war and the future-第32节

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you　found　so　interesting　and　sympathetic；　Lloyd　George　and　Lord
Northcliffe；　for　example；　belong。　　It　is　the　Britain　of　the　great
effort；　the　Britain　of　the　smoking　factories　and　the　torrent　of
munitions；　the　Britain　of　the　men　and　subalterns　of　the　new
armies；　the　Britain　which　invents　and　thinks　and　achieves；　and
stands　now　between　German　imperialism　and　the　empire　of　the
world。　　I　do　not　want　to　exaggerate　the　quality　of　greater
Britain。　　If　the　inner　set　are　narrowly　educated；　the　outer　set
if　often　crudely　educated。　　If　the　inner　set　is　so　close　knit　as
to　seem　like　a　conspiracy；　the　outer　set　is　so　loosely　knit　as　to
seem　like　a　noisy　confusion。　　Greater　Britain　is　only　beginning
to　realise　itself　and　find　itself。　　For　all　its　crudity　there　is
a　giant　spirit　in　it　feeling　its　way　towards　the　light。　　It　has
quite　other　ambitions　for　the　ending　of　the　war　than　some　haggled
treaty　of　alliance　with　France　and　Italy；　some　advantage　that
will　invalidate　German　competition；　it　begins　to　realise　newer
and　wider　sympathies；　possibilities　of　an　amalgamation　of
interests　and　community　of　aim　that　is　utterly　beyond　the　habits
of　the　old　oligarchy　to　conceive；　beyond　the　scope　of　that　tawdry
word　'Empire'　to　express。。。。〃

I　descended　from　my　rhetoric　to　find　M。　Reinach　asking　how　and
when　this　greater　Britain　was　likely　to　become　politically
effective。


V。　THE　SOCIAL　CHANGES　IN　PROGRESS


1

〃Nothing　will　be　the　same　after　the　war。〃　　This　is　one　of　the
consoling　platitudes　with　which　people　cover　over　voids　of
thought。　　They　utter　it　with　an　air　of　round…eyed　profundity。
But　to　ask　in　reply；　〃Then　how　will　things　be　different？〃　　is　in
many　cases　to　rouse　great　resentment。　　It　is　almost　as　rude　as
saying；　〃Was　that　thought　of　yours　really　a　thought？〃

Let　us　in　this　chapter　confine　ourselves　to　the　social…economic
processes　that　are　going　on。　　So　far　as　I　am　able　to　distinguish
among　the　things　that　are　being　said　in　these　matters；　they　may
be　classified　out　into　groups　that　centre　upon　several　typical
questions。　　There　is　the　question　of　〃How　to　pay　for　the　war？〃
There　is　the　question　of　the　behaviour　of　labour　after　the　war。
〃Will　there　be　a　Labour　Truce　or　a　violent　labour　struggle？〃
There　is　the　question　of　the　reconstruction　of　European　industry
after　the　war　in　the　face　of　an　America　in　a　state　of　monetary
and　economic　repletion　through　non…intervention。　　My　present
purpose　in　this　chapter　is　a　critical　one；　it　is　not　to　solve
problems　but　to　set　out　various　currents　of　thought　that　are
flowing　through　the　general　mind。　　Which　current　is　likely　to
seize　upon　and　carry　human　affairs　with　it；　is　not　for　our
present　speculation。

There　seem　to　be　two　distinct　ways　of　answering　the　first　of　the
questions　I　have　noted。　　They　do　not　necessarily　contradict　each
other。　　Of　course　the　war　is　being　largely　paid　for　immediately
out　of　the　accumulated　private　wealth　of　the　past。　　We　are　buying
off　the　〃hold…up〃　of　the　private　owner　upon　the　material　and
resources　we　need；　and　paying　in　paper　money　and　war　loans。　　This
is　not　in　itself　an　impoverishment　of　the　community。　　The　wealth
of　individuals　is　not　the　wealth　of　nations；　the　two　things　may
easily　be　contradictory　when　the　rich　man's　wealth　consists　of
land　or　natural　resources　or　franchises　or　privileges　the　use　of
which　he　reluctantly　yields　for　high　prices。　　The　conversion　of
held…up　land　and　material　into　workable　and　actively　used
material　in　exchange　for　national　debt　may　be　indeed　a　positive
increase　in　the　wealth　of　the　community。　　And　what　is　happening
in　all　the　belligerent　countries　is　the　taking　over　of　more　and
more　of　the　realities　of　wealth　from　private　hands　and；　in
exchange；　the　contracting　of　great　masses　of　debt　to　private
people。　　The　nett　tendency　is　towards　the　disappearance　of　a
reality　holding　class　and　the　destruction　of　realities　in
warfare；　and　the　appearance　of　a　vast　/rentier/　class　in　its
place。　　At　the　end　of　the　war　much　material　will　be　destroyed　for
evermore；　transit；　food　production　and　industry　will　be
everywhere　enormously　socialised；　and　the　country　will　be　liable
to　pay　every　year　in　interest；　a　sum　of　money　exceeding　the
entire　national　expenditure　before　the　war。　　From　the　point　of
view　of　the　state；　and　disregarding　material　and　moral　damages；
that　annual　interest　is　the　annual　instalment　of　the　price　to　be
paid　for　the　war。

