history of the impeachment of andrew johnson-第19节

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　had　these　words：　〃To　be　removable　from　office　by　the　President　of　the　United　States。〃　It　was　moved　to　strike　out　these　words；　and　the　motion　was　sustained　with　great　ability　and　vigor。　It　was　insisted　that　the　President　could　not　constitutionally　exercise　the　power　of　removal　exclusive　of　the　Senate；　that　the　Federalist　so　interpreted　the　Constitution　when　arguing　for　its　adoption　by　the　several　States；　that　the　Constitution　had　nowhere　given　the　President　power　of　removal；　either　expressly　or　by　strong　implication；　but　on　the　contrary；　had　distinctly　provided　for　removals　from　office　by　impeachment　only。　A　construction　which　denied　the　power　of　removal　by　the　President　was　further　maintained　by　arguments　drawn　from　the　danger　of　the　abuse　of　the　power；　from　the　supposed　tendency　of　an　exposure　of　public　officers　to　capricious　removal；　to　impair　the　efficiency　of　the　civil　service；　from　the　alleged　injustice　and　hardship　of　displacing　incumbents；　dependent　upon　their　official　stations；　without　sufficient　consideration；　from　a　supposed　want　of　responsibility　on　the　part　the　President；　and　from　an　imagined　defect　of　guarantees　against　a　vicious　President；　who　might　incline　to　abuse　the　power。

On　the　other　hand；　an　exclusive　power　of　removal　by　the　President　was　defended　as　a　true　exposition　of　the　text　of　the　Constitution。　It　was　maintained　that　there　are　certain　causes　for　which　persons　ought　to　be　removed　from　office　without　being　guilty　of　treason；　bribery；　or　malfeasance；　and　that　the　nature　of　things　demands　that　it　should　be　so。　〃Suppose；〃　it　was　said；　〃a　man　becomes　insane　by　the　visitation　of　God；　and　is　likely　to　ruin　our　affairs；　are　the　hands　of　Government　to　be　confined　front　warding　off　the　evil？　Suppose　a　person　in　office　not　possessing　the　talents　he　was　judged　to　have　at　the　time　of　the　appointment；　is　the　error　not　to　be　corrected；　suppose　he　acquire　vicious　habits　and　incurable　indolence；　or　totally　neglect　the　duties　of　his　office；　which　shall　work　mischief　to　the　public　welfare；　is　there　no　way　to　arrest　the　threatened　danger？　Suppose　he　become　odious　and　unpopular　by　reason　of　the　measures　he　pursues；　and　this　he　may　do　without　committing　any　positive　offense　against　the　law；　must　he　preserve　his　office　in　despite　of　the　popular　will？　Suppose　him　grasping　for　his　own　aggrandizement　and　the　elevation　of　his　connections　by　every　means　short　of　the　treason　defined　by　the　Constitution；　hurrying　your　affairs　to　the　precipice　of　destruction；　endangering　your　domestic　tranquility；　plundering　you　of　the　means　of　defense；　alienating　the　affections　of　your　allies；　and　promoting　the　spirit　of　discord；　must　the　tardy；　tedious；　desultory　road；　by　way　of　impeachment；　be　traveled　to　overtake　the　man　who；　barely　confining　himself　within　the　letter　of　the　law；　is　employed　in　drawing　off　the　vital　principle　of　the　Government？〃　The　nature　of　things；　the　great　objects　of　society；　the　express　objects　of　the　Constitution　itself　require　that　this　thing　should　be　otherwise。　To　unite　the　Senate　with　the　President　〃in　the　exercise　of　the　power〃　it　was　said；　would　involve　us　in　the　most　serious　difficulty。　〃Suppose　a　discovery　of　any　of　these　events　should　take　place　when　the　Senate　is　not　in　session；　how　is　the　remedy　to　be　applied？　The　evil　could　be　avoided　in　no　other　way　than　by　the　Senate　sitting　always。〃　In　regard　to　the　danger　of　the　power　being　abused　if　exercised　by　one　man；　it　was　said　〃that　the　danger　is　as　great　with　respect　to　the　Senate；　who　are　assembled　from　various　parts　of　the　continent；　with　different　impressions　and　opinions；〃　that　such　a　body　is　more　likely　to　misuse　the　power　of　removal　than　the　man　whom　the　united　voice　of　America　calls　to　the　presidential　chair。　As　the　nature　of　Government　requires　the　power　of　removal；　it　was　maintained　〃that　it　should　be　exercised　in　this　way　by　the　hand　capable　of　exerting　itself　with　effect；　and　the　power　must　be　conferred　on　the　President　by　the　Constitution　as　the　executive　officer　of　the　Government。〃　Mr。　Madison；　whose　adverse　opinion　in　the　Federalist　had　been　relied　upon　by　those　who　denied　the　exclusive　power；　now　participated　in　the　debate。　He　declared　that　he　had　reviewed　his　former　opinions；　and　he　summed　up　the　whole　case　as　follows：

