utilitarianism-第15节
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to him； but should leave him to chance； or to his own exertions。 Thus； a person is said to have a right to what he can earn in fair professional competition； because society ought not to allow any other person to hinder him from endeavouring to earn in that manner as much as he can。 But he has not a right to three hundred a…year； though he may happen to be earning it； because society is not called on to provide that he shall earn that sum。 On the contrary； if he owns ten thousand pounds three per cent stock； he has a right to three hundred a…year； because society has come under an obligation to provide him with an income of that amount。 To have a right； then； is； I conceive； to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of。 If the objector goes on to ask； why it ought？ I can give him no other reason than general utility。 If that expression does not seem to convey a sufficient feeling of the strength of the obligation； nor to account for the peculiar energy of the feeling； it is because there goes to the composition of the sentiment； not a rational only； but also an animal element； the thirst for retaliation； and this thirst derives its intensity； as well as its moral justification； from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is concerned。 The interest involved is that of security； to every one's feelings the most vital of all interests。 All other earthly benefits are needed by one person； not needed by another； and many of them can； if necessary； be cheerfully foregone； or replaced by something else； but security no human being can possibly do without on it we depend for all our immunity from evil； and for the whole value of all and every good； beyond the passing moment； since nothing but the gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us； if we could be deprived of anything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves。 Now this most indispensable of all necessaries； after physical nutriment； cannot be had； unless the
machinery for providing it is kept unintermittedly in active play。 Our notion； therefore； of the claim we have on our fellow…creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence； gathers feelings around it so much more intense than those concerned in any of the more common cases of utility； that the difference in degree （as is often the case in psychology） becomes a real difference in kind。 The claim assumes that character of absoluteness； that apparent infinity； and incommensurability with all other considerations； which constitute the distinction between the feeling of right and wrong and that of ordinary expediency and inexpediency。 The feelings concerned are so powerful； and we count so positively on finding a responsive feeling in others （all being alike interested）； that ought and should grow into must； and recognised indispensability becomes a moral necessity； analogous to physical； and often not inferior to it in binding force exhorted；
If the preceding analysis； or something resembling it； be not the correct account of the notion of justice； if justice be totally independent of utility； and be a standard per se； which the mind can recognise by simple introspection of itself； it is hard to understand why that internal oracle is so ambiguous； and why so many things appear either just or unjust； according to the light in which they are regarded。 We are continually informed that Utility is an uncertain standard； which every different person interprets differently； and that there is no safety but in the immutable； ineffaceable； and unmistakable dictates of justice； which carry their evidence in themselves； and are independent of the fluctuations of opinion。 One would suppose from this that on questions of justice there could be no controversy； that if we take that for our rule； its application to any given case could leave us in as little doubt as a mathematical demonstration。 So far is this from being the fact； that there is as much difference of opinion； and as much discussion； about what is just； as about what is useful to society。 Not only have different nations and individuals different notions of justice； but in the mind of one and the same individual； justice is not some one rule； principle； or maxim； but many； which do not always coincide in their dictates； and in choosing between which； he is guided either by some extraneous standard； or by his own personal predilections。 For instance； there are some who say； that it is unjust to punish any one for the sake of example to others； that punishment is just； only when intended for the good of the sufferer himself。 Others maintain the extreme reverse； contending that to punish persons who have attained years of discretion； for their own benefit； is despotism and injustice； since if the matter at issue is solely their own good； no one has a right to control their own judgment of it； but that they may justly be punished to prevent evil to others； this being the exercise of the legitimate right of self…defence。 Mr。 Owen； again； affirms that it is unjust to punish at all； for the criminal did not make his own character； his education； and the circumstances which surrounded him； have made him a criminal； and for these he is not responsible。 All these opinions are extremely plausible； and so long as the question is argued as one of justice simply； without going down to the principles which lie under justice and are the source of its authority； I am unable to see how any of these reasoners can be refuted。 For in truth every one of the three builds upon rules of justice confessedly true。 The first appeals to the acknowledged injustice of singling out an individual； and making a sacrifice； without his consent； for other people's benefit。 The second relies on the acknowledged justice of self…defence； and the admitted injustice of forcing one person to conform to another's notions of what constitutes his good。 The Owenite invokes the admitted principle； that it is unjust to punish any one for what he cannot help。 Each is triumphant so long as he is not compelled to take into consideration any other maxims of justice than the one he has selected； but as soon as their several maxims are brought face to face； each disputant seems to have exactly as much to say for himself as the others。 No one of them can carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another equally binding。 These are difficulties； they have always been felt to be such； and many devices have been invented to turn rather than to overcome them。 As a refuge from the last of the three； men imagined what they called the freedom of the will； fancying that they could not justify punishing a man whose will is in a thoroughly hateful state； unless it be supposed to have come into that state through no influence of anterior circumstances。 To escape from the other difficulties； a favourite contrivance has been the fiction of a contract； whereby at some unknown period all the members of society engaged to obey the laws； and consented to be punished for any disobedience to them； thereby giving to their legislators the right； which it is assumed they would not otherwise have had； of punishing them； either for their own good or for that of society。 This happy thought was considered to get rid of the whole difficulty； and to legitimate the infliction of punishment； in virtue of another received maxim of justice； Volenti non fit injuria； that is not unjust which is done with the consent of the person who is supposed to be hurt by it。 I need hardly remark； that even if the consent were not a mere fiction； this maxim is not superior in authority to the others which it is brought in to supersede。 It is； on the contrary； an instructive specimen of the loose and irregular manner in which supposed principles of justice grow up。 This particular one evidently came into use as a help to the coarse exigencies of courts of law； which are sometimes obliged to be content with very uncertain presumptions； on account of the greater evils which would often arise from any attempt on their part to cut finer。 But even courts of law are not able to adhere consistently to the maxim； for they allow voluntary engagements to be set aside on the ground of fraud； and sometimes on that of mere mistake or misinformation。 Again； when the legitimacy of inflicting punishment is admitted； how many conflicting conceptions of justice come to light in discussing the proper apportionment of punishments to offences。 No rule on the subject recommends itself so strongly to the primitive and spontaneous sentiment of justice； as the bex talionis； an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth。 Though this principle of the Jewish and of the Mahometan law has been generally abandoned in Europe as a practical maxim； there is； I suspect； in most minds； a secret hankering after it； and when retribution accidentally falls on an offender in that precise shape； the general feeling of satisfaction evinced bears witness how natural is the sentiment to which this repayment in kind is acceptable。 With many； the test of justice in penal infliction is that the punishment should be proportioned to the offence； meaning that it should be exactly measured b
