the common law-第63节

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ed　having　the　benefit　of　the　time　during　which　the　testator　had　been　in　possession　for　the　purpose　of　acquiring　a　title；　the　legatee　was　in　a　certain　sense　quasi　an　heir。　/1/　Yet　a　legatarius　was　not　a　universal　successor；　and　for　most　purposes　stood　in　marked　contrast　with　such　successors。　/2/

Thus　the　strict　law　of　inheritance　had　made　the　notion　familiar　that　one　man　might　have　the　advantage　of　a　position　filled　by　another；　although　it　was　not　filled；　or　was　only　partially　filled；　by　himself；　and　the　second　fiction；　by　which　the　privileges　of　a　legal　heir　in　this　respect　as　well　as　others　had　been　extended　to　other　persons；　broke　down　the　walls　which　might　otherwise　have　confined　those　privileges　to　a　single　case。　A　new　conception　was　introduced　into　the　law；　and　there　was　nothing　to　hinder　its　further　application。　As　has　been　shown；　it　was　applied　in　terms　to　a　sale　of　the　universitas　for　business　purposes；　and　to　at　least　one　case　where　the　succession　was　confined　to　a　single　specific　thing。　Why；　then；　might　not　every　gift　or　sale　be　regarded　as　a　succession；　so　far　as　to　insure　the　same　advantages？

＇363＇　The　joinder　of　times　to　make　out　a　title　was　soon　allowed　between　buyer　and　seller；　and　I　have　no　doubt；　from　the　language　always　used　by　the　Roman　lawyers；　that　it　was　arrived　at　in　the　way　I　have　suggested。　A　passage　from　Scaevola　（B。　C。　30）　will　furnish　sufficient　proof。　Joinder　of　possessions；　he　says；　that　is；　the　right　to　add　the　time　of　one's　predecessor's　holding　to　one's　own；　clearly　belongs　to　those　who　succeed　to　the　place　of　others；　whether　by　contract　or　by　will：　for　heirs　and　those　who　are　treated　as　holding　the　place　of　successors　are　allowed　to　add　their　testator's　possession　to　their　own。　Accordingly；　if　you　sell　me　a　slave　I　shall　have　the　benefit　of　your　holding。　/1/

The　joinder　of　times　is　given　to　those　who　succeed　to　the　place　of　another。　Ulpian　cites　a　like　phrase　from　a　jurisconsult　of　the　time　of　the　Antonines；　〃to　whose　place　I　have　succeeded　by　inheritance；　or　purchase；　or　any　other　right。〃　/2/　Succedere　in　locum　aliorum；　like　sustinere　personam；　is　an　expression　of　the　Roman　lawyers　for　those　continuations　of　one　man's　legal　position　by　another　of　which　the　type　was　the　succession　of　heir　to　ancestor。　Suecedere　alone　is　used　in　the　sense　of　inherit；　/3/　and　successio　in　that　of　〃inheritance。〃　/4/　The　succession　par　excellence　was　the　inheritance；　and　it　is　believed　that　scarcely　any　instance　will　be　found　in　the　Roman　sources　where　〃succession〃　does　not　convey　that　analogy；　and　indicate　the　partial　＇364＇　assumption；　at　least；　of　a　persona　formerly　sustained　by　another。　It　clearly　does　so　in　the　passage　before　us。

But　the　succession　which　admits　a　joinder　of　times　is　not　hereditary　succession　alone。　In　the　passage　which　has　been　cited　Scaevola　says　that　it　may　be　by　contract　or　purchase；　as　well　as　by　inheritance　or　will。　It　may　be　singular；　as　well　as　universal。　The　jurists　often　mention　antithetically　universal　successions　and　those　confined　to　a　single　specific　thing。　Ulpian　says　that　a　man　succeeds　to　another's　place；　whether　his　succession　be　universal　or　to　the　single　object。　/1/

If　further　evidence　were　wanting　for　the　present　argument；　it　would　be　found　in　another　expression　of　Ulpian's。　He　speaks　of　the　benefit　of　joinder　as　derived　from　the　persona　of　the　grantor。　〃He　to　whom　a　thing　is　granted　shall　have　the　benefit　of　joinder　from　the　persona　of　his　grantor。〃　/2/　A　benefit　cannot　be　derived　from　a　persona　except　by　sustaining　it。

It　farther　appears　pretty　plainly　from　Justinian's　Institutes　and　the　Digest；　that　the　benefit　was　not　extended　to　purchasers　in　all　cases　until　a　pretty　late　period。　/3/

Savigny　very　nearly　expressed　the　truth　when　he　said；　somewhat　broadly；　that　〃every　accessio；　for　whatever　purpose；　presupposes　nothing　else　than　a　relation　of　juridical　＇365＇　succession　between　the　previous　and　present　possessor。　For　succession　does　not　apply　to　possession　by　itself。〃　/1/　And　I　may　add；　by　way　of　further　explanation；　that　every　relation　of　juridical　succession　presupposes　either　an　inheritance　or　a　relation　to　which；　so　far　as　it　extends；　the　analogies　of　the　inheritance　may　be　applied。

