utilitarianism-第8节

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y　either　has；　or　there　is　no　reason　why　it　might　not　have；　all　the　sanctions　which　belong　to　any　other　system　of　morals。　Those　sanctions　are　either　external　or　internal。　Of　the　external　sanctions　it　is　not　necessary　to　speak　at　any　length。　They　are；　the　hope　of　favour　and　the　fear　of　displeasure；　from　our　fellow　creatures　or　from　the　Ruler　of　the　Universe；　along　with　whatever　we　may　have　of　sympathy　or　affection　for　them；　or　of　love　and　awe　of　Him；　inclining　us　to　do　his　will　independently　of　selfish　consequences。　There　is　evidently　no　reason　why　all　these　motives　for　observance　should　not　attach　themselves　to　the　utilitarian　morality；　as　completely　and　as　powerfully　as　to　any　other。　Indeed；　those　of　them　which　refer　to　our　fellow　creatures　are　sure　to　do　so；　in　proportion　to　the　amount　of　general　intelligence；　for　whether　there　be　any　other　ground　of　moral　obligation　than　the　general　happiness　or　not；　men　do　desire　happiness；　and　however　imperfect　may　be　their　own　practice；　they　desire　and　commend　all　conduct　in　others　towards　themselves；　by　which　they　think　their　happiness　is　promoted。　With　regard　to　the　religious　motive；　if　men　believe；　as　most　profess　to　do；　in　the　goodness　of　God；　those　who　think　that　conduciveness　to　the　general　happiness　is　the　essence；　or　even　only　the　criterion　of　good；　must　necessarily　believe　that　it　is　also　that　which　God　approves。　The　whole　force　therefore　of　external　reward　and　punishment；　whether　physical　or　moral；　and　whether　proceeding　from　God　or　from　our　fellow　men；　together　with　all　that　the　capacities　of　human　nature　admit　of　disinterested　devotion　to　either；　become　available　to　enforce　the　utilitarian　morality；　in　proportion　as　that　morality　is　recognised；　and　the　more　powerfully；　the　more　the　appliances　of　education　and　general　cultivation　are　bent　to　the　purpose。　　　So　far　as　to　external　sanctions。　The　internal　sanction　of　duty；　whatever　our　standard　of　duty　may　be；　is　one　and　the　same…　a　feeling　in　our　own　mind；　a　pain；　more　or　less　intense；　attendant　on　violation　of　duty；　which　in　properly　cultivated　moral　natures　rises；　in　the　more　serious　cases；　into　shrinking　from　it　as　an　impossibility。　This　feeling；　when　disinterested；　and　connecting　itself　with　the　pure　idea　of　duty；　and　not　with　some　particular　form　of　it；　or　with　any　of　the　merely　accessory　circumstances；　is　the　essence　of　Conscience；　though　in　that　complex　phenomenon　as　it　actually　exists；　the　simple　fact　is　in　general　all　encrusted　over　with　collateral　associations；　derived　from　sympathy；　from　love；　and　still　more　from　fear；　from　all　the　forms　of　religious　feeling；　from　the　recollections　of　childhood　and　of　all　our　past　life；　from　self…esteem；　desire　of　the　esteem　of　others；　and　occasionally　even　self…abasement。　This　extreme　complication　is；　I　apprehend；　the　origin　of　the　sort　of　mystical　character　which；　by　a　tendency　of　the　human　mind　of　which　there　are　many　other　examples；　is　apt　to　be　attributed　to　the　idea　of　moral　obligation；　and　which　leads　people　to　believe　that　the　idea　cannot　possibly　attach　itself　to　any　other　objects　than　those　which；　by　a　supposed　mysterious　law；　are　found　in　our　present　experience　to　excite　it。　Its　binding　force；　however；　consists　in　the　existence　of　a　mass　of　feeling　which　must　be　broken　through　in　order　to　do　what　violates　our　standard　of　right；　and　which；　if　we　do　nevertheless　violate　that　standard；　will　probably　have　to　be　encountered　afterwards　in　the　form　of　remorse。　Whatever　theory　we　have　of　the　nature　or　origin　of　conscience；　this　is　what　essentially　constitutes　it。　　　The　ultimate　sanction；　therefore；　of　all　morality　（external　motives　apart）　being　a　subjective　feeling　in　our　own　minds；　I　see　nothing　embarrassing　to　those　whose　standard　is　utility；　in　the　question；　what　is　the　sanction　of　that　particular　standard？　We　may　answer；　the　same　as　of　all　other　moral　standards…　the　conscientious　feelings　of　mankind。　Undoubtedly　this　sanction　has　no　binding　efficacy　on　those　who　do　not　possess　the　feelings　it　appeals　to；　but　neither　will　these　persons　be　more　obedient　to　any　other　moral　principle　than　to　the　utilitarian　one。　On　them　morality　of　any　kind　has　no　hold　but　through　the　external　sanctions。　Meanwhile　the　feelings　exist；　a　fact　in　human　nature；　the　reality　of　which；　and　the　great　power　with　which　they　are　capable　of　acting　on　those　in　whom　they　have　been　duly　cultivated；　are　proved　by　experience。　No　reason　has　ever　been　shown　why　they　may　not　be　cultivated　to　as　great　intensity　in　connection　with　the　utilitarian；　as　with　any　other　rule　of　morals。　　　