the common law-第66节

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iously　worked　out　in　the　creation　of　the　executor；　whose　entire　status　is　governed　by　it。　It　has　been　seen　still　consciously　applied　in　the　narrower　sphere　of　the　heir。　It　has　been　found　hidden　at　the　root　of　the　relation　between　buyer　and　seller　in　two　cases　at　least；　prescription　and　warranty；　when　the　history　of　that　relation　is　opened　to　a　sufficient　depth。

But　although　it　would　be　more　symmetrical　if　this　analysis　exhausted　the　subject；　there　is　another　class　of　cases　in　which　the　transfer　of　rights　takes　place　upon　a　wholly　different　plan。　In　explaining　the　succession　which　is　worked　out　between　buyer　and　seller　for　the　purpose　of　creating　a　prescriptive　right；　such　as　a　right　of　way　over　neighboring　land　to　the　land　bought　and　sold；　it　was　shown　that　one　who；　instead　of　purchasing　the　land；　had　wrongfully　possessed　himself　of　it　by　force；　would　not　be　treated　as　a　successor；　and　would　get　no　benefit　from　the　previous　use　of　the　way　by　his　disseisee。　But　when　the　former　possessor　has　already　gained　a　right　of　way　before　he　is　turned　out；　a　new　principle　comes　into　operation。　If　the　owner　of　the　land　over　which　the　way　ran　stopped　it　up；　and　was　sued　by　the　wrongful　possessor；　a　defence　on　the　ground　that　the　disseisor　had　not　succeeded　to　the　former　owner's　rights　would　not　prevail。　The　disseisor　would　be　protected　in　his　possession　of　the　land　against　all　but　the　rightful　owner；　and　he　would　equally　be　protected　＇382＇　in　his　use　of　the　way。　This　rule　of　law　does　not　stand　on　a　succession　between　the　wrongful　possessor　and　the　owner；　which　is　out　of　the　question。　Neither　can　it　be　defended　on　the　same　ground　as　the　protection　to　the　occupation　of　the　land　itself。　That　ground　is　that　the　law　defends　possession　against　everything　except　a　better　title。　But；　as　has　been　said　before；　the　common　law　does　not　recognize　possession　of　a　way。　A　man　who　has　used　a　way　ten　years　without　title　cannot　sue　even　a　stranger　for　stopping　it。　He　was　a　trespasser　at　the　beginning；　he　is　nothing　but　a　trespasser　still。　There　must　exist　a　right　against　the　servient　owner　before　there　is　a　right　against　anybody　else。　At　the　same　time　it　is　clear　that　a　way　is　no　more　capable　of　possession　because　somebody　else　has　a　right　to　it；　than　if　no　one　had。

How　comes　it；　then；　that　one　who　has　neither　title　nor　possession　is　so　far　favored？　The　answer　is　to　be　found；　not　in　reasoning；　but　in　a　failure　to　reason。　In　the　first　Lecture　of　this　course　the　thought　with　which　we　have　to　deal　was　shown　in　its　theological　stage；　to　borrow　Comte's　well…known　phraseology；　as　where　an　axe　was　made　the　object　of　criminal　process；　and　also　in　the　metaphysical　stage；　where　the　language　of　personification　alone　survived；　but　survived　to　cause　confusion　of　reasoning。　The　case　put　seems　to　be　an　illustration　of　the　latter。　The　language　of　the　law　of　easements　was　built　up　out　of　similes　drawn　from　persons　at　a　time　when　the　noxoe　deditio　was　still　familiar；　and　then；　as　often　happens；　language　reacted　upon　thought；　so　that　conclusions　were　drawn　as　to　the　rights　themselves　from　the　terms　in　which　they　happened　to　be　expressed。　When　one　estate　was　said　to　be　enslaved　to　another；　or　a　right　of　way　was　said　to　be　a　quality　or　＇383＇　incident　of　a　neighboring　piece　of　land；　men's　minds　were　not　alert　to　see　that　these　phrases　were　only　so　many　personifying　metaphors；　which　explained　nothing　unless　the　figure　of　speech　was　true。

Rogron　deduced　the　negative　nature　of　servitudes　from　the　rule　that　the　land　owes　the　services；　not　the　person；Proedium　non　persona　servit。　For；　said　Rogron；　the　land　alone　being　bound；　it　can　only　be　bound　passively。　Austin　called　this　an　〃absurd　remark。〃　/1/　But　the　jurists　from　whom　we　have　inherited　our　law　of　easements　were　contented　with　no　better　reasoning。　Papinian　himself　wrote　that　servitudes　cannot　be　partially　extinguished；　because　they　are　due　from　lands；　not　persons。　/2/　Celsus　thus　decides　the　case　which　I　took　for　my　illustration：　Even　if　possession　of　a　dominant　estate　is　acquired　by　forcibly　ejecting　the　owner；　the　way　will　be　retained；　since　the　estate　is　possessed　in　such　quality　and　condition　as　it　is　when　taken。　/3/　The　commentator　Godefroi　tersely　adds　that　there　are　two　such　conditions；　slavery　and　freedom；　and　his　antithesis　is　as　old　as　Cicero。　/4/　So；　in　another　passage；　Celsus　asks；　What　else　are　the　rights　attaching　to　land　but　qualities　of　that　land？　/5/　So　Justinian's　Institutes　speak　of　servitudes　which　inhere　in　buildings。　/6/　So　Paulus　＇384＇　speaks　of　such　rights　as　being　accessory　to　bodies。　〃And　thus；〃　adds　Godefroi；　〃rights　may　belong　to　inanimate　things。〃　/1/　It　easily　followed　from　all　this　that　a　sale　of　the　dominant　estate　carried　existing　easements；　not　because　the　buyer　succeeded　to　the　place　of　the　seller；　but　because　land　is　bound　to　land。　/2/

