the unseen world and other essays-第11节

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e　Unknown　Power　（not　material）　existing　beyond　consciousness。　We　do　very　well　to　speak　of　〃matter〃　in　common　parlance；　but　all　that　the　word　really　means　is　a　group　of　qualities　which　have　no　existence　apart　from　our　minds。　Modern　philosophers　have　quite　generally　accepted　this　conclusion；　and　every　attempt　to　overturn　Berkeley's　reasoning　has　hitherto　resulted　in　complete　and　disastrous　failure。　In　admitting　this；　we　do　not　admit　the　conclusion　of　Absolute　Idealism；　that　nothing　exists　outside　of　consciousness。　What　we　admit　as　existing　independently　of　our　own　consciousness　is　the　Power　that　causes　in　us　those　conscious　states　which　we　call　the　perception　of　material　qualities。　We　have　no　reason　for　regarding　this　Power　as　in　itself　material：　indeed；　we　cannot　do　so；　since　by　the　theory　material　qualities　have　no　existence　apart　from　our　minds。　I　have　elsewhere　sought　to　show　that　less　difficulty　is　involved　in　regarding　this　Power　outside　of　us　as　quasi…psychical；　or　in　some　measure　similar　to　the　mental　part　of　ourselves；　and　I　have　gone　on　to　conclude　that　this　Power　may　be　identical　with　what　men　have；　in　all　times　and　by　the　aid　of　various　imperfect　symbols；　endeavoured　to　apprehend　as　Deity。＇12＇　We　are　thus　led　to　a　view　of　things　not　very　unlike　the　views　entertained　by　Spinoza　and　Berkeley。　We　are　led　to　the　inference　that　what　we　call　the　material　universe　is　but　the　manifestation　of　infinite　Deity　to　our　finite　minds。　Obviously；　on　this　view；　Matterthe　only　thing　to　which　materialists　concede　real　existenceis　simply　an　orderly　phantasmagoria；　and　God　and　the　Soulwhich　materialists　regard　as　mere　fictions　of　the　imaginationare　the　only　conceptions　that　answer　to　real　existences。

＇12＇　See　my　Outlines　of　Cosmic　Philosophy；　Part　I。　Chap。　IV。；　Part　III。　Chaps。　III。；　IV。


In　the　foregoing　paragraph　I　have　been　setting　down　opinions　with　which　I　am　prepared　to　agree；　and　which　are　not　in　conflict　with　anything　that　our　study　of　the　development　of　the　objective　world　has　taught　us。　In　so　far　as　that　study　may　be　supposed　to　bear　on　the　question　of　a　future　life；　two　conclusions　are　open　to　us。　First　we　may　say　that　since　the　phenomena　of　mind　appear　and　run　their　course　along　with　certain　specialized　groups　of　material　phenomena；　so；　too；　they　must　disappear　when　these　specialized　groups　are　broken　up。　Or；　in　other　words；　we　may　say　that　every　living　person　is　an　organized　whole；　consciousness　is　something　which　pertains　to　this　organized　whole；　as　music　belongs　to　the　harp　that　is　entire；　but　when　the　harp　is　broken　it　is　silent；　and　when　the　organized　whole　of　personality　falls　to　pieces　consciousness　ceases　forever。　To　many　well…disciplined　minds　this　conclusion　seems　irresistible；　and　doubtless　it　would　be　a　sound　onea　good　Baconian　conclusionif　we　were　to　admit；　with　the　materialists；　that　the　possibilities　of　existence　are　limited　by　our　tiny　and　ephemeral　experience。

But　now；　supposing　some　Platonic　speculator　were　to　come　along　and　insist　upon　our　leaving　room　for　an　alternative　conclusion；　suppose　he　were　to　urge　upon　us　that　all　this　process　of　material　development；　with　the　discovery　of　which　our　patient　study　has　been　rewarded；　may　be　but　the　temporary　manifestation　of　relations　otherwise　unknown　between　ourselves　and　the　infinite　Deity；　suppose　he　were　to　argue　that　psychical　qualities　may　be　inherent　in　a　spiritual　substance　which　under　certain　conditions　becomes　incarnated　in　matter；　to　wear　it　as　a　perishable　garment　for　a　brief　season；　but　presently　to　cast　it　off　and　enter　upon　the　freedom　of　a　larger　existence；what　reply　should　we　be　bound　to　make；　bearing　in　mind　that　the　possibilities　of　existence　are　in　no　wise　limited　by　our　experience？　Obviously　we　should　be　bound　to　admit　that　in　sound　philosophy　this　conclusion　is　just　as　likely　to　be　true　as　the　other。　We　should；　indeed；　warn　him　not　to　call　on　us　to　help　him　to　establish　it　by　scientific　arguments；　and　we　should　remind　him　that　he　must　not　make　illicit　use　of　his　extra…experiential　hypotheses　by　bringing　them　into　the　treatment　of　scientific　questions　that　lie　within　the　range　of　experience。　In　science；　for　example；　we　make　no　use　of　the　conception　of　a　〃spiritual　substance〃　（or　of　a　〃material　substance〃　either）；　because　we　can　get　along　sufficiently　well　by　dealing　solely　with　qualities。　But　with　this　general　understanding　we　should　feel　bound　to　concede　the　impregnableness　of　his　main　position。