There　is；　I　am　aware；　a　disposition　to　believe　that　a　person　who　sees　in　moral　obligation　a　transcendental　fact；　an　objective　reality　belonging　to　the　province　of　〃Things　in　themselves；〃　is　likely　to　be　more　obedient　to　it　than　one　who　believes　it　to　be　entirely　subjective；　having　its　seat　in　human　consciousness　only。　But　whatever　a　person's　opinion　may　be　on　this　point　of　Ontology；　the　force　he　is　really　urged　by　is　his　own　subjective　feeling；　and　is　exactly　measured　by　its　strength。　No　one's　belief　that　duty　is　an　objective　reality　is　stronger　than　the　belief　that　God　is　so；　yet　the　belief　in　God；　apart　from　the　expectation　of　actual　reward　and　punishment；　only　operates　on　conduct　through；　and　in　proportion　to；　the　subjective　religious　feeling。　The　sanction；　so　far　as　it　is　disinterested；　is　always　in　the　mind　itself；　and　the　notion　therefore　of　the　transcendental　moralists　must　be；　that　this　sanction　will　not　exist　in　the　mind　unless　it　is　believed　to　have　its　root　out　of　the　mind；　and　that　if　a　person　is　able　to　say　to　himself；　This　which　is　restraining　me；　and　which　is　called　my　conscience；　is　only　a　feeling　in　my　own　mind；　he　may　possibly　draw　the　conclusion　that　when　the　feeling　ceases　the　obligation　ceases；　and　that　if　he　find　the　feeling　inconvenient；　he　may　disregard　it；　and　endeavour　to　get　rid　of　it。　But　is　this　danger　confined　to　the　utilitarian　morality？　Does　the　belief　that　moral　obligation　has　its　seat　outside　the　mind　make　the　feeling　of　it　too　strong　to　be　got　rid　of？　The　fact　is　so　far　otherwise；　that　all　moralists　admit　and　lament　the　ease　with　which；　in　the　generality　of　minds；　conscience　can　be　silenced　or　stifled。　The　question；　Need　I　obey　my　conscience？　is　quite　as　often　put　to　themselves　by　persons　who　never　heard　of　the　principle　of　utility；　as　by　its　adherents。　Those　whose　conscientious　feelings　are　so　weak　as　to　allow　of　their　asking　this　question；　if　they　answer　it　affirmatively；　will　not　do　so　because　they　believe　in　the　transcendental　theory；　but　because　of　the　external　sanctions。　　　It　is　not　necessary；　for　the　present　purpose；　to　decide　whether　the　feeling　of　duty　is　innate　or　implanted。　Assuming　it　to　be　innate；　it　is　an　open　question　to　what　objects　it　naturally　attaches　itself；　for　the　philosophic　supporters　of　that　theory　are　now　agreed　that　the　intuitive　perception　is　of　principles　of　morality　and　not　of　the　details。　If　there　be　anything　innate　in　the　matter；　I　see　no　reason　why　the　feeling　which　is　innate　should　not　be　that　of　regard　to　the　pleasures　and　pains　of　others。　If　there　is　any　principle　of　morals　which　is　intuitively　obligatory；　I　should　say　it　must　be　that。　If　so；　the　intuitive　ethics　would　coincide　with　the　utilitarian；　and　there　would　be　no　further　quarrel　between　them。　Even　as　it　is；　the　intuitive　moralists；　though　they　believe　that　there　are　other　intuitive　moral　obligations；　do　already　believe　this　to　one；　for　they　unanimously　hold　that　a　large　portion　of　morality　turns　upon　the　consideration　due　to　the　interests　of　our　fellow…creatures。　Therefore；　if　the　belief　in　the　transcendental　origin　of　moral　obligation　gives　any　additional　efficacy　to　the　internal　sanction；　it　appears　to　me　that　the　utilitarian　principle　has　already　the　benefit　of　it。　　　On　the　other　hand；　if；　as　is　my　own　belief；　the　moral　feelings　are　not　innate；　but　acquired；　they　are　not　for　that　reason　the　less　natural。　It　is　natural　to　man　to　speak；　to　reason；　to　build　cities；　to　cultivate　the　ground；　though　these　are　acquired　faculties。　The　moral　feelings　are　not　indeed　a　part　of　our　nature；　in　the　sense　of　being　in　any　perceptible　degree　present　in　all　of　us；　but　this；　unhappily；　is　a　fact　admitted　by　those　who　believe　the　most　strenuously　in　their　transcendental　origin。　Like　the　other　acquired　capacities　above　referred　to；　the　moral　faculty；　if　not　a　part　of　our　nature；　is　a　natural　outgrowth　from　it；　capable；　like　them；　in　a　certain　small　degree；　of　springing　up　spontaneously；　and　susceptible　of　being　brought　by　cultivation　to　a　high　degree　of　development。　Unhappily　it　is　also　susceptible；　by　a　sufficient　use　of　the　external　sanctions　and　of　the　force　of　early　impressions；　of　being　cultivated　in　almost　any　direction：　so　that　there　is　hardly　anything　so　absurd　or　so　mischievous　that　it　may　not；　by　means　of　these　influences；　be　made　to　act　on　the　human　mind　with　all　the　authority　of　conscience。　To　doubt　that　the　same　potency　might　be　given　by　the　same　means　to　the　principle　of　utility；　even　if　it　had　no　foundation　in　human　nature；　would　be　flying　in　the　face　of　all　experience。　　　But　moral　associations　which　are　wholly　of　artificial　creation；　when　intellectual　culture　goes　on；　yield　by　degrees　to　the　dissolving　force　of　analysis：　and　if　t