〃The　Constitution　affirms　that　the　executive　power　is　vested　in　the　President。　Are　there　exceptions　to　this　proposition？　Yes；　there　are。　The　Constitution　says　that　in　appointing　to　office　the　Senate　shall　be　associated　with　the　President；　unless；　in　the　case　of　inferior　officers；　when　the　law　shall　otherwise　direct。　Have　we　（that　is；　Congress）　a　right　to　extend　this　exception？　I　believe　not。　If　the　Constitution　has　invested　all　executive　power　in　the　President；　I　return　to　assert　that　the　Legislature　has　no　right　to　diminish　or　modify　his　executive　authority。　The　question　now　resolves　itself　into　this：　is　the　power　of　displacing　an　executive　power？　I　conceive　that　if　any　power　whatever　is　in　the　Executive；　it　is　in　the　power　of　appointing；　overseeing；　and　controlling　those　who　execute　the　laws。　If　the　Constitution　had　not　qualified　the　power　of　the　President　in　appointing　to　office　by　associating　the　Senate　with　him　in　that　business；　would　it　not　be　clear　that　he　would　have　the　right　by　virtue　of　his　executive　power　to　make　such　appointment？　Should　we　be　authorized；　in　defiance　of　that　clause　in　the　Constitutionthe　executive　power　shall　be　vested　in　the　Presidentto　unite　the　Senate　with　the　President　in　the　appointment　to　office？　I　conceive　not。　It　is　admitted　that　we　should　not　be　authorized　to　do　this；　I　think　it　may　be　disputed　whether　we　have　a　right　to　associate　there　in　removing　persons　from　office；　the　one　power　being　as　much　of　an　executive　nature　as　the　other；　and　the　first　is　authorized　by　being　excepted　out　of　the　general　rule　established　by　the　Constitution　in　these　words：　'The　executive　power　shall　be　vested　in　the　President。'〃

The　question　thus　ably　and　exhaustively　argued　was　decided　by　the　House　of　Representatives；　by　a　vote　of　34　to　20；　in　favor　of　the　principle　that　the　executive　power　of　removal　is　vested　by　the　Constitution　in　the　Executive；　and　in　the　Senate　by　the　casting　vote　of　the　Vice　President。　The　question　has　often　been　raised　in　subsequent　times　of　high　excitement；　and　the　practice　of　the　Government　has　nevertheless　conformed　in　all　cases　to　the　decision　thus　early　made。　*　*　*　Chancellor　Kent's　remarks　on　the　subject　are　as　follows：

〃On　the　first　organization　of　the　Government　it　was　made　a　question　whether　the　power　of　removal　in　case　of　officers　appointed　to　hold　at　pleasure　resided　nowhere　but　in　the　body　which　appointed；　and；　of　course；　whether　the　consent　of　the　Senate　was　not　requisite　to　remove。　This　was　the　construction　given　to　the　Constitution　while　it　was　pending　for　ratification　before　the　State　conventions　by　the　author　of　the　Federalist。　But　the　construction　which　was　given　to　the　Constitution　by　Congress；　after　great　consideration　and　discussion；　was　different。　The　words　of　the　act　（establishing　the　Treasury　Department）　are：　'And　whenever　the　same　shall　be　removed　from　office　by　the　President　of　the　United　States；　or　in　any　other　case　of　vacancy　in　the　office；　the　assistant　shall　act。'　This　amounted　to　a　legislative　construction　of　the　Constitution；　and　it　has　ever　since　been　acquiesced　in　and　acted　upon　as　decisive　authority　in　the　case。　It　applies　equally　to　every　other　officer　of　the　Government　appointed　by　the　President；　whose　term　of　duration　is　not　specially　declared。　It　is　supported　by　the　weighty　reason　that　the　subordinate　officers　in　the　executive　department　ought　to　hold　at　the　pleasure　of　the　head　of　the　Department；　because　he　is　invested　generally　with　the　executive　authority；　and　the　participation　in　that　authority　by　the　Senate　was　an　exception　to　a　general　principle　and　ought　to　be　taken　strictly。　The　President　is　the　great　responsible　officer　for　the　faithful　execution　of　the　law；　and　the　power　of　removal　was　incidental　to　that　duty；　and　might　often　be　requisite　to　fulfill　it。〃

Thus　has　the　important　question　presented　by　this　bill　been　settled；　in　the　language　of　the　late　Daniel　Webster　（who；　while　dissenting　from　it；　admitted　that　it　was　settled）；　by　construction；　settled　by　precedent；　settled　by　the　practice　of　the　Government；　and　settled　by　statute。

The　events　of　the　last　war　furnished　a　practical　confirmation　of　the　wisdom　of　the　Constitution　as　it　has　hitherto　been　maintained　in　many　of　its　parts；　including　that　which　is　now　the　subject　of　consideration。　When　the　war　broke　out　rebel　enemies；　traitors；　abettors；　and　sympathizers　were　found　in　every　department　of　the　Government；　as　well　in　the　civil　service　as　in　the　land　and　naval　military　service。　They　were　found　in　Congress　and　among　the　keepers　of　the　Capitol；　in　foreign　missions；　in　each　and　all　of　the　Executive　Departments；　in　the　judicial　service；　in　the　Post　Office；　and　among　the　agents　for　conducting　Indian　affairs；　and　upon　probable　suspicion　they　were　promptly　displaced　by　my　predecessor；　so　far　as　they　held　their　offices　under　executive　authority；　and　their　duties　were　confided　to　new　and　loyal　successors。　No　complaints　against　that　power　or　doubts　of　its　wisdom；　were　entertained　in　any　quarter。

Ha