I　have　supposed　this　theory　only　as　an　illustration；　not　as　a　theory　which　I　am　prepared　to　adopt。　My　present　purpose　is　not　to　treat　as　an　advocate　the　question　of　a　future　life；　but　to　endeavour　to　point　out　what　conditions　should　be　observed　in　treating　the　question　philosophically。　It　seems　to　me　that　a　great　deal　is　gained　when　we　have　distinctly　set　before　us　what　are　the　peculiar　conditions　of　proof　in　the　case　of　such　transcendental　questions。　We　have　gained　a　great　deal　when　we　have　learned　how　thoroughly　impotent；　how　truly　irrelevant；　is　physical　investigation　in　the　presence　of　such　a　question。　If　we　get　not　much　positive　satisfaction　for　our　unquiet　yearnings；　we　occupy　at　any　rate　a　sounder　philosophic　position　when　we　recognize　the　limits　within　which　our　conclusions；　whether　positive　or　negative；　are　valid。

It　seems　not　improbable　that　Mr。　Mill　may　have　had　in　mind　something　like　the　foregoing　considerations　when　he　suggested　that　there　is　no　reason　why　one　should　not　entertain　the　belief　in　a　future　life　if　the　belief　be　necessary　to　one's　spiritual　comfort。　Perhaps　no　suggestion　in　Mr。　Mill's　richly　suggestive　posthumous　work　has　been　more　generally　condemned　as　unphilosophical；　on　the　ground　that　in　matters　of　belief　we　must　be　guided；　not　by　our　likes　and　dislikes；　but　by　the　evidence　that　is　accessible。　The　objection　is　certainly　a　sound　one　so　far　as　it　relates　to　scientific　questions　where　evidence　is　accessible。　To　hesitate　to　adopt　a　well…supported　theory　because　of　some　vague　preference　for　a　different　view　is　in　scientific　matters　the　one　unpardonable　sin；a　sin　which　has　been　only　too　often　committed。　Even　in　matters　which　lie　beyond　the　range　of　experience；　where　evidence　is　inaccessible；　desire　is　not　to　be　regarded　as　by　itself　an　adequate　basis　for　belief。　But　it　seems　to　me　that　Mr。　Mill　showed　a　deeper　knowledge　of　the　limitations　of　scientific　method　than　his　critics；　when　he　thus　hinted　at　the　possibility　of　entertaining　a　belief　not　amenable　to　scientific　tests。　The　hypothesis　of　a　purely　spiritual　unseen　world；　as　above　described；　is　entirely　removed　from　the　jurisdiction　of　physical　inquiry；　and　can　only　be　judged　on　general　considerations　of　what　has　been　called　〃moral　probability〃；　and　considerations　of　this　sort　are　likely；　in　the　future　as　in　the　past；　to　possess　different　values　for　different　minds。　He　who；　on　such　considerations；　entertains　a　belief　in　a　future　life　may　not　demand　that　his　sceptical　neighbour　shall　be　convinced　by　the　same　considerations；　but　his　neighbour　is　at　the　same　time　estopped　from　stigmatizing　his　belief　as　unphilosophical。

The　consideration　which　must　influence　most　minds　in　their　attitude　toward　this　question；　is　the　craving；　almost　universally　felt；　for　some　teleological　solution　to　the　problem　of　existence。　Why　we　are　here　now　is　a　question　of　even　profounder　interest　than　whether　we　are　to　live　hereafter。　Unfortunately　its　solution　carries　us　no　less　completely　beyond　the　range　of　experience！　The　belief　that　all　things　are　working　together　for　some　good　end　is　the　most　essential　expression　of　religious　faith：　of　all　intellectual　propositions　it　is　the　one　most　closely　related　to　that　emotional　yearning　for　a　higher　and　better　life　which　is　the　sum　and　substance　of　religion。　Yet　all　the　treatises　on　natural　theology　that　have　ever　been　written　have　barely　succeeded　in　establishing　a　low　degree　of　scientific　probability　for　this　belief。　In　spite　of　the　eight　Bridgewater　Treatises；　and　the　〃Ninth〃　beside；　dysteleology　still　holds　full　half　the　field　as　against　teleology。　Most　of　this　difficulty；　however；　results　from　the　crude　anthropomorphic　views　which　theologians　have　held　concerning　God。　Once　admitting　that　the　Divine　attributes　may　be　（as　they　must　be）　incommensurably　greater　than　human　attributes；　our　faith　that　all　things　are　working　together　for　good　may　remain　unimpugned。

To　many　minds　such　a　faith　will　seem　incompatible　with　belief　in　the　ultimate　destruction　of　sentiency　amid　the　general　doom　of　the　material　universe。　A　good　end　can　have　no　meaning　to　us　save　in　relation　to　consciousness　that　distinguishes　and　knows　the　good　from　the　evil。　There　could　be　no　better　illustration　of　how　we　are　hemmed　in　than　the　very　inadequacy　of　the　words　with　which　we　try　to　discuss　this　subject。　Such　words　have　all　gained　their　meanings　from　human　experience；　and　hence　of　necessity　carry　anthropomorphic　implications。　But　we　cannot　help　this。　We　must　think　with　the　symbols　with　which　experience　has　furnished　us；　and　when　we　so　think；　there　does　seem　to　be　little　that　is　even　intellectually　satisfying　in　the　awful　picture　which　science　shows　us；　of　giant　worlds　concentrating　out　of　nebulous　vapour；　developing　with　prodigious　waste　of　energy　into　theatres　of　all　that　is　grand　and