utilitarianism-第16节

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t　the　punishment　should　be　proportioned　to　the　offence；　meaning　that　it　should　be　exactly　measured　by　the　moral　guilt　of　the　culprit　（whatever　be　their　standard　for　measuring　moral　guilt）：　the　consideration；　what　amount　of　punishment　is　necessary　to　deter　from　the　offence；　having　nothing　to　do　with　the　question　of　justice；　in　their　estimation：　while　there　are　others　to　whom　that　consideration　is　all　in　all；　who　maintain　that　it　is　not　just；　at　least　for　man；　to　inflict　on　a　fellow　creature；　whatever　may　be　his　offences；　any　amount　of　suffering　beyond　the　least　that　will　suffice　to　prevent　him　from　repeating；　and　others　from　imitating；　his　misconduct。　　　To　take　another　example　from　a　subject　already　once　referred　to。　In　a　co…operative　industrial　association；　is　it　just　or　not　that　talent　or　skill　should　give　a　title　to　superior　remuneration？　On　the　negative　side　of　the　question　it　is　argued；　that　whoever　does　the　best　he　can；　deserves　equally　well；　and　ought　not　in　justice　to　be　put　in　a　position　of　inferiority　for　no　fault　of　his　own；　that　superior　abilities　have　already　advantages　more　than　enough；　in　the　admiration　they　excite；　the　personal　influence　they　command；　and　the　internal　sources　of　satisfaction　attending　them；　without　adding　to　these　a　superior　share　of　the　world's　goods；　and　that　society　is　bound　in　justice　rather　to　make　compensation　to　the　less　favoured；　for　this　unmerited　inequality　of　advantages；　than　to　aggravate　it。　On　the　contrary　side　it　is　contended；　that　society　receives　more　from　the　more　efficient　labourer；　that　his　services　being　more　useful；　society　owes　him　a　larger　return　for　them；　that　a　greater　share　of　the　joint　result　is　actually　his　work；　and　not　to　allow　his　claim　to　it　is　a　kind　of　robbery；　that　if　he　is　only　to　receive　as　much　as　others；　he　can　only　be　justly　required　to　produce　as　much；　and　to　give　a　smaller　amount　of　time　and　exertion；　proportioned　to　his　superior　efficiency。　Who　shall　decide　between　these　appeals　to　conflicting　principles　of　justice？　justice　has　in　this　case　two　sides　to　it；　which　it　is　impossible　to　bring　into　harmony；　and　the　two　disputants　have　chosen　opposite　sides；　the　one　looks　to　what　it　is　just　that　the　individual　should　receive；　the　other　to　what　it　is　just　that　the　community　should　give。　Each；　from　his　own　point　of　view；　is　unanswerable；　and　any　choice　between　them；　on　grounds　of　justice；　must　be　perfectly　arbitrary。　Social　utility　alone　can　decide　the　preference。　　　How　many；　again；　and　how　irreconcilable；　are　the　standards　of　justice　to　which　reference　is　made　in　discussing　the　repartition　of　taxation。　One　opinion　is；　that　payment　to　the　State　should　be　in　numerical　proportion　to　pecuniary　means。　Others　think　that　justice　dictates　what　they　term　graduated　taxation；　taking　a　higher　percentage　from　those　who　have　more　to　spare。　In　point　of　natural　justice　a　strong　case　might　be　made　for　disregarding　means　altogether；　and　taking　the　same　absolute　sum　（whenever　it　could　be　got）　from　every　one：　as　the　subscribers　to　a　mess；　or　to　a　club；　all　pay　the　same　sum　for　the　same　privileges；　whether　they　can　all　equally　afford　it　or　not。　Since　the　protection　（it　might　be　said）　of　law　and　government　is　afforded　to；　and　is　equally　required　by　all；　there　is　no　injustice　in　making　all　buy　it　at　the　same　price。　It　is　reckoned　justice；　not　injustice；　that　a　dealer　should　charge　to　all　customers　the　same　price　for　the　same　article；　not　a　price　varying　according　to　their　means　of　payment。　This　doctrine；　as　applied　to　taxation；　finds　no　advocates；　because　it　conflicts　so　strongly　with　man's　feelings　of　humanity　and　of　social　expediency；　but　the　principle　of　justice　which　it　invokes　is　as　true　and　as　binding　as　those　which　can　be　appealed　to　against　it。　Accordingly　it　exerts　a　tacit　influence　on　the　line　of　defence　employed　for　other　modes　of　assessing　taxation。　People　feel　obliged　to　argue　that　the　State　does　more　for　the　rich　than　for　the　poor；　as　a　justification　for　its　taking　more　from　them：　though　this　is　in　reality　not　true；　for　the　rich　would　be　far　better　able　to　protect　themselves；　in　the　absence　of　law　or　government；　than　the　poor；　and　indeed　would　probably　be　successful　in　converting　the　poor　into　their　slaves。　Others；　again；　so　far　defer　to　the　same　conception　of　justice；　as　to　maintain　that　all　should　pay　an　equal　capitation　tax　for　the　protection　of　their　persons　（these　being　of　equal　value　to　all）；　and　an　unequal　tax　for　the　protection　of　their　property；　which　is　unequal。　To　this　others　reply；　that　the　all　of　one　man　is　as　valuable　to　him　as　the　all　of　another。　From　these　confusions　there　is　no　other　mode　of　extrication　than　the　utilitarian。

