the ethics(part ii)-第9节

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constitutes　the　nature　of　the　human　mind；　therefore　（II。　xi。



Cor。）　this　idea　is　also　　adequate　in　the　human　mind。　　Q。E。D。







ProofThis　proposition　is　self…evident。　　For　when　we　say



that　an　idea　in　the　human　　mind　follows　from　ideas　which　are



therein　adequate；　we　say；　in　other　words　（II。　xi。　Cor。）；　　that　an



idea　is　in　the　divine　intellect；　whereof　God　is　the　cause；　not　in



so　far　as　he　is　　infinite；　nor　in　so　far　as　he　is　affected　by　the



ideas　of　very　many　particular　things；　but　only　　in　so　far　as　he



constitutes　the　essence　of　the　human　mind。







*****Note　II　have　thus　set　forth　the　cause　of　those　notions；



which　are　common　to　all　　men；　and　which　form　the　basis　of　our



ratiocinations。　　But　there　are　other　causes　of　certain　　axioms　or



notions；　which　it　would　be　to　the　purpose　to　set　forth　by　this



method　of　ours；　for　　it　would　thus　appear　what　notions　are　more



useful　than　others；　and　what　notions　have　　scarcely　any　use　at



all。　　Furthermore；　we　should　see　what　notions　are　common　to　all



men；　　and　what　notions　are　only　clear　and　distinct　to　those　who



are　unshackled　by　prejudice；　and　　we　should　detect　those　which



are　ill…founded。　　Again　we　should　discern　whence　the　notions　



called　〃secondary〃　derived　their　origin；　and　consequently　the



axioms　on　which　they　are　　founded；　and　other　points　of　interest



connected　with　these　questions。　　But　I　have　decided　　to　pass　over



the　subject　here；　partly　because　I　have　set　it　aside　for　another



treatise；　partly　　because　I　am　afraid　of　wearying　the　reader　by



too　great　prolixity。　　Nevertheless；　in　order　　not　to　omit



anything　necessary　to　be　known；　I　will　briefly　set　down　the



causes；　whence　are　　derived　the　terms　styled　〃transcendental；〃



such　as　Being；　Thing；　Something。　　These　terms　　arose　from　the



fact；　that　the　human　body；　being　limited；　is　only　capable　of



distinctly　　forming　a　certain　number　of　images　（what　an　image　is



I　explained　in　the　II。　xvii。　note）　　within　itself　at　the　same



time；　if　this　number　be　exceeded；　the　images　will　begin　to　be　



confused；　if　this　number　of　images；　of　which　the　body　is　capable



of　forming　distinctly　　within　itself；　be　largely　exceeded；　all



will　become　entirely　confused　one　with　another。　　This　　being　so；



it　is　evident　（from　II。　Prop。　xvii。　Cor。；　and　xviii。）　that　the



human　mind　can　　distinctly　imagine　as　many　things　simultaneously；



as　its　body　can　form　images　　simultaneously。　　When　the　images



become　quite　confused　in　the　body；　the　mind　also　　imagines　all



bodies　confusedly　without　any　distinction；　and　will　comprehend



them；　as　it　　were；　under　one　attribute；　namely；　under　the



attribute　of　Being；　Thing；　&c。　　The　same　　conclusion　can　be　drawn



from　the　fact　that　images　are　not　always　equally　vivid；　and　from　



other　analogous　causes；　which　there　is　no　need　to　explain　here；



for　the　purpose　which　we　　have　in　view　it　is　sufficient　for　us　to



consider　one　only。　　All　may　be　reduced　to　this；　that　　these　terms



represent　ideas　in　the　highest　degree　confused。　　From　similar



causes　arise　those　　notions；　which　we　call　〃general；〃　such　as



man；　horse；　dog；　&c。　　They　arise；　to　wit；　from　　the　fact　that　so



many　images；　for　instance；　of　men；　are　formed　simultaneously　in



the　　human　mind；　that　the　powers　of　imagination　break　down；　not



indeed　utterly；　but　to　the　　extent　of　the　mind　losing　count　of



small　differences　between　individuals　（e。g。　colour；　size；　　&c。）



and　their　definite　number；　and　only　distinctly　imagining　that；　in



which　all　the　　individuals；　in　so　far　as　the　body　is　affected　by



them；　agree；　for　that　is　the　point；　in　which　　each　of　the　said



individuals　chiefly　affected　the　body；　this　the　mind　expresses　by



the　name　　man；　and　this　it　predicates　of　an　infinite　number　of



particular　individuals。　　For；　as　we　have　　said；　it　is　unable　to



imagine　the　definite　number　of　individuals。　　We　must；　however；



bear　in　　mind；　that　these　general　notions　are　not　formed　by　all



men　in　the　same　way；　but　vary　in　　each　individual　according　as



the　point　varies；　whereby　the　body　has　been　most　often　　affected



