on sophistical refutations-第4节

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should　come　about　without　taking　into　account　the　original　point；



and　this　is　not　the　case　with　those　arguments　which　depend　upon



begging　the　original　point。



　　　　Those　that　depend　upon　the　consequent　are　a　branch　of　Accident：



for　the　consequent　is　an　accident；　only　it　differs　from　the　accident



in　this；　that　you　may　secure　an　admission　of　the　accident　in　the



case　of　one　thing　only　（e。g。　the　identity　of　a　yellow　thing　and



honey　and　of　a　white　thing　and　swan）；　whereas　the　consequent　always



involves　more　than　one　thing：　for　we　claim　that　things　that　are　the



same　as　one　and　the　same　thing　are　also　the　same　as　one　another；　and



this　is　the　ground　of　a　refutation　dependent　on　the　consequent。　It　is；



however；　not　always　true；　e。g。　suppose　that　and　B　are　the　same　as　C



per　accidens；　for　both　'snow'　and　the　'swan'　are　the　same　as　something



white'。　Or　again；　as　in　Melissus'　argument；　a　man　assumes　that　to



'have　been　generated'　and　to　'have　a　beginning'　are　the　same　thing；　or



to　'become　equal'　and　to　'assume　the　same　magnitude'。　For　because　what



has　been　generated　has　a　beginning；　he　claims　also　that　what　has　a



beginning　has　been　generated；　and　argues　as　though　both　what　has



been　generated　and　what　is　finite　were　the　same　because　each　has　a



beginning。　Likewise　also　in　the　case　of　things　that　are　made　equal



he　assumes　that　if　things　that　assume　one　and　the　same　magnitude



become　equal；　then　also　things　that　become　equal　assume　one　magnitude：



i。e。　he　assumes　the　consequent。　Inasmuch；　then；　as　a　refutation



depending　on　accident　consists　in　ignorance　of　what　a　refutation　is；



clearly　so　also　does　a　refutation　depending　on　the　consequent。　We



shall　have　further　to　examine　this　in　another　way　as　well。



　　Those　fallacies　that　depend　upon　the　making　of　several　questions



into　one　consist　in　our　failure　to　dissect　the　definition　of



'proposition'。　For　a　proposition　is　a　single　statement　about　a



single　thing。　For　the　same　definition　applies　to　'one　single　thing



only'　and　to　the　'thing'；　simply；　e。g。　to　'man'　and　to　'one　single　man



only'　and　likewise　also　in　other　cases。　If；　then；　a　'single



proposition'　be　one　which　claims　a　single　thing　of　a　single　thing；　a



'proposition'；　simply；　will　also　be　the　putting　of　a　question　of



that　kind。　Now　since　a　proof　starts　from　propositions　and　refutation



is　a　proof；　refutation；　too；　will　start　from　propositions。　If；　then；　a



proposition　is　a　single　statement　about　a　single　thing；　it　is



obvious　that　this　fallacy　too　consists　in　ignorance　of　what　a



refutation　is：　for　in　it　what　is　not　a　proposition　appears　to　be



one。　If；　then；　the　answerer　has　returned　an　answer　as　though　to　a



single　question；　there　will　be　a　refutation；　while　if　he　has



returned　one　not　really　but　apparently；　there　will　be　an　apparent



refutation　of　his　thesis。　All　the　types　of　fallacy；　then；　fall　under



ignorance　of　what　a　refutation　is；　some　of　them　because　the



contradiction；　which　is　the　distinctive　mark　of　a　refutation；　is



merely　apparent；　and　the　rest　failing　to　conform　to　the　definition



of　a　proof。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　7







　　The　deception　comes　about　in　the　case　of　arguments　that　depend　on



ambiguity　of　words　and　of　phrases　because　we　are　unable　to　divide



the　ambiguous　term　（for　some　terms　it　is　not　easy　to　divide；　e。g。



'unity'；　'being'；　and　'sameness'）；　while　in　those　that　depend　on



combination　and　division；　it　is　because　we　suppose　that　it　makes　no



difference　whether　the　phrase　be　combined　or　divided；　as　is　indeed　the



case　with　most　phrases。　Likewise　also　with　those　that　depend　on



accent：　for　the　lowering　or　raising　of　the　voice　upon　a　phrase　is



thought　not　to　alter　its　meaning…with　any　phrase；　or　not　with　many。



With　those　that　depend　on　the　of　expression　it　is　because　of　the



likeness　of　expression。　For　it　is　hard　to　distinguish　what　kind　of



things　are　signified　by　the　same　and　what　by　different　kinds　of



expression：　for　a　man　who　can　do　this　is　practically　next　door　to



the　understanding　of　the　truth。　A　special　reason　why　a　man　is　liable



to　be　hurried　into　assent　to　the　fallacy　is　that　we　suppose　every



predicate　of　everything　to　be　an　individual　thing；　and　we　understand



it　as　being　one　with　the　thing：　and　we　therefore　treat　it　as　a



substance：　for　it　is　to　that　which　is　one　with　a　thing　or　substance；



