on sophistical refutations-第6节

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does　not　understand　or　suppose　it　to　have　them；　surely　the



questioner　here　has　directed　his　argument　against　his　thought！　Or



how　else　ought　he　to　put　his　question　except　by　suggesting　a



distinction…suppose　one's　question　to　be　speaking　of　the　silent



possible　or　not？'…as　follows；　'Is　the　answer　〃No〃　in　one　sense；　but



〃Yes〃　in　another？'　If；　then；　any　one　were　to　answer　that　it　was　not



possible　in　any　sense　and　the　other　were　to　argue　that　it　was；　has　not



his　argument　been　directed　against　the　thought　of　the　answerer？　Yet



his　argument　is　supposed　to　be　one　of　those　that　depend　on　the



expression。　There　is　not；　then；　any　definite　kind　of　arguments　that　is



directed　against　the　thought。　Some　arguments　are；　indeed；　directed



against　the　expression：　but　these　are　not　all　even　apparent



refutations；　let　alone　all　refutations。　For　there　are　also　apparent



refutations　which　do　not　depend　upon　language；　e。g。　those　that



depend　upon　accident；　and　others。



　　If；　however；　any　one　claims　that　one　should　actually　draw　the



distinction；　and　say；　'By　〃speaking　of　the　silent〃　I　mean；　in　one



sense　this　and　in　the　other　sense　that'；　surely　to　claim　this　is　in



the　first　place　absurd　（for　sometimes　the　questioner　does　not　see



the　ambiguity　of　his　question；　and　he　cannot　possibly　draw　a



distinction　which　he　does　not　think　to　be　there）：　in　the　second　place；



what　else　but　this　will　didactic　argument　be？　For　it　will　make



manifest　the　state　of　the　case　to　one　who　has　never　considered；　and



does　not　know　or　suppose　that　there　is　any　other　meaning　but　one。



For　what　is　there　to　prevent　the　same　thing　also　happening　to　us　in



cases　where　there　is　no　double　meaning？　'Are　the　units　in　four　equal



to　the　twos？　Observe　that　the　twos　are　contained　in　four　in　one



sense　in　this　way；　in　another　sense　in　that'。　Also；　'Is　the



knowledge　of　contraries　one　or　not？　Observe　that　some　contraries　are



known；　while　others　are　unknown'。　Thus　the　man　who　makes　this　claim



seems　to　be　unaware　of　the　difference　between　didactic　and　dialectical



argument；　and　of　the　fact　that　while　he　who　argues　didactically　should



not　ask　questions　but　make　things　clear　himself；　the　other　should



merely　ask　questions。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　11







　　Moreover；　to　claim　a　'Yes'　or　'No'　answer　is　the　business　not　of　a



man　who　is　showing　something；　but　of　one　who　is　holding　an



examination。　For　the　art　of　examining　is　a　branch　of　dialectic　and　has



in　view　not　the　man　who　has　knowledge；　but　the　ignorant　pretender。　He；



then；　is　a　dialectician　who　regards　the　common　principles　with　their



application　to　the　particular　matter　in　hand；　while　he　who　only



appears　to　do　this　is　a　sophist。　Now　for　contentious　and　sophistical



reasoning：　（1）　one　such　is　a　merely　apparent　reasoning；　on　subjects　on



which　dialectical　reasoning　is　the　proper　method　of　examination；



even　though　its　conclusion　be　true：　for　it　misleads　us　in　regard　to



the　cause：　also　（2）　there　are　those　misreasonings　which　do　not　conform



to　the　line　of　inquiry　proper　to　the　particular　subject；　but　are



generally　thought　to　conform　to　the　art　in　question。　For　false



diagrams　of　geometrical　figures　are　not　contentious　（for　the　resulting



fallacies　conform　to　the　subject　of　the　art）…any　more　than　is　any



false　diagram　that　may　be　offered　in　proof　of　a　truth…e。g。



Hippocrates'　figure　or　the　squaring　of　the　circle　by　means　of　the



lunules。　But　Bryson's　method　of　squaring　the　circle；　even　if　the



circle　is　thereby　squared；　is　still　sophistical　because　it　does　not



conform　to　the　subject　in　hand。　So；　then；　any　merely　apparent



reasoning　about　these　things　is　a　contentious　argument；　and　any



reasoning　that　merely　appears　to　conform　to　the　subject　in　hand；



even　though　it　be　genuine　reasoning；　is　a　contentious　argument：　for　it



is　merely　apparent　in　its　conformity　to　the　subject…matter；　so　that　it



is　deceptive　and　plays　foul。　For　just　as　a　foul　in　a　race　is　a



definite　type　of　fault；　and　is　a　kind　of　foul　fighting；　so　the　art



of　contentious　reasoning　is　foul　fighting　in　disputation：　for　in　the



former　case　those　who　are　resolved　to　win　at　all　costs　snatch　at



everything；　and　so　in　the　latter　case　do　contentious　reasoners。　Those；



then；　who　do　this　in　order　to　win　the　mere　victory　are　generally



considered　to　be　contentious　and　quarrelsome　persons；　while　those



