lectures14+15-第2节

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supposed　that　they　were　destined　to　lead　to　the　pale　negations　of



Boston　Unitarianism。







So　far；　then；　although　we　are　compelled；　whatever　may　be　our



pretensions　to　empiricism；　to　employ　some　sort　of　a　standard　of



theological　probability　of　our　own　whenever　we　assume　to　estimate



the　fruits　of　other　men's　religion；　yet　this　very　standard　has



been　begotten　out　of　the　drift　of　common　life。　　It　is　the　voice



of　human　experience　within　us；　judging　and　condemning　all　gods



that　stand　athwart　the　pathway　along　which　it　feels　itself　to　be



advancing。　　Experience；　if　we　take　it　in　the　largest　sense；　is



thus　the　parent　of　those　disbeliefs　which；　it　was　charged；　were



inconsistent　with　the　experiential　method。　　The　inconsistency；



you　see；　is　immaterial；　and　the　charge　may　be　neglected。







If　we　pass　from　disbeliefs　to　positive　beliefs；　it　seems　to　me



that　there　is　not　even　a　formal　inconsistency　to　be　laid　against



our　method。　　The　gods　we　stand　by　are　the　gods　we　need　and　can



use；　the　gods　whose　demands　on　us　are　reinforcements　of　our



demands　on　ourselves　and　on　one　another。　What　I　then　propose　to



do　is；　briefly　stated；　to　test　saintliness　by　common　sense；　to



use　human　standards　to　help　us　decide　how　far　the　religious　life



commends　itself　as　an　ideal　kind　of　human　activity。　　If　it



commends　itself；　then　any　theological　beliefs　that　may　inspire



it；　in　so　far　forth　will　stand　accredited。　　If　not；　then　they



will　be　discredited；　and　all　without　reference　to　anything　but



human　working　principles。　　It　is　but　the　elimination　of　the



humanly　unfit；　and　the　survival　of　the　humanly　fittest；　applied



to　religious　beliefs；　and　if　we　look　at　history　candidly　and



without　prejudice；　we　have　to　admit　that　no　religion　has　ever　in



the　long　run　established　or　proved　itself　in　any　other　way。　



Religions　have　APPROVED　themselves；　they　have　ministered　to



sundry　vital　needs　which　they　found　reigning。　　When　they　violated



other　needs　too　strongly；　or　when　other　faiths　came　which　served



the　same　needs　better；　the　first　religions　were　supplanted。







The　needs　were　always　many；　and　the　tests　were　never　sharp。　　So



the　reproach　of　vagueness　and　subjectivity　and　〃on　the



whole〃…ness；　which　can　with　perfect　legitimacy　be　addressed　to



the　empirical　method　as　we　are　forced　to　use　it；　is　after　all　a



reproach　to　which　the　entire　life　of　man　in　dealing　with　these



matters　is　obnoxious。　　No　religion　has　ever　yet　owed　its



prevalence　to　〃apodictic　certainty。〃　　　　In　a　later　lecture　I　will



ask　whether　objective　certainty　can　ever　be　added　by　theological



reasoning　to　a　religion　that　already　empirically　prevails。







One　word；　also；　about　the　reproach　that　in　following　this　sort　of



an　empirical　method　we　are　handing　ourselves　over　to　systematic



skepticism。







Since　it　is　impossible　to　deny　secular　alterations　in　our



sentiments　and　needs；　it　would　be　absurd　to　affirm　that　one's　own



age　of　the　world　can　be　beyond　correction　by　the　next　age。　



Skepticism　cannot；　therefore；　be　ruled　out　by　any　set　of　thinkers



as　a　possibility　against　which　their　conclusions　are　secure；　and



no　empiricist　ought　to　claim　exemption　from　this　universal



liability。　　But　to　admit　one's　liability　to　correction　is　one



thing；　and　to　embark　upon　a　sea　of　wanton　doubt　is　another。　　Of



willfully　playing　into　the　hands　of　skepticism　we　cannot　be



accused。　　He　who　acknowledges　the　imperfectness　of　his



instrument；　and　makes　allowance　　for　it　in　discussing　his



observations；　is　in　a　much　better　position　for　gaining　truth　than



if　he　claimed　his　instrument　to　be　infallible。　　Or　is　dogmatic　or



scholastic　theology　less　doubted　in　point　of　fact　for　claiming；



as　it　does；　to　be　in　point　of　right　undoubtable？　　And　if　not；



what　command　over　truth　would　this　kind　of　theology　really　lose



if；　instead　of　absolute　certainty；　she　only　claimed　reasonable



probability　for　her　conclusions？　　If　WE　claim　only　reasonable



probability；　it　will　be　as　much　as　men　who　love　the　truth　can



ever　at　any　given　moment　hope　to　have　within　their　grasp。　Pretty



surely　it　will　be　more　than　we　could　have　had；　if　we　were



unconscious　of　our　liability　to　err。