as　also　to　substance　itself；　that　'individually'　and　'being'　are



deemed　to　belong　in　the　fullest　sense。　For　this　reason；　too；　this　type



of　fallacy　is　to　be　ranked　among　those　that　depend　on　language；　in　the



first　place；　because　the　deception　is　effected　the　more　readily　when



we　are　inquiring　into　a　problem　in　company　with　others　than　when　we　do



so　by　ourselves　（for　an　inquiry　with　another　person　is　carried　on　by



means　of　speech；　whereas　an　inquiry　by　oneself　is　carried　on　quite



as　much　by　means　of　the　object　itself）；　secondly　a　man　is　liable　to　be



deceived；　even　when　inquiring　by　himself；　when　he　takes　speech　as



the　basis　of　his　inquiry：　moreover　the　deception　arises　out　of　the



likeness　（of　two　different　things）；　and　the　likeness　arises　out　of　the



language。　With　those　fallacies　that　depend　upon　Accident；　deception



comes　about　because　we　cannot　distinguish　the　sameness　and　otherness



of　terms；　i。e。　their　unity　and　multiplicity；　or　what　kinds　of



predicate　have　all　the　same　accidents　as　their　subject。　Likewise



also　with　those　that　depend　on　the　Consequent：　for　the　consequent　is　a



branch　of　Accident。　Moreover；　in　many　cases　appearances　point　to



this…and　the　claim　is　made　that　if　is　inseparable　from　B；　so　also　is　B



from　With　those　that　depend　upon　an　imperfection　in　the　definition



of　a　refutation；　and　with　those　that　depend　upon　the　difference



between　a　qualified　and　an　absolute　statement；　the　deception



consists　in　the　smallness　of　the　difference　involved；　for　we　treat　the



limitation　to　the　particular　thing　or　respect　or　manner　or　time　as



adding　nothing　to　the　meaning；　and　so　grant　the　statement　universally。



Likewise　also　in　the　case　of　those　that　assume　the　original　point；　and



those　of　false　cause；　and　all　that　treat　a　number　of　questions　as　one：



for　in　all　of　them　the　deception　lies　in　the　smallness　of　the



difference：　for　our　failure　to　be　quite　exact　in　our　definition　of



'premiss'　and　of　'proof'　is　due　to　the　aforesaid　reason。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　8







　　Since　we　know　on　how　many　points　apparent　syllogisms　depend；　we　know



also　on　how　many　sophistical　syllogisms　and　refutations　may　depend。　By



a　sophistical　refutation　and　syllogism　I　mean　not　only　a　syllogism



or　refutation　which　appears　to　be　valid　but　is　not；　but　also　one



which；　though　it　is　valid；　only　appears　to　be　appropriate　to　the　thing



in　question。　These　are　those　which　fail　to　refute　and　prove　people



to　be　ignorant　according　to　the　nature　of　the　thing　in　question；　which



was　the　function　of　the　art　of　examination。　Now　the　art　of　examining



is　a　branch　of　dialectic：　and　this　may　prove　a　false　conclusion



because　of　the　ignorance　of　the　answerer。　Sophistic　refutations　on　the



other　hand；　even　though　they　prove　the　contradictory　of　his　thesis；　do



not　make　clear　whether　he　is　ignorant：　for　sophists　entangle　the



scientist　as　well　with　these　arguments。



　　That　we　know　them　by　the　same　line　of　inquiry　is　clear：　for　the　same



considerations　which　make　it　appear　to　an　audience　that　the　points



required　for　the　proof　were　asked　in　the　questions　and　that　the



conclusion　was　proved；　would　make　the　answerer　think　so　as　well；　so



that　false　proof　will　occur　through　all　or　some　of　these　means：　for



what　a　man　has　not　been　asked　but　thinks　he　has　granted；　he　would　also



grant　if　he　were　asked。　Of　course；　in　some　cases　the　moment　we　add　the



missing　question；　we　also　show　up　its　falsity；　e。g。　in　fallacies



that　depend　on　language　and　on　solecism。　If　then；　fallacious　proofs　of



the　contradictory　of　a　thesis　depend　on　their　appearing　to　refute；



it　is　clear　that　the　considerations　on　which　both　proofs　of　false



conclusions　and　an　apparent　refutation　depend　must　be　the　same　in



number。　Now　an　apparent　refutation　depends　upon　the　elements



involved　in　a　genuine　one：　for　the　failure　of　one　or　other　of　these



must　make　the　refutation　merely　apparent；　e。g。　that　which　depends　on



the　failure　of　the　conclusion　to　follow　from　the　argument　（the



argument　ad　impossible）　and　that　which　treats　two　questions　as　one　and



so　depends　upon　a　flaw　in　the　premiss；　and　that　which　depends　on　the



substitution　of　an　accident　for　an　essential　attribute；　and…a　branch



of　the　last…that　which　depends　upon　the　consequent：　more　over；　the



conclusion　may　follow　not　in　fact　but　only　verbally：　then；　instead



of　proving　the　contradictory　universally　and　in　the　same　respect　and



relation　and　manner；　the　falla