Now　the　interesting　question　arises　whether　these　great
belligerent　states　may　go　bankrupt；　and　if　so　to　what　extent。
States　may　go　bankrupt　to　the　private　creditor　without
repudiating　their　debts　or　seeming　to　pay　less　to　him。　　They　can
go　bankrupt　either　by　a　depreciation　of　their　currency　or
without　touching　the　gold　standardthrough　a　rise　in　prices。　　In
the　end　both　these　things　work　out　to　the　same　end；　the　creditor
gets　so　many　loaves　or　pairs　of　boots　or　workman's　hours　of
labour　for　his　pound　/less/　than　he　would　have　got　under　the
previous　conditions。　　One　may　imagine　this　process　of　price　（and
of　course　wages）　increase　going　on　to　a　limitless　extent。　　Many
people　are　inclined　to　look　to　such　an　increase　in　prices　as　a
certain　outcome　of　the　war；　and　just　so　far　as　it　goes；　just　so
far　will　the　burthen　of　the　/rentier/　class；　their　call；　tat
is；　for　goods　and　services；　be　lightened。　　This　expectation　is
very　generally　entertained；　and　I　can　see　little　reason　against
it。　　The　intensely　stupid　or　dishonest　〃labour〃　press；　however；
which　in　the　interests　of　the　common　enemy　misrepresents
socialism　and　seeks　to　misguide　labour　in　Great　Britain；　ignores
these　considerations；　and　positively　holds　out　this　prospect　of
rising　prices　as　an　alarming　one　to　the　more　credulous　and
ignorant　of　its　readers。

But　now　comes　the　second　way　of　meeting　the　after…the…war
obligations。　　This　second　way　is　by　increasing　the　wealth　of　the
state　and　by　increasing　the　national　production　to　such　an　extent
that　the　payment　of　the　/rentier/　class　will　not　be　an
overwhelming　burthen。　　Rising　prices　bilk　the　creditor。
Increased　production　will　check　the　rise　in　prices　and　get　him　a
real　payment。　　The　outlook　for　the　national　creditor　seems　to　be
that　he　will　be　partly　bilked　and　partly　paid；　how　far　he　will　be
bilked　and　how　far　depends　almost　entirely　upon　this　possible
increase　in　production；　and　there　is　consequently　a　very　keen　and
quite　unprecedented　desire　very　widely　diffused　among　intelligent
and　active　people；　holding　War　Loan　scrip　and　the　like；　in　all
the　belligerent　countries；　to　see　bold　and　hopeful　schemes　for
state　enrichment　pushed　forward。　　The　movement　towards　socialism
is　receiving　an　impulse　from　a　new　and　unexpected　quarter；　there
is　now　a　/rentier/　socialism；　and　it　is　interesting　to　note
that　while　the　London　/Times/　is　full　of　schemes　of　great
state　enterprises；　for　the　exploitation　of　Colonial　state　lands；
for　the　state　purchase　and　wholesaling　of　food　and　many　natural
products；　and　for　the　syndication　of　shipping　and　the　great
staple　industries　into　vast　trusts　into　which　not　only　the
British　but　the　French　and　Italian　governments　may　enter　as
partners；　the　so…called　socialist　press　of　Great　Britain　is
chiefly　busy　about　the　draughts　in　the　cell　of　Mr。　Fenner
Brockway　and　the　refusal　of　Private　Scott　Duckers　to　put　on　his
khaki　trousers。　　/The　New　Statesman/　and　the　Fabian　Society；
however；　display　a　wider　intelligence。

There　is　a　great　variety　of　suggestions　for　this　increase　of
public　wealth　and　production。　　Many　of　them　have　an　extreme
reasonableness。　　The　extent　to　which　they　will　be　adopted
depends；　no　doubt；　very　largely　upon　the　politician　and　permanent
official；　and　both　these　classes　are　prone　to　panic　in　the
presence　of　reality。　　In　spite　of　its　own　interests　in
restraining　a　rise　in　prices；　the　old　official　〃salariat〃　is
likely　to　be　obstructive　to　any　such　innovations。　　It　is　the
resistance　of　spurs　and　red　tabs　to　military　innovations　over
again。　　This　is　the　resistance　of　quills　and　red　tape。　　On　the
other　hand　the　organisation　of　Britain　for　war　has　〃officialised〃
a　number　of　industrial　leaders；　and　created　a　large　body　of
temporary　and　adventurous　officials。　　They　may　want　to　carry　on
into　peace　production　the　great　new　factories　the　war　has
created。　　At　the　end　of　the　war；　for　example；　every　belligerent
country　will　be　in　urgent　need　of　cheap　automobiles　for　farmers；
tradesmen；　and　industrial　purposes　generally；　America　is　now
producing　such　automobiles　at　a　price　of　eighty　pounds。　　But
Europe　will　be　heavily　in　debt　to　America；　her　industries　will　be
disorganised；　and　there　will　therefore　be　no　sort　of　return
payment　possible　for　these　hundreds　of　thousands　of　automobiles。
A　country　that　is　neither　creditor　nor　producer　cannot　be　an
importer。　　Consequently　though　those　cheap　tin　cars　may　be
stacked　as　high　as　the　Washington　Monument　in　America；　they　will
never　come　to　Europe。　　On　the　other　hand　the　great　shell
factories　of　Europe　will　be　standing　idle　and　ready；　their　staffs
disciplined　and　available；　for　conversion　to　the　new　task。　　The
imperative　common　sense　of　the　position　seems　to　be　that　the
European　governments　should　set　themselves　straight　awa