and　which　the　mind　most　easily　imagines　or　remembers。　　For



instance；　those　who　　have　most　often　regarded　with　admiration　the



stature　of　man；　will　by　the　name　of　man　　understand　an　animal　of



erect　stature；　those　who　have　been　accustomed　to　regard　some　



other　attribute；　will　form　a　different　general　image　of　man；　for



instance；　that　man　is　a　　laughing　animal；　a　two…footed　animal



without　feathers；　a　rational　animal；　and　thus；　in　other　　cases；



everyone　will　form　general　images　of　things　according　to　the



habit　of　his　body。







It　is　thus　not　to　be　wondered　at；　that　among　philosophers；　who



seek　to　explain　things　in　　nature　merely　by　the　images　formed　of



them；　so　many　controversies　should　have　arisen。







*****Note　IIFrom　all　that　has　been　said　above　it　is　clear；　that



we；　in　many　cases；　　perceive　and　form　our　general　notions：（1。）



From　particular　things　represented　to　our　　intellect



fragmentarily；　confusedly；　and　without　order　through　our　senses



（II。　xxix。　Cor。）；　　I　have　settled　to　call　such　perceptions　by　the



name　of　knowledge　from　the　mere　　suggestions　of　experience。　　（2。）



From　symbols；　e。g。；　from　the　fact　of　having　read　or　heard　



certain　words　we　remember　things　and　form　certain　ideas



concerning　them；　similar　to　those　　through　which　we　imagine



things　（II。　xviii。　Note）。　　I　shall　call　both　these　ways　of



regarding　　things　〃knowledge　of　the　first　kind；〃　〃opinion；〃　or



〃imagination。〃　　（3。）　From　the　fact　that　　we　have　notions　common



to　all　men；　and　adequate　ideas　of　the　properties　of　things　（II。　



xxxviii。　Cor。；　xxxix。　and　Cor。；　and　xl。）；　this　I　call　〃reason〃



and　〃knowledge　of　the　second　　kind。〃　　Besides　these　two　kinds　of



knowledge；　there　is；　as　I　will　hereafter　show；　a　third　　kind　of



knowledge；　which　we　will　call　intuition。　　This　kind　of　knowledge



proceeds　from　an　　adequate　idea　of　the　absolute　essence　of



certain　attributes　of　God　to　the　adequate　　knowledge　of　the



essence　of　things。　　I　will　illustrate　all　three　kinds　of



knowledge　by　a　　single　example。　　Three　numbers　are　given　for



finding　a　fourth；　which　shall　be　to　the　third　　as　the　second　is



to　the　first。　　Tradesmen　without　hesitation　multiply　the　second



by　the　third；　　and　divide　the　product　by　the　first；　either



because　they　have　not　forgotten　the　rule　which　　they　received



from　a　master　without　any　proof；　or　because　they　have　often　made



trial　of　　it　with　simple　numbers；　or　by　virtue　of　the　proof　of



the　nineteenth　proposition　of　the　　seventh　book　of　Euclid；



namely；　in　virtue　of　the　general　property　of　proportionals。







But　with　very　simple　numbers　there　is　no　need　of　this。　　For



instance；　one；　two；　three　being　　given；　everyone　can　see　that　the



fourth　proportional　is　six；　and　this　is　much　clearer；　because　



we　infer　the　fourth　number　from　an　intuitive　grasping　of　the



ratio；　which　the　first　bears　to　　the　second。







XLI。　　Knowledge　of　the　first　kind　is　the　only　source　of　falsity；



knowledge　of　the　second　　and　third　kinds　is　necessarily　true。







》》》》》ProofTo　knowledge　of　the　first　kind　we　have　（in　the



foregoing　note）　assigned　all　　those　ideas；　which　are　inadequate



and　confused；　therefore　this　kind　of　knowledge　is　the　　only



source　of　falsity　（II。　xxxv。）。　　Furthermore；　we　assigned　to　the



second　and　third　kinds　　of　knowledge　those　ideas　which　are



adequate；　therefore　these　kinds　are　necessarily　true　（II。　



xxxiv。）。　　Q。E。D。







XLII。　Knowledge　of　the　second　and　third　kinds；　not　knowledge　of



the　first　kind；　teaches　us　　to　distinguish　the　true　from　the



false。







》》》》》ProofThis　proposition　is　self…evident。　　He；　who　knows　how



to　distinguish　between　　true　and　false；　must　have　an　adequate



idea　of　true　and　false。　　That　is　（II。　xl。；　note　ii。）；　he　　must



know　the　true　and　the　false　by　the　second　or　third　kind　of



knowledge。







XLIII。　He；　who　has　a　true　idea；　simultaneously　knows　that　he　has



a　true　idea；　and　cannot　　doubt　of　the　truth　of　the　thing



perceived。







》》》》》ProofA　true　idea　in　us　is　an　idea　which　is　adequate　in



God；　in　so　far　as　he　is　　displayed　through　the　nature　of　the



human　mind　（II。　xi。　Cor。）。　　Let　us　suppose　that　there　is　　in　God；