　　Is；　then　the　difference　between　the　just　and　the　Expedient　a　merely　imaginary　distinction？　Have　mankind　been　under　a　delusion　in　thinking　that　justice　is　a　more　sacred　thing　than　policy；　and　that　the　latter　ought　only　to　be　listened　to　after　the　former　has　been　satisfied？　By　no　means。　The　exposition　we　have　given　of　the　nature　and　origin　of　the　sentiment；　recognises　a　real　distinction；　and　no　one　of　those　who　profess　the　most　sublime　contempt　for　the　consequences　of　actions　as　an　element　in　their　morality；　attaches　more　importance　to　the　distinction　than　I　do。　While　I　dispute　the　pretensions　of　any　theory　which　sets　up　an　imaginary　standard　of　justice　not　grounded　on　utility；　I　account　the　justice　which　is　grounded　on　utility　to　be　the　chief　part；　and　incomparably　the　most　sacred　and　binding　part；　of　all　morality。　justice　is　a　name　for　certain　classes　of　moral　rules；　which　concern　the　essentials　of　human　well…being　more　nearly；　and　are　therefore　of　more　absolute　obligation；　than　any　other　rules　for　the　guidance　of　life；　and　the　notion　which　we　have　found　to　be　of　the　essence　of　the　idea　of　justice；　that　of　a　right　residing　in　an　individual　implies　and　testifies　to　this　more　binding　obligation。　　　The　moral　rules　which　forbid　mankind　to　hurt　one　another　（in　which　we　must　never　forget　to　include　wrongful　interference　with　each　other's　freedom）　are　more　vital　to　human　well…being　than　any　maxims；　however　important；　which　only　point　out　the　best　mode　of　managing　some　department　of　human　affairs。　They　have　also　the　peculiarity；　that　they　are　the　main　element　in　determining　the　whole　of　the　social　feelings　of　mankind。　It　is　their　observance　which　alone　preserves　peace　among　human　beings：　if　obedience　to　them　were　not　the　rule；　and　disobedience　the　exception；　every　one　would　see　in　every　one　else　an　enemy；　against　whom　he　must　be　perpetually　guarding　himself。　What　is　hardly　less　important；　these　are　the　precepts　which　mankind　have　the　strongest　and　the　most　direct　inducements　for　impressing　upon　one　another。　By　merely　giving　to　each　other　prudential　instruction　or　exhortation；　they　may　gain；　or　think　they　gain；　nothing：　in　inculcating　on　each　other　the　duty　of　positive　beneficence　they　have　an　unmistakable　interest；　but　far　less　in　degree：　a　person　may　possibly　not　need　the　benefits　of　others；　but　he　always　needs　that　they　should　not　do　him　hurt。　Thus　the　moralities　which　protect　every　individual　from　being　harmed　by　others；　either　directly　or　by　being　hindered　in　his　freedom　of　pursuing　his　own　good；　are　at　once　those　which　he　himself　has　most　at　heart；　and　those　which　he　has　the　strongest　interest　in　publishing　and　enforcing　by　word　and　deed。　It　is　by　a　person's　observance　of　these　that　his　fitness　to　exist　as　one　of　the　fellowship　of　human　beings　is　tested　and　decided；　for　on　that　depends　his　being　a　nuisance　or　not　to　those　with　whom　he　is　in　contact。　Now　it　is　these　moralities　primarily　which　compose　the　obligations　of　justice。　The　most　marked　cases　of　injustice；　and　those　which　give　the　tone　to　the　feeling　of　repugnance　which　characterises　the　sentiment；　are　acts　of　wrongful　aggression；　or　wrongful　exercise　of　power　over　some　one；　the　next　are　those　which　consist　in　wrongfully　withholding　from　him　something　which　is　his　due；　in　both　cases；　inflicting　on　him　a　positive　hurt；　either　in　the　form　of　direct　suffering；　or　of　the　privation　of　some　good　which　he　had　reasonable　ground；　either　of　a　physical　or　of　a　social　kind；　for　counting　upon。　　　The　same　powerful　motives　which　command　the　observance　of　these　primary　moralities；　enjoin　the　punishment　of　those　who　violate　them；　and　as　the　impulses　of　self…defence；　of　defence　of　others；　and　of　vengeance；　are　all　called　forth　against　such　persons；　retribution；　or　evil　for　evil；　becomes　closely　connected　with　the　sentiment　of　justice；　and　is　universally　included　in　the　idea。　Good　for　good　is　also　one　of　the　dictates　of　justice；　and　this；　though　its　social　utility　is　evident；　and　though　it　carries　with　it　a　natural　human　feeling；　has　not　at　first　sight　that　obvious　connection　with　hurt　or　injury；　which；　existing　in　the　most　elementary　cases　of　just　and　unjust；　is　the　source　of　the　characteristic　intensity　of　the　sentiment。　But　the　connection；　though　less　obvious；　is　not　less　real。　He　who　accepts　benefits；　and　denies　a　return　of　them　when　needed；　inflicts　a　real　hurt；　by　disappointing　one　of　the　most　natural　and　reasonable　of　expectations；　and　one　which　he　must　at　least　tacitly　have　encouraged；　otherwise　the　benefits　would　seldom　have　been　conferred。　The　important　rank；　among　human　evils　and　wrongs；　of　th