history of the impeachment of andrew johnson-第18节

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　to　render　this　relation　of　confidence　and　trust　and　personal　esteem　inharmonious；　HE　SHOULD　IN　SUCH　CASE　BE　ALLOWED　TO　DISPENSE　WITH　THE　SERVICES　OF　THAT　OFFICER　IN　VACATION　AND　HAVE　SOME　OTHER　PERSON　ACT　IN　HIS　STEAD。　We　thought　that　so　much　discretion；　so　much　confidence；　so　much　respect　ought　to　be　properly　attributed　to　the　Chief　Magistrate　of　the　Nation。　It　may　happen　that　at　some　particular　timesome　people　may　suppose　that　it　has　happened　nowthe　Chief　Magistrate　for　the　time　being　ought　not　to　be　invested　with　such　powers；　but　the　Committee　have　recommended　the　adoption　of　this　rule　respecting　the　tenure…of…office　as　a　permanent　and　systematic；　and　as　they　believe；　an　appropriate　regulation　of　the　Government　for　all　administrations　and　for　all　time；　and　it　did　appear　to　them　（whether　the　reason　may　command　itself　to　the　Senate　or　not）；　that　it　was　just　to　the　Executive；　and　on　the　whole　best　for　the　interest　of　the　Nation；　that　he　should　be　allowed　during　a　recess　of　the　Senate　to　change　his　confidential　advisers　if　it　should　appear　to　him　to　be　fit；　subject　to　that　general　responsibility　which　every　officer　must　be　held　to　the　public　and　to　the　Senate　when　they　meet　again。

Mr。　Williams　said：

I　prepared　the　original　bill　in　this　case；　which　contains　in　different　words　the　exception　contained　in　the　amendment　reported　by　the　Committee。　I　do　not　regard　the　exception　as　of　any　real　practical　consequence；　because　I　suppose　if　the　President　and　any　head　of　a　Department　should　disagree　so　as　to　make　their　relations　unpleasant；　and　the　President　should　signify　a　desire　that　the　head　of　a　Department　retire　from　the　Cabinet；　THAT　WOULD　FOLLOW　WITHOUT　ANY　POSITIVE　ACT　OF　REMOVAL　ON　THE　PART　OF　THE　PRESIDENT。

Mr。　Fessenden　said：

The　Constitution　imposes　upon　the　President　of　the　United　States　the　duty　of　executing　the　laws；　it　does　not　impose　that　duty　upon　the　Secretaries。　They　are　creatures　of　the　law　and　not　of　the　Constitution　directly。　Some；　and　perhaps　the　greater　part；　of　their　functions　are　as　advisers　of　the　President　and　to　aid　him　in　executing　the　laws　in　their　several　Departments。　There　are　some　duties　that　are　specifically　conferred　upon　them　by　Congress。　Their　relation　to　the　President；　as　has　been　well　said　by　gentlemen；　is　that　mostly　of　confidential　advisers。　With　the　exception　of　the　particular　duties　imposed　upon　them　by　law；　and　on　the　Secretary　of　the　Treasury　more　than　on　the　others；　they　do　nothing　of　their　own　motion；　but　act　by　order　of　the　President　in　discharging　the　particular　duties　of　their　office。　*　*　*　That　being　the　peculiar　condition　of　affairs　it　has　always　been　considered　since　the　foundation　of　the　Government；　as　a　matter　of　course；　as　a　general　rulethere　may　have　been　one　or　two　exceptions；　and　I　think　there　have　been；　but　I　am　not　very　positive　on　that　pointthat　the　President　might　select　such　persons　as　he　pleased　to　be　members　of　his　Cabinet。　Of　course　the　confirmation　of　the　Senate　is　necessary；　but　the　general　idea　of　the　Senate　has　been；　whether　they　liked　the　men　or　not；　to　confirm　them　without　any　difficulty；　because　in　executing　the　great　and　varied　interests　of　this　great　country　it　is　exceedingly　important　that　there　should　be　the　utmost　harmony　between　those　who　are　charged　with　that　execution。

The　bill　passed　as　reported　and　went　to　the　House。　That　body　amended　it　by　making　Cabinet　officers　non…removable　by　the　President　without　the　consent　of　the　Senate；　and　sent　the　bill　back　to　the　Senate；　when　Mr。　Sherman　said：

It　（the　Tenure…of…Office　bill）　ought　to　have　been　passed；　and　probably　would　have　been　passed；　long　ago；　if　a　different　condition　of　affairs　had　existed　before。　But　when　you　propose　to　extend　that　principle　to　Cabinet　officers；　a　very　different　state　of　affairs　arises；　and　different　circumstances　apply　to　this　subject。　Now　I　say；　that　if　a　Cabinet　officer　should　attempt　to　hold　his　office　for　a　moment　beyond　the　time　when　he　retained　the　entire　confidence　of　the　President；　I　would　not　vote　to　retain　him；　NOR　WOULD　I　COMPEL　THE　PRESIDENT　TO　LEAVE　ABOUT　HIM　IN　THESE　HIGH　POSITIONS　A　MAN　IN　WHOM　HE　DID　NOT　ENTIRELY　TRUST；　both　personally　and　politically。　It　would　be　unwise　to　require　him　to　administer　the　Government　without　agents　of　his　own　choosing。　It　seems　to　me；　therefore；　that　it　would　be　unwise　for　the　Senate　to　engraft　in　this　bill　a　provision　that　would　enable　a　Cabinet　officer　to　hold　on　to　his　office　in　violation　of　the　will　of　his　Chief。　*　*　*　Suppose　the　personal　relations　between　a　Cabinet　officer　and　the　President　became　so　unpleasant　that　they　could　have　no　personal　intercourse。　The　Senator　from　Wisconsin　（Mr。　Howe）；　says　in　such　a　case　the　Cabinet　officer　would　resign。　Suppose　he　should　hold　on　to　his　power　and　positionwhat　then？　There　is　no　power　to　remove　him；　and　the　President　can　have　no　intercourse　with　him。　Would　you　compel　such　a　state　of　affairs？　It　seems　to　me　that　it　would　be　unwise　to　do　so。　That　the　Senate　had　no　such　purpose　is　shown　by　its　vote　twice　to　make　this　exception。　That　this　provision　does　not　apply　to　the　present　case；　is　shown　by　the　fact　that　its　language　is　so　framed　as　NOT　TO　APPLY　TO　THE　PRESENT　PRESIDENT。　*　*　*　It　would　not　prevent　the　present　President　from　removing　the　present　Secretary　of　War；　the　Secretary　of　the　Navy；　or　the　Secretary　of　State。

