protagoras-第12节

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other　and　the　whole　of　which　they　are　parts；　but　as　the　parts　of　the



face　are　unlike　the　whole　of　which　they　are　parts　and　one　another；　and



have　each　of　them　a　distinct　function。　I　should　like　to　know　whether



this　is　still　your　opinion；　or　if　not；　I　will　ask　you　to　define　your



meaning；　and　I　shall　not　take　you　to　task　if　you　now　make　a



different　statement。　For　I　dare　say　that　you　may　have　said　what　you



did　only　in　order　to　make　trial　of　me。



　　I　answer；　Socrates；　he　said；　that　all　these　qualities　are　parts　of



virtue；　and　that　four　out　of　the　five　are　to　some　extent　similar；



and　that　the　fifth　of　them；　which　is　courage；　is　very　different　from



the　other　four；　as　I　prove　in　this　way：　You　may　observe　that　many



men　are　utterly　unrighteous；　unholy；　intemperate；　ignorant；　who　are



nevertheless　remarkable　for　their　courage。



　　Stop；　I　said；　I　should　like　to　think　about　that。　When　you　speak　of



brave　men；　do　you　mean　the　confident；　or　another　sort　of　nature？



　　Yes；　he　said；　I　mean　the　impetuous；　ready　to　go　at　that　which　others



are　afraid　to　approach。



　　In　the　next　place；　you　would　affirm　virtue　to　be　a　good　thing；　of



which　good　thing　you　assert　yourself　to　be　a　teacher。



　　Yes；　he　said；　I　should　say　the　best　of　all　things；　if　I　am　in　my



right　mind。



　　And　is　it　partly　good　and　partly　bad；　I　said；　or　wholly　good？



　　Wholly　good；　and　in　the　highest　degree。



　　Tell　me　then；　who　are　they　who　have　confidence　when　diving　into　a



well？



　　I　should　say；　the　divers。



　　And　the　reason　of　this　is　that　they　have　knowledge？



　　Yes；　that　is　the　reason。



　　And　who　have　confidence　when　fighting　on　horseback…the　skilled



horseman　or　the　unskilled？



　　The　skilled。



　　And　who　when　fighting　with　light　shields…the　peltasts　or　the



nonpeltasts？



　　The　peltasts。　And　that　is　true　of　all　other　things；　he　said；　if　that



is　your　point：　those　who　have　knowledge　are　more　confident　than



those　who　have　no　knowledge；　and　they　are　more　confident　after　they



have　learned　than　before。



　　And　have　you　not　seen　persons　utterly　ignorant；　I　said；　of　these



things；　and　yet　confident　about　them？



　　Yes；　he　said；　I　have　seen　such　persons　far　too　confident。



　　And　are　not　these　confident　persons　also　courageous？



　　In　that　case；　he　replied；　courage　would　be　a　base　thing；　for　the　men



of　whom　we　are　speaking　are　surely　madmen。



　　Then　who　are　the　courageous？　Are　they　not　the　confident？



　　Yes；　he　said；　to　that　statement　I　adhere。



　　And　those；　I　said；　who　are　thus　confident　without　knowledge　are



really　not　courageous；　but　mad；　and　in　that　case　the　wisest　are　also



the　most　confident；　and　being　the　most　confident　are　also　the　bravest；



and　upon　that　view　again　wisdom　will　be　courage。



　　Nay；　Socrates；　he　replied；　you　are　mistaken　in　your　remembrance　of



what　was　said　by　me。　When　you　asked　me；　I　certainly　did　say　that　the



courageous　are　the　confident；　but　I　was　never　asked　whether　the



confident　are　the　courageous；　if　you　had　asked　me；　I　should　have



answered　〃Not　all　of　them〃：　and　what　I　did　answer　you　have　not



proved　to　be　false；　although　you　proceeded　to　show　that　those　who　have



knowledge　are　more　courageous　than　they　were　before　they　had



knowledge；　and　more　courageous　than　others　who　have　no　knowledge；



and　were　then　led　on　to　think　that　courage　is　the　same　as　wisdom。



But　in　this　way　of　arguing　you　might　come　to　imagine　that　strength



is　wisdom。　You　might　begin　by　asking　whether　the　strong　are　able；



and　I　should　say　〃Yes〃；　and　then　whether　those　who　know　how　to　wrestle



are　not　more　able　to　wrestle　than　those　who　do　not　know　how　to



wrestle；　and　more　able　after　than　before　they　had　learned；　and　I



should　assent。　And　when　I　had　admitted　this；　you　might　use　my



admissions　in　such　a　way　as　to　prove　that　upon　my　view　wisdom　is



strength；　whereas　in　that　case　I　should　not　have　admitted；　any　more



than　in　the　other；　that　the　able　are　strong；　although　I　have



admitted　that　the　strong　are　able。　For　there　is　a　difference　between



ability　and　strength；　the　former　is　given　by　knowledge　as　well　as　by



madness　or　rage；　but　strength　comes　from　nature　and　a　healthy　state　of



the　body。　And　in　like　manner　I　say　of　confidence　and　courage；　that



they　are　not　the　same；　and　I　argue　that　the　courageous　are



confident；　but　not　all　the　confident　courageous。　For　confidence　may　be



