utilitarianism-第9节
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n； when intellectual culture goes on； yield by degrees to the dissolving force of analysis： and if the feeling of duty； when associated with utility； would appear equally arbitrary； if there were no leading department of our nature； no powerful class of sentiments； with which that association would harmonise； which would make us feel it congenial； and incline us not only to foster it in others （for which we have abundant interested motives）； but also to cherish it in ourselves； if there were not； in short； a natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality； it might well happen that this association also； even after it had been implanted by education； might be analysed away。 But there is this basis of powerful natural sentiment； and this it is which； when once the general happiness is recognised as the ethical standard； will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality。 This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind； the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures； which is already a powerful principle in human nature； and happily one of those which tend to become stronger； even without express inculcation； from the influences of advancing civilisation。 The social state is at once so natural； so necessary； and so habitual to man； that； except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction； he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body； and this association is riveted more and more； as mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence。 Any condition； therefore； which is essential to a state of society； becomes more and more an inseparable part of every person's conception of the state of things which he is born into； and which is the destiny of a human being。 Now； society between human beings； except in the relation of master and slave； is manifestly impossible on any other footing than that the interests of all are to be consulted。 Society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded equally。 And since in all states of civilisation； every person； except an absolute monarch； has equals； every one is obliged to live on these terms with somebody； and in every age some advance is made towards a state in which it will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with anybody。 In this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregard of other people's interests。 They are under a necessity of conceiving themselves as at least abstaining from all the grosser injuries； and （if only for their own protection） living in a state of constant protest against them。 They are also familiar with the fact of co…operating with others and proposing to themselves a collective； not an individual interest as the aim （at least for the time being） of their actions。 So long as they are co…operating； their ends are identified with those of others； there is at least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their own interests。 Not only does all strengthening of social ties； and all healthy growth of society； give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others； it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good； or at least with an even greater degree of practical consideration for it。 He comes； as though instinctively； to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others。 The good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to； like any of the physical conditions of our existence。 Now； whatever amount of this feeling a person has； he is urged by the strongest motives both of interest and of sympathy to demonstrate it； and to the utmost of his power encourage it in others； and even if he has none of it himself； he is as greatly interested as any one else that others should have it。 Consequently the smallest germs of the feeling are laid hold of and nourished by the contagion of sympathy and the influences of education； and a complete web of corroborative association is woven round it； by the powerful agency of the external sanctions。 This mode of conceiving ourselves and human life； as civilisation goes on； is felt to be more and more natural。 Every step in political improvement renders it more so； by removing the sources of opposition of interest； and levelling those inequalities of legal privilege between individuals or classes； owing to which there are large portions of mankind whose happiness it is still practicable to disregard。 In an improving state of the human mind； the influences are constantly on the increase； which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest； which； if perfect； would make him never think of； or desire； any beneficial condition for himself； in the benefits of which they are not included。 If we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion； and the whole force of education； of institutions； and of opinion； directed； as it once was in the case of religion； to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and the practice of it； I think that no one； who can realise this conception； will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the Happiness morality。 To any ethical student who finds the realisation difficult； I recommend； as a means of facilitating it； the second of M。 Comte's two principle works； the Traite de Politique Positive。 I entertain the strongest objections to the system of politics and morals set forth in that treatise； but I think it has superabundantly shown the possibility of giving to the service of humanity； even without the aid of belief in a Providence； both the psychological power and the social efficacy of a religion； making it take hold of human life； and colour all thought； feeling； and action； in a manner of which the greatest ascendancy ever exercised by any religion may be but a type and foretaste； and of which the danger is； not that it should be insufficient but that it should be so excessive as to interfere unduly with human freedom and individuality。 Neither is it necessary to the feeling which constitutes the binding force of the utilitarian morality on those who recognise it； to wait for those social influences which would make its obligation felt by mankind at large。 In the comparatively early state of human advancement in which we now live； a person cannot indeed feel that entireness of sympathy with all others； which would make any real discordance in the general direction of their conduct in life impossible； but already a person in whom the social feeling is at all developed； cannot bring himself to think of the rest of his fellow creatures as struggling rivals with him for the means of happiness； whom he must desire to see defeated in their object in order that he may succeed in his。 The deeply rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being； tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures。 If differences of opinion and of mental culture make it impossible for him to share many of their actual feelings… perhaps make him denounce and defy those feelings… he still needs to be conscious that his real aim and theirs do not conflict； that he is not opposing himself to what they really wish for； namely their own good； but is； on the contrary； promoting it。 This feeling in most individuals is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings； and is often wanting altogether。 But to those who have it； it possesses all the characters of a natural feeling。 It does not present itself to their minds as a superstition of education； or a law despotically imposed by the power of society； but as an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without。 This conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality。 This it is which makes any mind； of well…developed feelings； work with； and not against； the outward motives to care for others； afforded by what I have called the external sanctions； and when those sanctions are wanting； or act in an opposite direction； constitutes in itself a powerful internal binding force； in proportion to the sensitiveness and thoughtfulness of the character； since few but those whose mind is a moral blank； could bear to lay out their course of life on the plan of paying no regard to others except so far as their own private interest compels。 Chapter 4 Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible。
IT HAS already been remarked； that questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof； in the ordinary acceptation of the term。 To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles； to the first premises of our knowledge； as well as to those of our conduct。 But the former； being matters of fact； may be the subject of a direct appeal to the faculties which judge of fact… namely； our senses； and our internal consciousness。 Can an appeal be made to the same faculties on questions of practical ends？ Or by what other faculty is cognisance taken of them？ Q