who　do　it　to　win　a　reputation　with　a　view　to　making　money　are



sophistical。　For　the　art　of　sophistry　is；　as　we　said；'　a　kind　of　art



of　money…making　from　a　merely　apparent　wisdom；　and　this　is　why　they



aim　at　a　merely　apparent　demonstration：　and　quarrelsome　persons　and



sophists　both　employ　the　same　arguments；　but　not　with　the　same



motives：　and　the　same　argument　will　be　sophistical　and　contentious；



but　not　in　the　same　respect；　rather；　it　will　be　contentious　in　so



far　as　its　aim　is　an　apparent　victory；　while　in　so　far　as　its　aim　is



an　apparent　wisdom；　it　will　be　sophistical：　for　the　art　of　sophistry



is　a　certain　appearance　of　wisdom　without　the　reality。　The　contentious



argument　stands　in　somewhat　the　same　relation　to　the　dialectical　as



the　drawer　of　false　diagrams　to　the　geometrician；　for　it　beguiles　by



misreasoning　from　the　same　principles　as　dialectic　uses；　just　as　the



drawer　of　a　false　diagram　beguiles　the　geometrician。　But　whereas　the



latter　is　not　a　contentious　reasoner；　because　he　bases　his　false



diagram　on　the　principles　and　conclusions　that　fall　under　the　art　of



geometry；　the　argument　which　is　subordinate　to　the　principles　of



dialectic　will　yet　clearly　be　contentious　as　regards　other　subjects。



Thus；　e。g。　though　the　squaring　of　the　circle　by　means　of　the　lunules



is　not　contentious；　Bryson's　solution　is　contentious：　and　the　former



argument　cannot　be　adapted　to　any　subject　except　geometry；　because



it　proceeds　from　principles　that　are　peculiar　to　geometry；　whereas　the



latter　can　be　adapted　as　an　argument　against　all　the　number　of



people　who　do　not　know　what　is　or　is　not　possible　in　each　particular



context：　for　it　will　apply　to　them　all。　Or　there　is　the　method　whereby



Antiphon　squared　the　circle。　Or　again；　an　argument　which　denied　that



it　was　better　to　take　a　walk　after　dinner；　because　of　Zeno's　argument；



would　not　be　a　proper　argument　for　a　doctor；　because　Zeno's　argument



is　of　general　application。　If；　then；　the　relation　of　the　contentious



argument　to　the　dialectical　were　exactly　like　that　of　the　drawer　of



false　diagrams　to　the　geometrician；　a　contentious　argument　upon　the



aforesaid　subjects　could　not　have　existed。　But；　as　it　is；　the



dialectical　argument　is　not　concerned　with　any　definite　kind　of　being；



nor　does　it　show　anything；　nor　is　it　even　an　argument　such　as　we



find　in　the　general　philosophy　of　being。　For　all　beings　are　not



contained　in　any　one　kind；　nor；　if　they　were；　could　they　possibly　fall



under　the　same　principles。　Accordingly；　no　art　that　is　a　method　of



showing　the　nature　of　anything　proceeds　by　asking　questions：　for　it



does　not　permit　a　man　to　grant　whichever　he　likes　of　the　two



alternatives　in　the　question：　for　they　will　not　both　of　them　yield　a



proof。　Dialectic；　on　the　other　hand；　does　proceed　by　questioning；



whereas　if　it　were　concerned　to　show　things；　it　would　have　refrained



from　putting　questions；　even　if　not　about　everything；　at　least　about



the　first　principles　and　the　special　principles　that　apply　to　the



particular　subject　in　hand。　For　suppose　the　answerer　not　to　grant



these；　it　would　then　no　longer　have　had　any　grounds　from　which　to



argue　any　longer　against　the　objection。　Dialectic　is　at　the　same



time　a　mode　of　examination　as　well。　For　neither　is　the　art　of



examination　an　accomplishment　of　the　same　kind　as　geometry；　but　one



which　a　man　may　possess；　even　though　he　has　not　knowledge。　For　it　is



possible　even　for　one　without　knowledge　to　hold　an　examination　of



one　who　is　without　knowledge；　if　also　the　latter　grants　him　points



taken　not　from　thing　that　he　knows　or　from　the　special　principles　of



the　subject　under　discussion　but　from　all　that　range　of　consequences



attaching　to　the　subject　which　a　man　may　indeed　know　without　knowing



the　theory　of　the　subject；　but　which　if　he　do　not　know；　he　is　bound　to



be　ignorant　of　the　theory。　So　then　clearly　the　art　of　examining　does



not　consist　in　knowledge　of　any　definite　subject。　For　this　reason；



too；　it　deals　with　everything：　for　every　'theory'　of　anything



employs　also　certain　common　principles。　Hence　everybody；　including



even　amateurs；　makes　use　in　a　way　of　dialectic　and　the　practice　of



examining：　for　all　undertake　to　some　extent　a　rough　trial　of　those　who



profess　to　know　things。　What　serves　them　here　is　the　general



principles：　for　they　know　these　of　themselves　just　as　well　as　the



scientist；　even　if　in　what　they　say　they　seem　to　the　latter　t