the common law-第7节

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　propositions；　those　propositions　will　be　but　a　phase　in　a　continuous　growth。　To　understand　their　scope　fully；　to　know　how　they　will　be　dealt　with　by　judges　trained　in　the　past　which　the　law　embodies；　we　must　ourselves　know　something　of　that　past。　The　history　of　what　the　law　has　been　is　necessary　to　the　knowledge　of　what　the　law　is。

Again；　the　process　which　I　have　described　has　involved　the　attempt　to　follow　precedents；　as　well　as　to　give　a　good　reason　for　them。　When　we　find　that　in　large　and　important　branches　of　the　law　the　various　grounds　of　policy　on　which　the　various　rules　have　been　justified　are　later　inventions　to　account　for　what　are　in　fact　survivals　from　more　primitive　times；　we　have　a　right　to　reconsider　the　popular　reasons；　and；　taking　a　broader　view　of　the　field；　to　decide　anew　whether　those　reasons　are　satisfactory。　They　may　be；　notwithstanding　the　manner　of　their　appearance。　If　truth　were　not　often　suggested　by　error；　if　old　implements　could　not　be　adjusted　to　new　uses；　human　progress　would　be　slow。　But　scrutiny　and　revision　are　justified。

But　none　of　the　foregoing　considerations；　nor　the　purpose　of　showing　the　materials　for　anthropology　contained　in　the　history　of　the　law；　are　the　immediate　object　here。　My　aim　and　purpose　have　been　to　show　that　the　various　forms　of　liability　known　to　modern　law　spring　from　the　common　ground　of　revenge。　In　the　sphere　of　contract　the　fact　will　hardly　be　material　outside　the　cases　which　have　been　stated　in　this　Lecture。　But　in　the　criminal　law　and　the　law　of　torts　it　is　of　the　first　importance。　It　shows　that　they　have　started　from　a　moral　basis；　from　the　thought　that　some　one　was　to　blame。

＇38＇　It　remains　to　be　proved　that；　while　the　terminology　of　morals　is　still　retained；　and　while　the　law　does　still　and　always；　in　a　certain　sense；　measure　legal　liability　by　moral　standards；　it　nevertheless；　by　the　very　necessity　of　its　nature；　is　continually　transmuting　those　moral　standards　into　external　or　objective　ones；　from　which　the　actual　guilt　of　the　party　concerned　is　wholly　eliminated。

LECTURE　II。

THE　CRIMINAL　LAW。

In　the　beginning　of　the　first　Lecture　it　was　shown　that　the　appeals　of　the　early　law　were　directed　only　to　intentional　wrongs。　The　appeal　was　a　far　older　form　of　procedure　than　the　indictment；　and　may　be　said　to　have　had　a　criminal　as　well　as　a　civil　aspect。　It　had　the　double　object　of　satisfying　the　private　party　for　his　loss；　and　the　king　for　the　breach　of　his　peace。　On　its　civil　side　it　was　rooted　in　vengeance。　It　was　a　proceeding　to　recover　those　compositions；　at　first　optional；　afterwards　compulsory；　by　which　a　wrong…doer　bought　the　spear　from　his　side。　Whether；　so　far　as　concerned　the　king；　it　had　the　same　object　of　vengeance；　or　was　more　particularly　directed　to　revenue；　does　not　matter；　since　the　claim　of　the　king　did　not　enlarge　the　scope　of　the　action。

It　would　seem　to　be　a　fair　inference　that　indictable　offences　were　originally　limited　in　the　same　way　as　those　which　gave　rise　to　an　appeal。　For　whether　the　indictment　arose　by　a　splitting　up　of　the　appeal；　or　in　some　other　way；　the　two　were　closely　connected。

An　acquittal　of　the　appellee　on　the　merits　was　a　bar　to　an　indictment；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　when　an　appeal　was　fairly　started；　although　the　appellor　might　fail　to　prosecute；　or　might　be　defeated　by　plea；　the　cause　might　still　be　proceeded　with　on　behalf　of　the　king。　/1/

＇40＇　The　presentment；　which　is　the　other　parent　of　our　criminal　procedure；　had　an　origin　distinct　from　the　appeal。　If；　as　has　been　thought；　it　was　merely　the　successor　of　fresh　suit　and　lynch　law；　/1/　this　also　is　the　child　of　vengeance；　even　more　clearly　than　the　other。

The　desire　for　vengeance　imports　an　opinion　that　its　object　is　actually　and　personally　to　blame。　It　takes　an　internal　standard；　not　an　objective　or　external　one；　and　condemns　its　victim　by　that。　The　question　is　whether　such　a　standard　is　still　accepted　either　in　this　primitive　form；　or　in　some　more　refined　development；　as　is　commonly　supposed；　and　as　seems　not　impossible；　considering　the　relative　slowness　with　which　the　criminal　law　has　improved。

It　certainly　may　be　argued；　with　some　force；　that　it　has　never　ceased　to　be　one　object　of　punishment　to　satisfy　the　desire　for　vengeance。　The　argument　will　be　made　plain　by　considering　those　instances　in　which；　for　one　reason　or　another；　compensation　for　a　wrong　is　out　of　the　question。

Thus　an　act　may　be　of　such　a　kind　as　to　make　indemnity　impossible　by　putting　an　end　to　the　principal　sufferer；　as　in　the　case　of　murder　or　manslaughter。

Again；　these　and　other　crimes；　like　forgery；　although　directed　against　an　individual；　tend　to　make　others　feel　unsafe；　and　this　general　insecurity　does　not　admit　of　being　paid　for。

