war and the future-第20节
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shell delivery; and we are teaching them that we can play it
better; in the hope that so we and the world may be freed from
the German will…to…power and all its humiliating and disgusting
consequences henceforth for ever。 Europe now is no more than a
household engaged in holding up and if possible overpowering a
monomaniac member。
4
Now the whole of this process of the making and delivery of a
shell; which is the main process of modern warfare; is one that
can be far better conducted by a man accustomed to industrial
organisation or transit work than by the old type of soldier。
This is a thing that cannot be too plainly stated or too often
repeated。 Germany nearly won this way because of her
tremendously modern industrial resources; but she blundered into
it and she is losing it because she has too many men in military
uniform and because their tradition and interests were to
powerful with her。 All the state and glories of soldiering; the
bright uniforms; the feathers and spurs; the flags; the march…
past; the disciplined massed advance; the charge; all these are
as needless and obsolete now in war as the masks and shields of
an old…time Chinese brave。 Liberal…minded people talk of the
coming dangers of militarism in the face of events that prove
conclusively that professional militarism is already as dead as
Julius Caesar。 What is coming is not so much the conversion
of men into soldiers as the socialisation of the economic
organisation of the country with a view to both national and
international necessities。 We do not want to turn a chemist or a
photographer into a little figure like a lead soldier; moving
mechanically at the word of command; but we do want to make his
chemistry or photography swiftly available if the national
organisation is called upon to fight。
We have discovered that the modern economic organisation is in
itself a fighting machine。 It is so much so that it is capable
of taking on and defeating quite easily any merely warrior people
that is so rash as to pit itself against it。 Within the last
sixteen years methods of fighting have been elaborated that have
made war an absolutely hopeless adventure for any barbaric or non…
industrialised people。 In the rush of larger events few people
have realised the significance of the rapid squashing of the
Senussi in western Egypt; and the collapse of De Wet's rebellion
in South Africa。 Both these struggles would have been long;
tedious and uncertain even in A。D。 1900。 This time they have
been; so to speak; child's play。
Occasionally into the writer's study there come to hand drifting
fragments of the American literature upon the question of
〃preparedness;〃 and American papers discussing the Mexican
situation。 In none of these is there evident any clear
realisation of the fundamental revolution that has occurred in
military methods during the last two years。 It looks as if a
Mexican war; for example; was thought of as an affair of rather
imperfectly trained young men with rifles and horses and old…
fashioned things like that。 A Mexican war on that level might be
as tedious as the South African war。 But if the United States
preferred to go into Mexican affairs with what I may perhaps call
a 1916 autumn outfit instead of the small 1900 outfit she seems
to possess at present; there is no reason why America should not
clear up any and every Mexican guerilla force she wanted to in a
few weeks。
To do that she would need a plant of a few hundred aeroplanes;
for the most part armed with machine guns; and the motor repair
vans and so forth needed to go with the aeroplanes; she would
need a comparatively small army of infantry armed with machine
guns; with motor transport; and a few small land ironclads。 Such
a force could locate; overtake; destroy and disperse any possible
force that a country in the present industrial condition of
Mexico could put into the field。 No sort of entrenchment or
fortification possible in Mexico could stand against it。 It
could go from one end of the country to the other without serious
loss; and hunt down and capture anyone it wished。。。。
The practical political consequence of the present development of
warfare; of the complete revolution in the conditions of warfare
since this century began; is to make war absolutely hopeless for
any peoples not able either to manufacture or procure the very
complicated appliances and munitions now needed for its
prosecution。 Countries like Mexico; Bulgaria; Serbia;
Afghanistan or Abyssinia are no more capable of going to war
without the connivance and help of manufacturing states than
horses are capable of flying。 And this makes possible such a
complete control of war by the few great states which are at the
necessary level of industrial development as not the most Utopian
of us have hitherto dared to imagine。
5
Infantrymen with automobile transport; plentiful machine guns;
Tanks and such…like accessories; that is the first Arm in modern
war。 The factory hand and all the material of the shell route
from the factory to the gun constitute the second Arm。 Thirdly
comes the artillery; the guns and the photographic aeroplanes
working with the guns。 Next I suppose we must count sappers and
miners as a fourth Arm of greatly increased importance。 The
fifth and last combatant Arm is the modern substitute for
cavalry; and that also is essentially a force of aeroplanes
supported by automobiles。 Several of the French leaders with
whom I talked seemed to be convinced that the horse is absolutely
done with in modern warfare。 There is nothing; they declared;
that cavalry ever did that cannot now be done better by
aeroplane。
This is something to break the hearts of the Prussian junkers and
of old…fashioned British army people。 The hunt across the
English countryside; the preservation of the fox as a sacred
animal; the race meeting; the stimulation of betting in all
classes of the public; all these things depend ultimately upon
the proposition that the 〃breed of horses〃 is of vital importance
to the military strength of Great Britain。 But if the arguments
of these able French soldiers are sound; the cult of the horse
ceases to be of any more value to England than the elegant
activities of the Toxophilite Society。 Moreover; there has been
a colossal buying of horses for the British army; a tremendous
organisation for the purchase and supply of fodder; then
employment of tens of thousands of men as grooms; minders and the
like; who would otherwise have been in the munition factories or
the trenches。
To what possible use can cavalry be put? Can it be used in
attack? Not against trenches; that is better done by infantrymen
following up gunfire。 Can it be used against broken infantry in
the open? Not if the enemy has one or two machine guns covering
their retreat。 Against expose infantry the swooping aeroplane
with a machine gun is far more deadly and more difficult to hit。
Behind it your infantry can follow to receive surrenders; in most
circumstances they can come up on cycles if it is a case of
getting up quickly across a wide space。 Similarly for pursuit
the use of wire and use of the machine gun have abolished the
possibility of a pouring cavalry charge。 The swooping aeroplane
does everything that cavalry can do in the way of disorganising
the enemy; and far more than it can do in the way of silencing
machine guns。 It can capture guns in retreat much more easily by
bombing traction engines and coming down low and shooting horses
and men。 An ideal modern pursuit would be an advance of guns;
automobiles full of infantry; motor cyclists and cyclists; behind
a high screen of observation aeroplanes and a low screen of
bombing and fighting aeroplanes。 Cavalry /might/ advance
across fields and so forth; but only as a very accessory part of
the general advance。。。。
And what else is there for the cavalry to do?
It may be argued that horses can go over country that is
impossible for automobiles。 That is to ignore altogether what
has been done in this war by such devices as caterpillar wheels。
So far from cavalry being able to negotiate country where
machines would stick and fail; mechanism can now ride over places
where any horse would flounder。
I submit these considerations to the horse…lover。 They are not
my original observations; they have been put to me and they have
convinced me。 Except perhaps as a parent of transport mules I
see no further part henceforth for the horse to play in war。
6
The form and texture of the coming warfareif there is still
warfare to comeare not yet to be seen in their completeness
upon the modern battlefield。 One swallow does not make a summer;
nor a handful of aeroplanes; a 〃Tank〃 or so; a few acres of shell
craters; and a village here and there; pounded out of
recognition; do more than foreshadow the spectacle of modernised
war on land。 War by these developments has become the monopoly
of the five great industrial powers; it is their alternative to
end or evolve it; and if they continue to disagree; then it must
needs become a spectacle of majestic horror such as no man can
yet conceive。