a movement similar to the one afterward so successfully practised at Atlanta。 All the orders were issued to bring forward supplies enough to fill our wagons； intending to strip the railroad back to Allatoona； and leave that place as our depot； to be covered as well as possible by Garrard's cavalry。 General Thomas； as usual； shook his head； deeming it risky to leave the railroad； but something had to be done； and I had resolved on this move； as reported in my dispatch to General Halleck on July 1st：
General Schofield is now south of Olley's Creek； and on the head of Nickajack。 I have been hurrying down provisions and forage； and tomorrow night propose to move McPherson from the left to the extreme right； back of General Thomas。 This will bring my right within three miles of the Chattahoochee River； and about five miles from the railroad。 By this movement I think I can force Johnston to move his whole army down from Kenesaw to defend his railroad and the Chattahoochee； when I will （by the left flank） reach the railroad below Marietta； but in this I must cut loose from the railroad with ten days' supplies in wagons。 Johnston may come out of his intrenchments to attack Thomas； which is exactly what I want； for General Thomas is well intrenched on a line parallel with the enemy south of Kenesa