Again；　there　are　cases　where　there　are　no　means　of　enforcing　indemnity。　In　Macaulay's　draft　of　the　Indian　Penal　Code；　breaches　of　contract　for　the　carriage　of　passengers；　were　made　criminal。　The　palanquin…bearers　of　India　were　too　poor　to　pay　damages；　and　yet　had　to　be　＇41＇　trusted　to　carry　unprotected　women　and　children　through　wild　and　desolate　tracts；　where　their　desertion　would　have　placed　those　under　their　charge　in　great　danger。

In　all　these　cases　punishment　remains　as　an　alternative。　A　pain　can　be　inflicted　upon　the　wrong…doer；　of　a　sort　which　does　not　restore　the　injured　party　to　his　former　situation；　or　to　another　equally　good；　but　which　is　inflicted　for　the　very　purpose　of　causing　pain。　And　so　far　as　this　punishment　takes　the　place　of　compensation；　whether　on　account　of　the　death　of　the　person　to　whom　the　wrong　was　done；　the　indefinite　number　of　persons　affected；　the　impossibility　of　estimating　the　worth　of　the　suffering　in　money；　or　the　poverty　of　the　criminal；　it　may　be　said　that　one　of　its　objects　is　to　gratify　the　desire　for　vengeance。　The　prisoner　pays　with　his　body。

The　statement　may　be　made　stronger　still；　and　it　may　be　said；　not　only　that　the　law　does；　but　that　it　ought　to；　make　the　gratification　of　revenge　an　object。　This　is　the　opinion；　at　any　rate；　of　two　authorities　so　great；　and　so　opposed　in　other　views；　as　Bishop　Butler　and　Jeremy　Bentham。　/1/　Sir　James　Stephen　says；　〃The　criminal　law　stands　to　the　passion　of　revenge　in　much　the　same　relation　as　marriage　to　the　sexual　appetite。〃　/2/

The　first　requirement　of　a　sound　body　of　law　is；　that　it　should　correspond　with　the　actual　feelings　and　demands　of　the　community；　whether　right　or　wrong。　If　people　would　gratify　the　passion　of　revenge　outside　of　the　law；　if　the　law　did　not　help　them；　the　law　has　no　choice　but　to　satisfy　the　craving　itself；　and　thus　avoid　the　greater　evil　of　private　＇42＇　retribution。　At　the　same　time；　this　passion　is　not　one　which　we　encourage；　either　as　private　individuals　or　as　lawmakers。　Moreover；　it　does　not　cover　the　whole　ground。　There　are　crimes　which　do　not　excite　it；　and　we　should　naturally　expect　that　the　most　important　purposes　of　punishment　would　be　coextensive　with　the　whole　field　of　its　application。　It　remains　to　be　discovered　whether　such　a　general　purpose　exists；　and　if　so　what　it　is。　Different　theories　still　divide　opinion　upon　the　subject。

It　has　been　thought　that　the　purpose　of　punishment　is　to　reform　the　criminal；　that　it　is　to　deter　the　criminal　and　others　from　committing　similar　crimes；　and　that　it　is　retribution。　Few　would　now　maintain　that　the　first　of　these　purposes　was　the　only　one。　If　it　were；　every　prisoner　should　be　released　as　soon　as　it　appears　clear　that　he　will　never　repeat　his　offence；　and　if　he　is　incurable　he　should　not　be　punished　at　all。　Of　course　it　would　be　hard　to　reconcile　the　punishment　of　death　with　this　doctrine。

The　main　struggle　lies　between　the　other　two。　On　the　one　side　is　the　notion　that　there　is　a　mystic　bond　between　wrong　and　punishment；　on　the　other；　that　the　infliction　of　pain　is　only　a　means　to　an　end。　Hegel；　one　of　the　great　expounders　of　the　former　view；　puts　it；　in　his　quasi　mathematical　form；　that；　wrong　being　the　negation　of　right；　punishment　is　the　negation　of　that　negation；　or　retribution。　Thus　the　punishment　must　be　equal；　in　the　sense　of　proportionate　to　the　crime；　because　its　only　function　is　to　destroy　it。　Others；　without　this　logical　apparatus；　are　content　to　rely　upon　a　felt　necessity　that　suffering　should　follow　wrong…doing。

It　is　objected　that　the　preventive　theory　is　immoral；　because　it　overlooks　the　ill…desert　of　wrong…doing；　and　furnishes　＇43＇　no　measure　of　the　amount　of　punishment；　except　the　lawgiver's　subjective　opinion　in　regard　to　the　sufficiency　of　the　amount　of　preventive　suffering。　/1/　In　the　language　of　Kant；　it　treats　man　as　a　thing；　not　as　a　person；　as　a　means；　not　as　an　end　in　himself。　It　is　said　to　conflict　with　the　sense　of　justice；　and　to　violate　the　fundamental　principle　of　all　free　communities；　that　the　members　of　such　communities　have　equal　rights　to　life；　liberty；　and　personal　security。　/2/

In　spite　of　all　this；　probably　most　English…speaking　lawyers　would　accept　the　preventive　theory　without　hesitation。　As　to　the　violation　of　equal　rights　which　is　charged；　it　may　be　replied　that　the　dogma　of　equality　makes　an　equation　between　individuals　only；　not　between　an　individual　and　the　community。　No　society　has　ever　admitted　that　it　could　not　sacrifice　ind