A　considerable　number　of　Senators　participated　in　the　debate；　which　was　able　and　exhaustive　to　an　exceptional　degree；　on　both　sides；　and　occupied　several　days　in　the　various　stages　of　the　proceeding。

Mr。　Edmunds　closed　the　debate　in　the　Senate　with　the　following　remarks：

I　do　not　rise　to　prolong　the　debate；　but　only　to　express　the　hope　that　the　debate　on　this　question　may　terminatethat　we　may　come　to　a　vote。　*　*　*　While　I　should　be　glad　to　occupy　some　time　in　reply　to　some　things　that　have　fallen　in　the　course　of　this　debate；　I　feel　it　to　be　due　to　the　business　of　the　Senate　to　abstain。　I　hope　the　Senate　will　disagree　to　this　amendment；　（made　by　the　House）　and　adhere　to　the　bill　as　it　stands。

The　vote　was　then　taken；　and　resulted　in　17　for　agreeing　to　the　House　amendment；　and　28　against　it。

The　action　of　the　Senate　was　reported　to　the　House　and　Conference　Committees　were　appointed　by　the　two　houses。

On　the　18th　of　February；　the　following　substitute　for　the　first　section　of　the　bill　was　reported　by　the　Committee　of　Conference　and　adopted　by　both　Houses；　and　the　bill　went　to　the　President：

Provided；　That　the　Secretaries　of　State；　of　the　Treasury；　of　War；　of　the　Navy；　and　of　the　Interior；　the　Postmaster　General　and　the　Attorney　General；　shall　hold　their　offices　respectively　FOR　AND　DURING　THE　TERMS　OF　THE　PRESIDENT　BY　WHOM　THEY　MAY　HAVE　BEEN　APPOINTED；　and　for　one　month　thereafter；　subject　to　removal　by　and　with　the　advice　and　consent　of　the　Senate。

On　Monday；　March　2nd；　1867；　the　President　returned　the　bill　to　the　Senate；　in　which　house　it　had　originated；　with　his　objections　thereto；　as　follows：

To　the　Senate　of　the　United　States：

I　have　carefully　examined　the　bill　to　regulate　the　tenure　of　certain　civil　offices。　The　material　portion　of　the　bill　is　contained　in　the　first　section；　and　is　of　the　effect　following；　namely：

〃That　every　person　holding　any　civil　office　to　which　he　has　been　appointed　by　and　with　the　advice　and　consent　of　the　Senate；　and　every　person　who　shall　hereafter　be　appointed　to　any　such　office；　and　shall　become　duly　qualified　to　act　therein；　is　and　shall　be　entitled　to　hold　such　office　until　a　successor　shall　have　been　appointed　by　the　President；　with　the　advice　and　consent　of　the　Senate；　and　duly　qualified；　and　that　the　Secretaries　of　State；　of　the　Treasury；　of　War；　of　the　Navy；　and　of　the　Interior；　the　Postmaster　General；　and　the　Attorney　General；　shall　hold　their　offices　respectively　for　and　during　the　term　of　the　President　by　whom　they　may　have　been　appointed；　and　for　one　month　thereafter；　subject　to　removal　by　and　with　the　advice　and　consent　of　the　Senate。〃

These　revisions　are　qualified　by　a　reservation　in　the　fourth　section；　〃that　nothing　contained　in　the　bill　shall　be　construed　to　extend　the　term　of　any　office　the　duration　of　which　is　limited　by　law。〃　In　effect　the　bill　provides　that　the　President　shall　not　remove　from　their　places　any　of　the　civil　officers　whose　terms　of　service　are　not　limited　by　law　without　the　advice　and　consent　of　the　Senate　of　the　United　States。　The　bill；　in　this　respect；　conflicts；　in　my　judgment；　with　the　Constitution　of　the　United　States。　The　question；　as　Congress　is　well　aware；　is　by　no　means　a　new　one。　That　the　power　of　removal　is　constitutionally　vested　in　the　President　of　the　United　States　is　a　principle　which　has　been　not　more　distinctly　declared　by　judicial　authority　and　judicial　commentators　than　it　has　been　uniformly　practiced　upon　by　the　legislative　and　executive　departments　of　the　Government。　The　question　arose　in　the　House　of　Representatives　so　early　as　the　16th　day　of　June；　1789；　on　the　bill　for　establishing　an　executive　department；　denominated　〃The　Department　of　Foreign　Affairs。〃　The　first　clause　of　the　bill；　after　recapitulating　the　functions　of　that　officer　and　defining　his　duties；　had　these　words：　〃To　be　removable　from　office　by　the　President　of　the　United　States。〃　It　was　moved