theologico-political treatise p1(神学与政治专题研究1)-第18节
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intellect and sound reason； will doubtless accept what I have said without
question。
（38） We have now explained that wherein the Divine law chiefly
consists； and what are human laws； namely； all those which have a
different aim unless they have been ratified by revelation； for in this
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respect also things are referred to God （as we have shown above） and in
this sense the law of Moses； although it was not universal； but entirely
adapted to the disposition and particular preservation of a single people；
may yet be called a law of God or Divine law； inasmuch as we believe that
it was ratified by prophetic insight。 （39） If we consider the nature of
natural Divine law as we have just explained it； we shall see：
（40） I。… That it is universal or common to all men； for we have deduced
it from universal human nature。
（41） II。 That it does not depend on the truth of any historical narrative
whatsoever； for inasmuch as this natural Divine law is comprehended
solely by the consideration of human nature； it is plain that we can
conceive it as existing as well in Adam as in any other man； as well in a
man living among his fellows； as in a man who lives by himself。
（42） The truth of a historical narrative； however assured； cannot give
us the knowledge nor consequently the love of God； for love of God
springs from knowledge of Him； and knowledge of Him should be derived
from general ideas； in themselves certain and known； so that the truth of a
historical narrative is very far from being a necessary requisite for our
attaining our highest good。
（43） Still； though the truth of histories cannot give us the knowledge
and love of God； I do not deny that reading them is very useful with a
view to life in the world； for the more we have observed and known of
men's customs and circumstances； which are best revealed by their actions；
the more warily we shall be able to order our lives among them； and so far
as reason dictates to adapt our actions to their dispositions。
（44） III。 We see that this natural Divine law does not demand the
performance of ceremonies … that is； actions in themselves indifferent；
which are called good from the fact of their institution； or actions
symbolizing something profitable for salvation； or （if one prefers this
definition） actions of which the meaning surpasses human understanding。
（45） The natural light of reason does not demand anything which it is itself
unable to supply； but only such as it can very clearly show to be good； or a
means to our blessedness。 （46） Such things as are good simply because
they have been commanded or instituted； or as being symbols of
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something good； are mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among
actions that are the offsprings as it were； or fruit of a sound mind and of
intellect。 （47） There is no need for me to go into this now in more detail。
（48） IV。 Lastly； we see that the highest reward of the Divine law is the
law itself； namely； to know God and to love Him of our free choice； and
with an undivided and fruitful spirit； while its penalty is the absence of
these things； and being in bondage to the flesh … that is； having an
inconstant and wavering spirit。
（49） These points being noted； I must now inquire： （50） I。 Whether by
the natural light of reason we can conceive of God as a law…
giver or potentate ordaining laws for men？ （51） II。 What is the teaching of
Holy Writ concerning this natural light of reason and natural
law？ （52） III。 With what objects were ceremonies formerly instituted？ （53）
IV。 Lastly； what is the good gained by knowing the sacred
histories and believing them？
（54） Of the first two I will treat in this chapter； of the remaining two in
the following one。
（55） Our conclusion about the first is easily deduced from the nature of
God's will； which is only distinguished from His understanding in relation
to our intellect … that is； the will and the understanding of God are in
reality one and the same； and are only distinguished in relation to our
thoughts which we form concerning God's understanding。 （56） For
instance； if we are only looking to the fact that the nature of a triangle is
from eternity contained in the Divine nature as an eternal verity； we say
that God possesses the idea of a triangle； or that He understands the nature
of a triangle； but if afterwards we look to the fact that the nature of a
triangle is thus contained in the Divine nature； solely by the necessity of
the Divine nature； and not by the necessity of the nature and essence of a
triangle … in fact； that the necessity of a triangle's essence and nature； in so
far as they are conceived of as eternal verities； depends solely on the
necessity of the Divine nature and intellect； we then style God's will or
decree； that which before we styled His intellect。 （57） Wherefore we make
one and the same affirmation concerning God when we say that He has
from eternity decreed that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right
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angles； as when we say that He has understood it。
（58） Hence the affirmations and the negations of God always involve
necessity or truth； so that； for example； if God said to Adam that He did
not wish him to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil； it would
have involved a contradiction that Adam should have been able to eat of it；
and would therefore have been impossible that he should have so eaten；
for the Divine command would have involved an eternal necessity and
truth。 （59） But since Scripture nevertheless narrates that God did give this
command to Adam； and yet that none the less Adam ate of the tree； we
must perforce say that God revealed to Adam the evil which would surely
follow if he should eat of the tree； but did not disclose that such evil would
of necessity come to pass。 （60） Thus it was that Adam took the revelation
to be not an eternal and necessary truth； but a law … that is； an ordinance
followed by gain or loss； not depending necessarily on the nature of the act
performed； but solely on the will and absolute power of some potentate； so
that the revelation in question was solely in relation to Adam； and solely
through his lack of knowledge a law； and God was； as it were； a lawgiver
and potentate。 （61） From the same cause； namely； from lack of knowledge；
the Decalogue in relation to the Hebrews was a law； for since they knew
not the existence of God as an eternal truth； they must have taken as a law
that which was revealed to them in the Decalogue； namely； that God exists；
and that God only should be worshipped。 （62） But if God had spoken to
them without the intervention of any bodily means； immediately they
would have perceived it not as a law； but as an eternal truth。
（63） What we have said about the Israelites and Adam； applies also to
all the prophets who wrote laws in God's name … they did not adequately
conceive God's decrees as eternal truths。 （64） For instance； we must say of
Moses that from revelation； from the basis of what was revealed to him； he
perceived the method by which the Israelitish nation could best be united
in a particular territory； and could form a body politic or state； and further
that he perceived the method by which that nation could best be
constrained to obedience； but he did not perceive； nor was it revealed to
him； that this method was absolutely the best； nor that the obedience of the
people in a certain strip of territory would necessarily imply the end he
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