the common law-第65节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


m　the　beginning。　/1/

If　it　should　be　suggested　that　what　has　been　said　goes　to　show　that　the　first　grantor's　duty　to　warrant　arose　from　the　assign's　becoming　his　man　and　owing　homage；　the　answer　is　that　he　was　not　bound　unless　he　had　mentioned　assigns　in　his　grant；　homage　or　no　homage。　In　this　Bracton　is　confirmed　by　all　the　later　authorities。　/2/

Another　rule　on　which　there　are　vast　stores　of　forgotten　learning　will　show　how　exactly　the　fiction　fell　in　with　the　earlier　law。　Only　those　who　were　privy　in　estate　with　the　person　to　whom　the　warranty　was　originally　given；　could　vouch　the　original　warrantor。　Looking　back　to　the　early　＇376＇　procedure；　it　will　be　seen　that　of　course　only　those　in　the　same　chain　of　title　could　even　mediately　get　the　benefit　of　a　former　owner's　warranty。　The　ground　on　which　a　man　was　bound　to　warrant　was　that　he　had　conveyed　the　property　to　the　person　who　summoned　him。　Hence　a　man　could　summon　no　one　but　his　grantor；　and　the　successive　vouchers　came　to　an　end　when　the　last　vouchee　could　not　call　on　another　from　whom　he　had　bought。　Now　when　the　process　was　abridged；　no　persons　were　made　liable　to　summons　who　would　not　have　been　liable　before。　The　present　owner　was　allowed　to　vouch　directly　those　who　otherwise　would　have　been　indirectly　bound　to　defend　his　title；　but　no　others。　Hence　he　could　only　summon　those　from　whom　his　grantor　derived　his　title。　But　this　was　equally　well　expressed　in　terms　of　the　fiction　employed。　In　order　to　vouch；　the　present　owner　must　have　the　estate　of　the　person　to　whom　the　warranty　was　made。　As　every　lawyer　knows；　the　estate　does　not　mean　the　land。　It　means　the　status　or　persona　in　regard　to　that　land　formerly　sustained　by　another。　The　same　word　was　used　in　alleging　a　right　by　prescription；　〃that　he　and　those　whose　estate　he　hath　have　for　time　whereof　memory　runneth　not　to　the　contrary；〃　&c。；　and　it　will　be　remembered　that　the　word　corresponds　to　the　same　requirement　of　succession　there。

To　return　to　Bracton；　it　must　be　understood　that　the　description　of　assigns　as　quasi　heredes　is　not　accidental。　He　describes　them　in　that　way　whenever　he　has　occasion　to　speak　of　them。　He　even　pushes　the　reasoning　drawn　from　the　analogy　of　inheritance　to　extremes；　and　refers　to　it　in　countless　passages。　For　instance：　〃It　should　be　noted　that　of　heirs　some　are　true　heirs　and　some　quasi　＇377＇　heirs；　in　place　of　heirs；　&c。；　true　heirs　by　way　of　succession　quasi　heirs；　&c。　by　the　form　of　the　gift；　such　as　assigns；〃　&c。　/1/

If　it　should　be　suggested　that　Bracton's　language　is　only　a　piece　of　mediaeval　scholasticism；　there　are　several　answers。　In　the　first　place　it　is　nearly　contemporaneous　with　the　first　appearance　of　the　right　in　question。　This　is　shown　by　his　citing　authority　for　it　as　for　something　which　might　be　disputed。　He　says；　〃And　that　warranty　must　be　made　to　assigns　according　to　the　form　of　the　gift　is　proved　＇by　a　case＇　in　the　circuit　of　W。　de　Ralegh；　about　the　end　of　the　roll；〃&c。　/2/　It　is　not　justifiable　to　assume　that　a　contemporary　explanation　of　a　new　rule　had　nothing　to　do　with　its　appearance。　Again；　the　fact　is　clear　that　the　assign　got　the　benefit　of　the　warranty　to　the　first　grantee；　not　of　a　new　one　to　himself；　as　has　been　shown；　and　Bracton's　explanation　of　how　this　was　worked　out　falls　in　with　what　has　been　seen　of　the　course　of　the　German　and　Anglo…Saxon　law；　and　with　the　pervading　thought　of　the　Roman　law。　Finally；　and　most　important；　the　requirement　that　the　assign　should　be　in　of　the　first　grantee's　estate　has　remained　a　requirement　from　that　day　to　this。　The　fact　that　the　same　thing　is　required　in　the　same　words　as　in　prescription　goes　far　to　show　that　the　same　technical　thought　has　governed　both。

I　have　said；　Glanvill's　predecessors　probably　regarded　warranty　as　an　obligation　incident　to　a　conveyance；　rather　than　as　a　contract。　But　when　it　became　usual　to　insert　the　undertaking　to　warrant　in　a　deed　or　charter　of　feoffment；　it　lost　something　of　its　former　isolation　as　a　duty　standing　by　itself；　and　admitted　of　being　＇378＇　generalized。　It　was　a　promise　by　deed；　and　a　promise　by　deed　was　a　covenant。　/1/　This　was　a　covenant　having　peculiar　consequences　attached　to　it；　no　doubt。　It　differed　also　in　the　scope　of　its　obligation　from　some　other　covenants；　as　will　be　shown　hereafter。　But　still　it　was　a　covenant；　and　could　sometimes　be　sued　on　as　such。　It　was　spoken　of　in　the　Year　Books　of　Edward　III。　as　a　covenant　which　〃falls　in　the　blood；〃　/2/　as　distinguished　from　those　where　the　acquittance　fell　on　the　land；　and　not　on　the　person。　/3/

