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The Ethics 'Part II'







(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)







by Benedict de Spinoza







Translated by R。 H。 M。 Elwes























Part II:  ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND















PREFACE I now pass on to explaining the results; which must



necessarily follow from the essence of  God; or of the eternal



and infinite being; not; indeed; all of them (for we proved in



Part i。;  Prop。 xvi。; that an infinite number must follow in an



infinite number of ways); but only  those which are able to lead



us; as it were by the hand; to the knowledge of the human  mind



and its highest blessedness。







DEFINITIONS I。  By 'body' I mean a mode which expresses in a



certain determinate manner the essence  of God; in so far as he



is considered as an extended thing。  (See Pt。 i。; Prop。 xxv。



Cor。)







II。  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that;



which being given; the thing is  necessarily given also; and;



which being removed; the thing is necessarily removed also;  in



other words; that without which the thing; and which itself



without the thing; can neither  be nor be conceived。







III。 By 'idea;' I mean the mental conception which is formed by



the mind as a thinking  thing。







》》》》》ExplanationI say 'conception' rather than perception;



because the word perception  seems to imply that the mind is



passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems  to



express an activity of the mind。







IV。  By 'an adequate idea;' I mean an idea which; in so far as



it is considered in itself;  without relation to the object; has



all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea。







》》》》》ExplanationI say 'intrinsic;' in order to exclude that



mark which is extrinsic;  namely; the agreement between the idea



and its object (ideatum)。







V。  'Duration' is the indefinite continuance of existing。







》》》》》ExplanationI say 'indefinite;' because it cannot be



determined through the  existence itself of the existing thing;



or by its efficient cause; which necessarily gives the  existence



of the thing; but does not take it away。







VI。  'Reality' and 'perfection' I use as synonymous terms。







VII。  By 'particular things;' I mean things which are finite and



have a conditioned  existence; but if several individual things



concur in one action; so as to be all  simultaneously the effect



of one cause; I consider them all; so far; as one particular 



thing。







 AXIOMS  I。  The essence of man does not involve necessary



existence; that is; it may; in the order of  nature; come to pass



that this or that man does or does not exist。







II。  Man thinks。







III。  Modes of thinking; such as love; desire; or any other of



the passions; do not take place;  unless there be in the same



individual an idea of the thing loved; desired; &c。  But the idea 



can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking。







IV。  We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways。







V。  We feel and perceive no particular things; save bodies and



modes of thought。







N。B。  The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop。



xiii。







 PROPOSITIONS  I。  Thought is an attribute of God; or God is a



thinking thing。







》》》》》ProofParticular thoughts; or this and that thought; are



modes which; in a certain  conditioned manner; express the nature



of God (Pt。 i。; Prop。 xxv。; Cor。)。  God therefore  possesses the



attribute (Pt。 i。; Def。 v。) of which the concept is involved in



all particular  thoughts; which latter are conceived thereby。 



Thought; therefore; is one of the infinite  attributes of God;



which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt。 i。; Def。



vi。)。  In  other words; God is a thinking thing。  Q。E。D。







*****NoteThis proposition is also evident from the fact; that



we are able to conceive  an infinite thinking being。  For; in



proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking  more



thoughts; so is it conceived as containing more reality or



perfection。  Therefore a  being; which can think an infinite



number of things in an infinite number of ways; is; 



necessarily; in respect of thinking; infinite。  As; therefore;



from the consideration of  thought alone; we conceive an infinite



being; thought is necessarily (Pt。 i。; Deff。 iv。 and vi。)  one of



the infinite attributes of God; as we were desirous of showing。







II。  Extension is an attribute of God; or God is an extended



thing。







》》》》》ProofThe proof of this proposition is similar to that of



the last。







III。  In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his



essence; but also of all things which  necessarily follow from



his essence。







》》》》》ProofGod (by the first Prop。 of this Part) can think an



infinite number of things in  infinite ways; or (what is the same



thing; by Prop。 xvi。; Part i。) can form the idea of his  essence;



and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom。  Now all



that is in the power  of God necessarily is (Pt。 i。; Prop。



xxxv。)。  Therefore; such an idea as we are considering 



necessarily is; and in God alone。  Q。E。D。  (Part i。; Prop。 xv。)







*****NoteThe multitude understand by the power of God the free



will of God; and the  right over all things that exist; which



latter are accordingly generally considered as  contingent。  For



it is said that God has the power to destroy all things; and to



reduce them  to nothing。  Further; the power of God is very often



likened to the power of kings。  But  this doctrine we have



refuted (Pt。 i。; Prop。 xxxii。; Cors。 i。 and ii。); and we have



shown  (Part i。; Prop。 xvi。) that God acts by the same necessity;



as that by which he understands  himself; in other words; as it



follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit); 



that God understands himself; so also does it follow by the same



necessity; that God  performs infinite acts in infinite ways。  We



further showed (Part i。; Prop。 xxxiv。); that  God's power is



identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as



impossible for us  to conceive God as not acting; as to conceive



him as non…existent。  If we might pursue  the subject further; I



could point out; that the power which is commonly attributed to



God  is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the



multitude as a man; or in the  likeness of a man); but involves a



negation of power。  However; I am unwilling to go over  the same



ground so often。  I would only beg the reader again and again; to



turn over  frequently in his mind what I have said in Part i。



from Prop。 xvi。 to the end。  No one will  be able to follow my



meaning; unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the



power  of God with the human power and right of kings。







IV。  The idea of God; from which an infinite number of things



follow in infinite ways; can  only be one。







》》》》》ProofInfinite intellect comprehends nothing save the



attributes of God and his  modifications (Part i。; Prop。 xxx。)。 



Now God is one (Part i。; Prop。 xiv。; Cor。)。  Therefore  the idea



of God; wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite



ways; can only  be one。  Q。E。D。







V。  The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause; only in so



far as he is considered as a  thinking thing; not in so far as he



is unfolded in any other attribute; that is; the ideas both  of



the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as



their efficient cause their  objects (ideata) or the things



perceived; but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing。







》》》》》ProofThis proposition is evident from Prop。 iii。 of this



Part。  We there drew the  conclusion; that God can form the idea



of his essence; and of all things which follow  necessarily



therefrom; solely because he is a thinking thing; and not because



he is the  object of his own idea。  Wherefore the actual being of



ideas owns for cause God; in so far  as he is a thinking thing。 



It may be differently proved as follows:  the actual being of



ideas  is (obviously) a mode of thought; that is (Part i。; Prop。



xxv。; Cor。) a mode which expresses  in a certain manner the



nature of God; in so far as he is a thinking thing; and therefore 



(Part i。; Prop。 x。) involves the conception of no other attribute



of God; and consequently  (by Part i。; Ax。 iv。) is not the effect



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