Nevertheless；　dogmatism　will　doubtless　continue　to　condemn　us　for



this　confession。　　The　mere　outward　form　of　inalterable　certainty



is　so　precious　to　some　minds　that　to　renounce　it　explicitly　is



for　them　out　of　the　question。　　They　will　claim　it　even　where　the



facts　most　patently　pronounce　its　folly。　　But　the　safe　thing　is



surely　to　recognize　that　all　the　insights　of　creatures　of　a　day



like　ourselves　must　be　provisional。　The　wisest　of　critics　is　an



altering　being；　subject　to　the　better　insight　of　the　morrow；　and



right　at　any　moment；　only　〃up　to　date〃　and　〃on　the　whole。〃　　　



When　larger　ranges　of　truth　open；　it　is　surely　best　to　be　able　to



open　ourselves　to　their　reception；　unfettered　by　our　previous



pretensions。　〃Heartily　know；　when　half…gods　go；　the　gods　arrive。〃







The　fact　of　diverse　judgments　about　religious　phenomena　is



therefore　entirely　unescapable；　whatever　may　be　one's　own　desire



to　attain　the　irreversible。　　But　apart　from　that　fact；　a　more



fundamental　question　awaits　us；　the　question　whether　men's



opinions　ought　to　be　expected　to　be　absolutely　uniform　in　this



field。　　Ought　all　men　to　have　the　same　religion？　Ought　they　to



approve　the　same　fruits　and　follow　the　same　leadings？　　Are　they



so　like　in　their　inner　needs　that；　for　hard　and　soft；　for　proud



and　humble；　for　strenuous　and　lazy；　for　healthy…minded　and



despairing；　exactly　the　same　religious　incentives　are　required？　



Or　are　different　functions　in　the　organism　of　humanity　allotted



to　different　types　of　man；　so　that　some　may　really　be　the　better



for　a　religion　of　consolation　and　reassurance；　whilst　others　are



better　for　one　of　terror　and　reproof？　　It　might　conceivably　be



so；　and　we　shall；　I　think；　more　and　more　suspect　it　to　be　so　as



we　go　on。　And　if　it　be　so；　how　can　any　possible　judge　or　critic



help　being　biased　in　favor　of　the　religion　by　which　his　own　needs



are　best　met？　　He　aspires　to　impartiality；　but　he　is　too　close　to



the　struggle　not　to　be　to　some　degree　a　participant；　and　he　is



sure　to　approve　most　warmly　those　fruits　of　piety　in　others　which



taste　most　good　and　prove　most　nourishing　to　HIM。







I　am　well　aware　of　how　anarchic　much　of　what　I　say　may　sound。　



Expressing　myself　thus　abstractly　and　briefly；　I　may　seem　to



despair　of　the　very　notion　of　truth。　　But　I　beseech　you　to



reserve　your　judgment　until　we　see　it　applied　to　the　details





which　lie　before　us。　　I　do　indeed　disbelieve　that　we　or　any　other



mortal　men　can　attain　on　a　given　day　to　absolutely　incorrigible



and　unimprovable　truth　about　such　matters　of　fact　as　those　with



which　religions　deal。　　But　I　reject　this　dogmatic　ideal　not　out



of　a　perverse　delight　in　intellectual　instability。　　I　am　no　lover



of　disorder　and　doubt　as　such。　　Rather　do　I　fear　to　lose　truth　by



this　pretension　to　possess　it　already　wholly。　　That　we　can　gain



more　and　more　of　it　by　moving　always　in　the　right　direction；　I



believe　as　much　as　any　one；　and　I　hope　to　bring　you　all　to　my　way



of　thinking　before　the　termination　of　these　lectures。　　Till　then；



do　not；　I　pray　you；　harden　your　minds　irrevocably　against　the



empiricism　which　I　profess。







I　will　waste　no　more　words；　then；　in　abstract　justification　of　my



method；　but　seek　immediately　to　use　it　upon　the　facts。







In　critically　judging　of　the　value　of　religious　phenomena；　it　is



very　important　to　insist　on　the　distinction　between　religion　as



an　individual　personal　function；　and　religion　as　an



institutional；　corporate；　or　tribal　product。　　I　drew　this



distinction；　you　may　remember；　in　my　second　lecture。　　The　word



〃religion；〃　as　ordinarily　used；　is　equivocal。　　A　survey　of



history　shows　us　that；　as　a　rule；　religious　geniuses　attract



disciples；　and　produce　groups　of　sympathizers。　　When　these　groups



get　strong　enough　to　〃organize〃　themselves；　they　become



ecclesiastical　institutions　with　corporate　ambitions　of　their



own。　　The　spirit　of　politics　and　the　lust　of　dogmatic　rule　are



then　apt　to　enter　and　to　contaminate　the　originally　innocent



thing；　so　that　when　we　hear　the　word　〃religion〃　nowadays；　we



think　inevitably　of　some　〃church〃　or　other；　and　to　some　persons



the　word　〃church〃　suggests　so　much　hypocrisy　and　tyranny　and



meanness　and　tenacity　of　superstition　that　in　a　wholesale



undiscerning　way　they　glory　in　saying　that