The　importance　of　this　circumstance　lies　in　the　working　of　the　law　of　warranty　upon　other　covenants　which　took　its　place。　When　the　old　actions　for　land　gave　way　to　more　modern　and　speedier　forms；　warrantors　were　no　longer　vouched　in　to　defend；　and　if　a　grantee　was　evicted；　damages　took　the　place　of　a　grant　of　other　land。　The　ancient　warranty　disappeared；　and　was　replaced　by　the　covenants　which　we　still　find　in　our　deeds；　including　the　covenants　for　seisin；　for　right　to　convey；　against　incumbrances；　for　quiet　enjoyment；　of　warranty；　and　for　further　assurance。　But　the　principles　on　which　an　assign　could　have　the　benefit　of　these　covenants　were　derived　from　those　which　governed　warranty；　as　any　one　may　see　by　looking　at　the　earlier　decisions。

For　instance；　the　question；　what　was　a　sufficient　assignment　to　give　an　assign　the　benefit　of　a　covenant　for　quiet　enjoyment；　was　argued　and　decided　on　the　authority　of　the　old　cases　of　warranty。　/4/

＇379＇　The　assign；　as　in　warranty；　came　in　under　the　old　covenant　with　the　first　covenantee；　not　by　any　new　right　of　his　own。　Thus；　in　an　action　by　an　assign　on　a　covenant　for　further　assurance；　the　defendant　set　up　a　release　by　the　original　covenantee　after　the　commencement　of　the　suit。　The　court　held　that　the　assignee　should　have　the　benefit　of　the　covenant。　〃They　held；　that　although　the　breach　was　in　the　time　of　the　assignee；　yet　if　the　release　had　been　by　the　covenantee　（who　is　a　party　to　the　deed；　and　from　whom　the　plaintiff　derives）　before　any　breach；　or　before　the　suit　commenced；　it　had　been　a　good　bar　to　the　assignee　from　bringing　this　writ　of　covenant。　But　the　breach　of　the　covenant　being　in　the　time　of　the　assignee；　。。。　and　the　action　brought　by　him；　and　so　attached　in　his　person；　the　covenantee　cannot　release　this　action　wherein　the　assignee　is　interested。〃　/1/　The　covenantee　even　after　assignment　remains　the　legal　party　to　the　contract。　The　assign　comes　in　under　him；　and　does　not　put　an　end　to　his　control　over　it；　until　by　breach　and　action　a　new　right　attaches　in　the　assign's　person；　distinct　from　the　rights　derived　from　the　persona　of　his　grantor。　Later；　the　assign　got　a　more　independent　standing；　as　the　original　foundation　of　his　rights　sunk　gradually　out　of　sight；　and　a　release　after　assignment　became　ineffectual；　at　least　in　the　case　of　a　covenant　to　pay　rent。　/2/

Only　privies　in　estate　with　the　original　covenantee　can　have　the　benefit　of　covenants　for　title。　It　has　been　shown　that　a　similar　limitation　of　the　benefits　of　the　ancient　＇380＇　warranty　was　required　by　its　earlier　history　before　the　assign　was　allowed　to　sue；　and　that　the　fiction　by　which　he　got　that　right　could　not　extend　it　beyond　that　limit。　This　analogy　also　was　followed。　For　instance；　a　tenant　in　tail　male　made　a　lease　for　years　with　covenants　of　right　to　let　and　for　quiet　enjoyment；　and　then　died　without　issue　male。　The　lessee　assigned　the　lease　to　the　plaintiff。　The　latter　was　soon　turned　out；　and　thereupon　brought　an　action　upon　the　covenant　against　the　executor　of　the　lessor。　It　was　held　that　he　could　not　recover；　because　he　was　not　privy　in　estate　with　the　original　covenantee。　For　the　lease；　which　was　the　original　covenantee's　estate；　was　ended　by　the　death　of　the　lessor　and　termination　of　the　estate　tail　out　of　which　the　lease　was　granted；　before　the　form　of　assignment　to　the　plaintiff。　/1/

The　only　point　remaining　to　make　the　analogy　between　covenants　for　title　and　warranty　complete　was　to　require　assigns　to　be　mentioned　in　order　to　enable　them　to　sue。　In　modern　times；　of　course；　such　a　requirement；　if　it　should　exist；　would　be　purely　formal；　and　would　be　of　no　importance　except　as　an　ear…mark　by　which　to　trace　the　history　of　a　doctrine。　It　would　aid　our　studies　if　we　could　say　that　wherever　assigns　are　to　get　the　benefit　of　a　covenant　as　privies　in　estate　with　the　covenantee；　they　must　be　mentioned　in　the　covenant。　Whether　such　a　requirement　does　exist　or　not　would　be　hard　to　tell　from　the　decisions　alone。　It　is　commonly　supposed　not　to。　But　the　popular　opinion　on　this　trifling　point　springs　from　a　failure　to　understand　one　of　the　great　antinomies　of　the　law；　which　must　now　be　explained。

So　far　as　we　have　gone；　we　have　found　that；　wherever　＇381＇　one　party　steps　into　the　rights　or　obligations　of　another；　without　in　turn　filling　the　situation　of　fact　of　which　those　rights　or　obligations　are　the　legal　consequences；　the　substitution　is　explained　by　a　fictitious　identification　of　the　two　individuals；　which　is　derived　from　the　analogy　of　the　inheritance。　This　identification　has　been　seen　as　it　has　been　consciously　worked　out　in　the　creation　of　the　executor；　whose　entire　status　is　governed　by　it。　It　has　bee