All　these　figures　import　that　land　is　capable　of　having　rights；　as　Austin　recognizes。　Indeed；　he　even　says　that　the　land　〃is　erected　into　a　legal　or　fictitious　person；　and　is　styled　'praedium　dominans。'〃　/3/　But　if　this　means　anything　more　than　to　explain　what　is　implied　by　the　Roman　metaphors；　it　goes　too　far。　The　dominant　estate　was　never　〃erected　into　a　legal　person；〃　either　by　conscious　fiction　or　as　a　result　of　primitive　beliefs。　/4/　It　could　not　sue　or　be　sued；　like　a　ship　in　the　admiralty。　It　is　not　supposed　that　its　possessor　could　maintain　an　action　for　an　interference　with　an　easement　before　his　time；　as　an　heir　could　for　an　injury　to　property　of　the　hereditas　jacens。　If　land　had　even　been　systematically　treated　as　capable　of　acquiring　rights；　the　time　of　a　disseisee　might　have　been　added　to　that　Of　the　wrongful　occupant；　on　the　ground　that　the　land；　and　not　this　or　that　individual；　was　gaining　the　easement；　and　that　long　association　between　the　enjoyment　of　the　privilege　and　the　land　was　sufficient；　which　has　never　been　the　law。

All　that　can　be　said　is；　that　the　metaphors　and　similes　employed　naturally　led　to　the　rule　which　has　prevailed；　＇385＇　and　that；　as　this　rule　was　just　as　good　as　any　other；　or　at　least　was　unobjectionable；　it　was　drawn　from　the　figures　of　speech　without　attracting　attention；　and　before　any　one　had　seen　that　they　were　only　figures；　which　proved　nothing　and　justified　no　conclusion。

As　easements　were　said　to　belong　to　the　dominant　estate；　it　followed　that　whoever　possessed　the　land　had　a　right　of　the　same　degree　over　what　was　incidental　to　it。　If　the　true　meaning　had　been　that　a　way　or　other　easement　admits　of　possession；　and　is　taken　possession　of　with　the　land　to　which　it　runs；　and　that　its　enjoyment　is　protected　on　the　same　grounds　as　possession　in　other　cases；　the　thought　could　have　been　understood。　But　that　was　not　the　meaning　of　the　Roman　law；　and；　as　has　been　shown；　it　is　not　the　doctrine　of　ours。　We　must　take　it　that　easements　have　become　an　incident　of　land　by　an　unconscious　and　unreasoned　assumption　that　a　piece　of　land　can　have　rights。　It　need　not　be　said　that　this　is　absurd；　although　the　rules　of　law　which　are　based　upon　it　are　not　so。

Absurd　or　not；　the　similes　as　well　as　the　principles　of　the　Roman　law　reappear　in　Bracton。　He　says；　〃The　servitude　by　which　land　is　subjected　to　＇other＇　land；　is　made　on　the　likeness　of　that　by　which　man　is　made　the　slave　of　man。〃　/1/　For　rights　belong　to　a　free　tenement；　as　well　as　tangible　things。。。。　They　may　be　called　rights　or　liberties　with　regard　to　the　tenements　to　which　they　are　owed；　but　servitudes　with　regard　to　the　tenements　by　which　they　are　owed　。。。。　One　estate　is　free；　the　other　subjected　to　slavery。〃　/2/　〃＇A　servitude＇　may　be　called　an　arrangement　by　which　house　is　subjected　to　house；　farm　to　＇386＇　farm；　holding　to　holding。〃　/1/　No　passage　has　met　my　eye　in　which　Bracton　expressly　decides　that　an　easement　goes　with　the　dominant　estate　upon　a　disseisin；　but　what　he　says　leaves　little　doubt　that　he　followed　the　Roman　law　in　this　as　in　other　things。

The　writ　against　a　disseisor　was　for　〃so　much　land　and　its　appurtenances；〃　/2/　which　must　mean　that　he　who　had　the　land　even　wrongfully　had　the　appurtenances。　So　Bracton　says　an　action　is　in　rem　〃whether　it　is　for　the　principal　thing；　or　for　a　right　which　adheres　to　the　thing；　。。。　as　when　one　sues　for　a　right　of　way；　。。。　since　rights　of　this　sort　are　all　incorporeal　things；　and　are　quasi　possessed　and　reside　in　bodies；　and　cannot　be　got　or　kept　without　the　bodies　in　which　they　inhere；　nor　in　any　way　had　without　the　bodies　to　which　they　belong。〃　/3/　And　again；　〃Since　rights　do　not　admit　of　delivery；　but　are　transferred　with　the　thing　in　which　they　are；　that　is；　the　bodily　thing；　he　to　whom　they　are　transferred　forthwith　has　a　quasi　possession　of　those　rights　as　soon　as　he　has　the　body　in　which　they　are。〃　/4/

There　is　no　doubt　about　the　later　law；　as　has　been　said　at　the　outset。

We　have　thus　traced　two　competing　and　mutually　inconsistent　principles　into　our　law。　On　the　one　hand　is　the　conception　of　succession　or　privity；　on　the　other；　that　of　rights　inhering　in　a　thing。　Bracton　seems　to　have　vacillated　a　little　from　a　feeling　of　the　possibility　of　conflict　between　the　two。　The　benefit　of　a　warranty　was　confined　to　those　who；　by　the　act　and　consent　of　the　＇387＇　grantee；　succeeded　to　his　place。　It　did　not　pass　to　assigns