given　to　men　by　art；　and　also；　like　ability；　by　madness　and　rage；



but　courage　comes　to　them　from　nature　and　the　healthy　state　of　the



soul。



　　I　said：　You　would　admit；　Protagoras；　that　some　men　live　well　and



others　ill？



　　He　assented。



　　And　do　you　think　that　a　man　lives　well　who　lives　in　pain　and　grief？



　　He　does　not。



　　But　if　he　lives　pleasantly　to　the　end　of　his　life；　will　he　not　in



that　case　have　lived　well？



　　He　will。



　　Then　to　live　pleasantly　is　a　good；　and　to　live　unpleasantly　an　evil？



　　Yes；　he　said；　if　the　pleasure　be　good　and　honourable。



　　And　do　you；　Protagoras；　like　the　rest　of　the　world；　call　some



pleasant　things　evil　and　some　painful　things　good？…for　I　am　rather



disposed　to　say　that　things　are　good　in　as　far　as　they　are　pleasant；



if　they　have　no　consequences　of　another　sort；　and　in　as　far　as　they



are　painful　they　are　bad。



　　I　do　not　know；　Socrates；　he　said；　whether　I　can　venture　to　assert　in



that　unqualified　manner　that　the　pleasant　is　the　good　and　the



painful　the　evil。　Having　regard　not　only　to　my　present　answer；　but



also　to　the　whole　of　my　life；　I　shall　be　safer；　if　I　am　not



mistaken；　in　saying　that　there　are　some　pleasant　things　which　are



not　good；　and　that　there　are　some　painful　things　which　are　good；　and



some　which　are　not　good；　and　that　there　are　some　which　are　neither



good　nor　evil。



　　And　you　would　call　pleasant；　I　said；　the　things　which　participate　in



pleasure　or　create　pleasure？



　　Certainly；　he　said。



　　Then　my　meaning　is；　that　in　as　far　as　they　are　pleasant　they　are



good；　and　my　question　would　imply　that　pleasure　is　a　good　in　itself。



　　According　to　your　favourite　mode　of　speech；　Socrates；　〃Let　us



reflect　about　this；〃　he　said；　and　if　the　reflection　is　to　the　point；



and　the　result　proves　that　pleasure　and　good　are　really　the　same；　then



we　will　agree；　but　if　not；　then　we　will　argue。



　　And　would　you　wish　to　begin　the　enquiry？



　　I　said；　or　shall　I　begin？



　　You　ought　to　take　the　lead；　he　said；　for　you　are　the　author　of　the



discussion。



　　May　I　employ　an　illustration？　I　said。　Suppose　some　one　who　is



enquiring　into　the　health　or　some　other　bodily　quality　of



another：…he　looks　at　his　face　and　at　the　tips　of　his　fingers；　and　then



he　says；　Uncover　your　chest　and　back　to　me　that　I　may　have　a　better



view：…that　is　the　sort　of　thing　which　I　desire　in　this　speculation。



Having　seen　what　your　opinion　is　about　good　and　pleasure；　I　am



minded　to　say　to　you：　Uncover　your　mind　to　me；　Protagoras；　and



reveal　your　opinion　about　knowledge；　that　I　may　know　whether　you　agree



with　the　rest　of　the　world。　Now　the　rest　of　the　world　are　of　opinion



that　knowledge　is　a　principle　not　of　strength；　or　of　rule；　or　of



command：　their　notion　is　that　a　man　may　have　knowledge；　and　yet　that



the　knowledge　which　is　in　him　may　be　overmastered　by　anger；　or



pleasure；　or　pain；　or　love；　or　perhaps　by　fear；…just　as　if　knowledge



were　a　slave；　and　might　be　dragged　about　anyhow。　Now　is　that　your



view？　or　do　you　think　that　knowledge　is　a　noble　and　commanding



thing；　which　cannot　be　overcome；　and　will　not　allow　a　man；　if　he



only　knows　the　difference　of　good　and　evil；　to　do　anything　which　is



contrary　to　knowledge；　but　that　wisdom　will　have　strength　to　help　him？



　　I　agree　with　you；　Socrates；　said　Protagoras；　and　not　only　so；　but　I；



above　all　other　men；　am　bound　to　say　that　wisdom　and　knowledge　are　the



highest　of　human　things。



　　Good；　I　said；　and　true。　But　are　you　aware　that　the　majority　of　the



world　are　of　another　mind；　and　that　men　are　commonly　supposed　to



know　the　things　which　are　best；　and　not　to　do　them　when　they　might？



And　most　persons　whom　I　have　asked　the　reason　of　this　have　said　that



when　men　act　contrary　to　knowledge　they　are　overcome　by　pain；　or



pleasure；　or　some　of　those　affections　which　I　was　just　now　mentioning。



　　Yes；　Socrates；　he　replied；　and　that　is　not　the　only　point　about



which　mankind　are　in　error。



　　Suppose；　then；　that　you　and　I　endeavour　to　instruct　and　inform



them　what　is　the　nature　of　this　affection　which　they　call　〃being



overcome　by　pleasure；〃　and　which　they　affirm　to　be　the　reason　why　they



do　not　always　do　what　is　best。　When　we　say　to　them：　Friends；　you　are



mistaken；　and　are　saying　what　is　not　true；　they　would　probably



reply：　Socrates　and　Protagoras；　if　this　affection　of　the　soul　is　not



to　be　called　〃being　overcome　by　pleasure；〃　pray；　what　is　it；　and　by



what　name　would　you　d