protagoras-第13节

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to　be　called　〃being　overcome　by　pleasure；〃　pray；　what　is　it；　and　by



what　name　would　you　describe　it？



　　But　why；　Socrates；　should　we　trouble　ourselves　about　the　opinion



of　the　many；　who　just　say　anything　that　happens　to　occur　to　them？



　　I　believe；　I　said；　that　they　may　be　of　use　in　helping　us　to　discover



how　courage　is　related　to　the　other　parts　of　virtue。　If　you　are



disposed　to　abide　by　our　agreement；　that　I　should　show　the　way　in



which；　as　I　think；　our　recent　difficulty　is　most　likely　to　be



cleared　up；　do　you　follow；　but　if　not；　never　mind。



　　You　are　quite　right；　he　said；　and　I　would　have　you　proceed　as　you



have　begun。



　　Well　then；　I　said；　let　me　suppose　that　they　repeat　their　question；



What　account　do　you　give　of　that　which；　in　our　way　of　speaking；　is



termed　being　overcome　by　pleasure？　I　should　answer　thus：　Listen；　and



Protagoras　and　I　will　endeavour　to　show　you。　When　men　are　overcome



by　eating　and　drinking　and　other　sensual　desires　which　are　pleasant；



and　they；　knowing　them　to　be　evil；　nevertheless　indulge　in　them；　would



you　not　say　that　they　were　overcome　by　pleasure？　They　will　not　deny



this。　And　suppose　that　you　and　I　were　to　go　on　and　ask　them　again：　〃In



what　way　do　you　say　that　they　are　evil…in　that　they　are　pleasant　and



give　pleasure　at　the　moment；　or　because　they　cause　disease　and　poverty



and　other　like　evils　in　the　future？　Would　they　still　be　evil；　if



they　had　no　attendant　evil　consequences；　simply　because　they　give



the　consciousness　of　pleasure　of　whatever　nature？〃…Would　they　not



answer　that　they　are　not　evil　on　account　of　the　pleasure　which　is



immediately　given　by　them；　but　on　account　of　the　after



consequences…diseases　and　the　like？



　　I　believe；　said　Protagoras；　that　the　world　in　general　would　answer



as　you　do。



　　And　in　causing　diseases　do　they　not　cause　pain？　and　in　causing



poverty　do　they　not　cause　pain；…they　would　agree　to　that　also；　if　I　am



not　mistaken？



　　Protagoras　assented。



　　Then　I　should　say　to　them；　in　my　name　and　yours：　Do　you　think　them



evil　for　any　other　reason；　except　because　they　end　in　pain　and　rob



us　of　other　pleasures：…there　again　they　would　agree？



　　We　both　of　us　thought　that　they　would。



　　And　then　I　should　take　the　question　from　the　opposite　point　of　view；



and　say：　〃Friends；　when　you　speak　of　goods　being　painful；　do　you　not



mean　remedial　goods；　such　as　gymnastic　exercises；　and　military



service；　and　the　physician's　use　of　burning；　cutting；　drugging；　and



starving？　Are　these　the　things　which　are　good　but　painful？〃…they　would



assent　to　me？



　　He　agreed。



　　〃And　do　you　call　them　good　because　they　occasion　the　greatest



immediate　suffering　and　pain；　or　because；　afterwards；　they　bring



health　and　improvement　of　the　bodily　condition　and　the　salvation　of



states　and　power　over　others　and　wealth？〃…they　would　agree　to　the



latter　alternative；　if　I　am　not　mistaken？



　　He　assented。



　　〃Are　these　things　good　for　any　other　reason　except　that　they　end



in　pleasure；　and　get　rid　of　and　avert　pain？　Are　you　looking　to　any



other　standard　but　pleasure　and　pain　when　you　call　them　good？〃…they



would　acknowledge　that　they　were　not？



　　I　think　so；　said　Protagoras。



　　〃And　do　you　not　pursue　after　pleasure　as　a　good；　and　avoid　pain　as



an　evil？〃



　　He　assented。



　　〃Then　you　think　that　pain　is　an　evil　and　pleasure　is　a　good：　and



even　pleasure　you　deem　an　evil；　when　it　robs　you　of　greater



pleasures　than　it　gives；　or　causes　pains　greater　than　the　pleasure。



If；　however；　you　call　pleasure　an　evil　in　relation　to　some　other　end



or　standard；　you　will　be　able　to　show　us　that　standard。　But　you　have



none　to　show。〃



　　I　do　not　think　that　they　have；　said　Protagoras。



　　〃And　have　you　not　a　similar　way　of　speaking　about　pain？　You　call



pain　a　good　when　it　takes　away　greater　pains　than　those　which　it



has；　or　gives　pleasures　greater　than　the　pains：　then　if　you　have



some　standard　other　than　pleasure　and　pain　to　which　you　refer　when　you



call　actual　pain　a　good；　you　can　show　what　that　is。　But　you　cannot。〃



　　True；　said　Protagoras。



　　Suppose　again；　I　said；　that　the　world　says　to　me：　〃Why　do　you



spend　many　words　and　speak　in　many　ways　on　this　subject？〃　Excuse　me；



friends；　I　should　reply；　but　in　the　first　place　there　is　a



difficulty　in　explaining　the　meaning　of　the　expression　〃overcome　by



