utilitarianism-第14节
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h him； or in treating him worse than he deserves； or worse than other people who have no greater claims； in each case the supposition implies two things… a wrong done； and some assignable person who is wronged。 Injustice may also be done by treating a person better than others； but the wrong in this case is to his competitors； who are also assignable persons。 It seems to me that this feature in the case… a right in some person； correlative to the moral obligation… constitutes the specific difference between justice； and generosity or beneficence。 Justice implies something which it is not only right to do； and wrong not to do； but which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right。 No one has a moral right to our generosity or beneficence； because we are not morally bound to practise those virtues towards any given individual。 And it will be found with respect to this； as to every correct definition； that the instances which seem to conflict with it are those which most confirm it。 For if a moralist attempts； as some have done； to make out that mankind generally； though not any given individual； have a right to all the good we can do them； he at once； by that thesis； includes generosity and beneficence within the category of justice。 He is obliged to say； that our utmost exertions are due to our fellow creatures； thus assimilating them to a debt； or that nothing less can be a sufficient return for what society does for us； thus classing the case as one of gratitute； both of which are acknowledged cases of justice。 Wherever there is right； the case is one of justice； and not of the virtue of beneficence： and whoever does not place the distinction between justice and morality in general； where we have now placed it； will be found to make no distinction between them at all； but to merge all morality in justice。
Having thus endeavoured to determine the distinctive elements which enter into the composition of the idea of justice； we are ready to enter on the inquiry； whether the feeling； which accompanies the idea； is attached to it by a special dispensation of nature； or whether it could have grown up； by any known laws； out of the idea itself； and in particular； whether it can have originated in considerations of general expediency。 I conceive that the sentiment itself does not arise from anything which would commonly； or correctly； be termed an idea of expediency； but that though the sentiment does not； whatever is moral in it does。 We have seen that the two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice are； the desire to punish a person who has done harm； and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has been done。 Now it appears to me； that the desire to punish a person who has done harm to some individual is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments； both in the highest degree natural； and which either are or resemble instincts； the impulse of self…defence； and the feeling of sympathy。 It is natural to resent； and to repel or retaliate； any harm done or attempted against ourselves； or against those with whom we sympathise。 The origin of this sentiment it is not necessary here to discuss。 Whether it be an instinct or a result of intelligence； it is； we know； common to all animal nature； for every animal tries to hurt those who have hurt； or who it thinks are about to hurt； itself or its young。 Human beings； on this point； only differ from other animals in two particulars。 First； in being capable of sympathising； not solely with their offspring； or； like some of the more noble animals； with some superior animal who is kind to them； but with all human； and even with all sentient； beings。 Secondly； in having a more developed intelligence； which gives a wider range to the whole of their sentiments； whether self…regarding or sympathetic。 By virtue of his superior intelligence； even apart from his superior range of sympathy； a human being is capable of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human society of which he forms a part； such that any conduct which threatens the security of the society generally； is threatening to his own； and calls forth his instinct （if instinct it be） of self…defence。 The same superiority of intelligence joined to the power of sympathising with human beings generally； enables him to attach himself to the collective idea of his tribe； his country； or mankind； in such a manner that any act hurtful to them； raises his instinct of sympathy； and urges him to resistance。 The sentiment of justice； in that one of its elements which consists of the desire to punish； is thus； I conceive； the natural feeling of retaliation or vengeance； rendered by intellect and sympathy applicable to those injuries； that is； to those hurts； which wound us through； or in common with； society at large。 This sentiment； in itself； has nothing moral in it； what is moral is； the exclusive subordination of it to the social sympathies； so as to wait on and obey their call。 For the natural feeling would make us resent indiscriminately whatever any one does that is disagreeable to us； but when moralised by the social feeling； it only acts in the directions conformable to the general good： just persons resenting a hurt to society； though not otherwise a hurt to themselves； and not resenting a hurt to themselves； however painful； unless it be of the kind which society has a common interest with them in the repression of。 It is no objection against this doctrine to say； that when we feel our sentiment of justice outraged； we are not thinking of society at large； or of any collective interest； but only of the individual case。 It is common enough certainly； though the reverse of commendable； to feel resentment merely because we have suffered pain； but a person whose resentment is really a moral feeling； that is； who considers whether an act is blamable before he allows himself to resent it… such a person； though he may not say expressly to himself that he is standing up for the interest of society； certainly does feel that he is asserting a rule which is for the benefit of others as well as for his own。 If he is not feeling this… if he is regarding the act solely as it affects him individually… he is not consciously just； he is not concerning himself about the justice of his actions。 This is admitted even by anti…utilitarian moralists。 When Kant （as before remarked） propounds as the fundamental principle of morals； 〃So act； that thy rule of conduct might be adopted as a law by all rational beings；〃 he virtually acknowledges that the interest of mankind collectively； or at least of mankind indiscriminately； must be in the mind of the agent when conscientiously deciding on the morality of the act。 Otherwise he uses words without a meaning： for； that a rule even of utter selfishness could not possibly be adopted by all rational beings… that there is any insuperable obstacle in the nature of things to its adoption… cannot be even plausibly maintained。 To give any meaning to Kant's principle； the sense put upon it must be； that we ought to shape our conduct by a rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective interest。 To recapitulate： the idea of justice supposes two things； a rule of conduct； and a sentiment which sanctions the rule。 The first must be supposed common to all mankind； and intended for their good。 The other （the sentiment） is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule。 There is involved； in addition； the conception of some definite person who suffers by the infringement； whose rights （to use the expression appropriated to the case） are violated by it。 And the sentiment of justice appears to me to be； the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself； or to those with whom one sympathises； widened so as to include all persons； by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy； and the human conception of intelligent self…interest。 From the latter elements； the feeling derives its morality； from the former； its peculiar impressiveness； and energy of self…assertion。 I have； throughout； treated the idea of a right residing in the injured person； and violated by the injury； not as a separate element in the composition of the idea and sentiment； but as one of the forms in which the other two elements clothe themselves。 These elements are； a hurt to some assignable person or persons on the one hand； and a demand for punishment on the other。 An examination of our own minds； I think； will show； that these two things include all that we mean when we speak of violation of a right。 When we call anything a person's right； we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it； either by the force of law； or by that of education and opinion。 If he has what we consider a sufficient claim； on whatever account； to have something guaranteed to him by society； we say that he has a right to it。 If we desire to prove that anything does not belong to him by right； we think this done as soon as it is admitted that society ought not to take measures for securing it to him； but should leave him to chance； or to his own exertions。 Thus； a person is said to have a r