pleasure〃；　and　the　whole　argument　turns　upon　this。　And　even　now；　if



you　see　any　possible　way　in　which　evil　can　be　explained　as　other



than　pain；　or　good　as　other　than　pleasure；　you　may　still　retract。



Are　you　satisfied；　then；　at　having　a　life　of　pleasure　which　is　without



pain？　If　you　are；　and　if　you　are　unable　to　show　any　good　or　evil　which



does　not　end　in　pleasure　and　pain；　hear　the　consequences：…If　what



you　say　is　true；　then　the　argument　is　absurd　which　affirms　that　a



man　often　does　evil　knowingly；　when　he　might　abstain；　because　he　is



seduced　and　overpowered　by　pleasure；　or　again；　when　you　say　that　a　man



knowingly　refuses　to　do　what　is　good　because　he　is　overcome　at　the



moment　by　pleasure。　And　that　this　is　ridiculous　will　be　evident　if



only　we　give　up　the　use　of　various　names；　such　as　pleasant　and



painful；　and　good　and　evil。　As　there　are　two　things；　let　us　call



them　by　two　names…first；　good　and　evil；　and　then　pleasant　and　painful。



Assuming　this；　let　us　go　on　to　say　that　a　man　does　evil　knowing　that



he　does　evil。　But　some　one　will　ask；　Why？　Because　he　is　overcome；　is



the　first　answer。　And　by　what　is　he　overcome？　the　enquirer　will



proceed　to　ask。　And　we　shall　not　be　able　to　reply　〃By　pleasure；〃　for



the　name　of　pleasure　has　been　exchanged　for　that　of　good。　In　our



answer；　then；　we　shall　only　say　that　he　is　overcome。　〃By　what？〃　he



will　reiterate。　By　the　good；　we　shall　have　to　reply；　indeed　we



shall。　Nay；　but　our　questioner　will　rejoin　with　a　laugh；　if　he　be



one　of　the　swaggering　sort；　〃That　is　too　ridiculous；　that　a　man　should



do　what　he　knows　to　be　evil　when　he　ought　not；　because　he　is



overcome　by　good。　Is　that；　he　will　ask；　because　the　good　was　worthy　or



not　worthy　of　conquering　the　evil？〃　And　in　answer　to　that　we　shall



clearly　reply；　Because　it　was　not　worthy；　for　if　it　had　been　worthy；



then　he　who；　as　we　say；　was　overcome　by　pleasure；　would　not　have



been　wrong。　〃But　how；〃　he　will　reply；　〃can　the　good　be　unworthy　of　the



evil；　or　the　evil　of　the　good？〃　Is　not　the　real　explanation　that



they　are　out　of　proportion　to　one　another；　either　as　greater　and



smaller；　or　more　and　fewer？　This　we　cannot　deny。　And　when　you　speak　of



being　overcome…〃what　do　you　mean；〃　he　will　say；　〃but　that　you　choose



the　greater　evil　in　exchange　for　the　lesser　good？〃　Admitted。　And　now



substitute　the　names　of　pleasure　and　pain　for　good　and　evil；　and



say；　not　as　before；　that　a　man　does　what　is　evil　knowingly；　but　that



he　does　what　is　painful　knowingly；　and　because　he　is　overcome　by



pleasure；　which　is　unworthy　to　overcome。　What　measure　is　there　of



the　relations　of　pleasure　to　pain　other　than　excess　and　defect；



which　means　that　they　become　greater　and　smaller；　and　more　and



fewer；　and　differ　in　degree？　For　if　any　one　says：　〃Yes；　Socrates；



but　immediate　pleasure　differs　widely　from　future　pleasure　and



pain〃…To　that　I　should　reply：　And　do　they　differ　in　anything　but　in



pleasure　and　pain？　There　can　be　no　other　measure　of　them。　And　do



you；　like　a　skilful　weigher；　put　into　the　balance　the　pleasures　and



the　pains；　and　their　nearness　and　distance；　and　weigh　them；　and　then



say　which　outweighs　the　other。　If　you　weigh　pleasures　against



pleasures；　you　of　course　take　the　more　and　greater；　or　if　you　weigh



pains　against　pains；　you　take　the　fewer　and　the　less；　or　if



pleasures　against　pains；　then　you　choose　that　course　of　action　in



which　the　painful　is　exceeded　by　the　pleasant；　whether　the　distant



by　the　near　or　the　near　by　the　distant；　and　you　avoid　that　course　of



action　in　which　the　pleasant　is　exceeded　by　the　painful。　Would　you　not



admit；　my　friends；　that　this　is　true？　I　am　confident　that　they



cannot　deny　this。



　　He　agreed　with　me。



　　Well　then；　I　shall　say；　if　you　agree　so　far；　be　so　good　as　to　answer



me　a　question：　Do　not　the　same　magnitudes　appear　larger　to　your



sight　when　near；　and　smaller　when　at　a　distance？　They　will　acknowledge



that。　And　the　same　holds　of　thickness　and　number；　also　sounds；　which



are　in　themselves　equal；　are　greater　when　near；　and　lesser　when　at　a



distance。　They　will　grant　that　also。　Now　suppose　happiness　to



consist　in　doing　or　choosing　the　greater；　and　in　not　doing　or　in



avoiding　the　less；　what　would　be　the　saving　principle　of　human　life？



Would　not　the　art　of　measuring　be　the　saving　principle；　or　would　the



power　of　appearance？　Is　not　the　latter　that　deceiving　art　which



makes　us　wander　up　and　down　and　take　the　things　at　one　tim