The　way　of　thinking　which　led　to　the　accessio　or　joinder　of　times　is　equally　visible　in　other　cases。　The　time　during　which　a　former　owner　did　not　use　an　casement　was　imputed　to　the　person　who　had　succeeded　to　his　place。　/2/　The　defence　that　the　plaintiff　had　sold　and　delivered　the　thing　in　controversy　was　available　not　only　to　the　purchaser；　but　to　his　heirs　or　to　a　second　purchaser；　even　before　delivery　to　him；　against　the　successors　of　the　seller；　whether　universal　or　only　to　the　thing　in　question。　/3/　If　one　used　a　way　wrongfully　as　against　the　predecessor　in　title；　it　was　wrongful　as　against　the　successor；　whether　by　inheritance；　purchase；　or　any　other　right。　/4/　The　formal　oath　of　a　party　to　an　action　was　conclusive　in　favor　of　his　successors；　universal　or　singular。　/5/　Successors　by　purchase　or　gift　had　the　＇366＇　benefit　of　agreements　made　with　the　vendor。　/1/　A　multitude　of　general　expressions　show　that　for　most　purposes；　whether　of　action　or　defence；　the　buyer　stood　in　the　shoes　of　the　seller；　to　use　the　metaphor　of　our　own　law。　/2/　And　what　is　more　important　than　the　result；　which　often　might　have　been　reached　by　other　ways；　the　language　and　analogies　are　drawn　throughout　from　the　succession　to　the　inheritance。

Thus　understood；　there　could　not　have　been　a　succession　between　a　person　dispossessed　of　a　thing　against　his　will　and　the　wrongful　possessor。　Without　the　element　of　consent　there　is　no　room　for　the　analogy　just　explained。　Accordingly；　it　is　laid　down　that　there　is　no　joinder　of　times　when　the　possession　is　wrongful；　/3/　and　the　only　enumerated　means　of　succeeding　in　rem　are　by　will；　sale；　gift；　or　some　other　right。

The　argument　now　returns　to　the　English　law；　fortified　with　some　general　conclusions。　It　has　been　shown　that　in　both　the　systems　from　whose　union　our　law　arose　the　rules　governing　conveyance；　or　the　transfer　of　specific　＇367＇　objects　between　living　persons；　were　deeply　affected　by　notions　drawn　from　inheritance。　It　had　been　shown　previously　that　in　England　the　principles　of　inheritance　applied　directly　to　the　singular　succession　of　the　heir　to　a　specific　fee；　as　well　as　to　the　universal　succession　of　the　executor。　It　would　be　remarkable；　considering　their　history；　if　the　same　principles　had　not　affected　other　singular　successions　also。　It　will　soon　appear　that　they　have。　And　not　to　be　too　careful　about　the　order　of　proof；　I　will　first　take　up　the　joinder　of　times　in　prescription；　as　that　has　just　been　so　fully　discussed。　The　English　law　of　the　subject　is　found　on　examination　to　be　the　same　as　the　Roman　in　extent；　reason；　and　expression。　It　is　indeed　largely　copied　from　that　source。　For　servitudes；　such　as　rights　of　way；　light；　and　the　like；　form　the　chief　class　of　prescriptive　rights；　and　our　law　of　servitudes　is　mainly　Roman。　Prescriptions；　it　is　said；　〃are　properly　personal；　and　therefore　are　always　alleged　in　the　person　of　him　who　prescribes；　viz。　that　he　and　all　those　whose　estate　he　hath；　&c。；　therefore；　a　bishop　or　a　parson　may　prescribe；　。。。　for　there　is　a　perpetual　estate；　and　a　perpetual　succession　and　the　successor　hath　the　very　same　estate　which　his　predecessor　had；　for　that　continues；　though　the　person　alters；　like　the　case　of　the　ancestor　and　the　heir。〃　/1/　So　in　a　modern　case；　where　by　statute　twenty　years'　dispossession　extinguished　the　owner's　title；　the　Court　of　Queen's　Bench　said　that　probably　the　right　would　be　transferred　to　the　possessor　〃if　the　same　person；　or　several　persons；　claiming　one　from　the　other　by　descent；　will　＇368＇　or　conveyance；　had　been　in　possession　for　the　twenty　years。〃　〃But　。。。。　such　twenty　years'　possession　must　be　either　by　the　same　person；　or　several　persons　claiming　one　from　the　other；　which　is　not　the　case　here。〃　/1/

In　a　word；　it　is　equally　clear　that　the　continuous　possession　of　privies　in　title；　or；　in　Roman　phrase；　successors；　has　all　the　effect　of　the　continuous　possession　of　one；　and　that　such　an　effect　is　not　attributed　to　the　continuous　possession　of　different　persons　who　are　not　in　the　same　chain　of　title。　One　who　dispossesses　another　of　land　cannot　add　the　time　during　which　his　disseisee　has　used　a　way　to　the　period　of　his　own　use；　while　one　who　purchased　can。　/2/

The　authorities　which　have　been　quoted　make　it　plain　that　the　English　law　proceeds　on　the　same　theory　as　the　Roman。　One　who　buys　land　of　another　gets　the　very　same　estate　which　his　seller　had。　He　is　in　of　the　same　fee；　or　hereditas；　which　means；　as　I　have　shown；　that　he　sustains　the　same　persona。　On　the　other　hand；　one　who　wrongfully　dispossesses　another；a　disseisor；gets　a　different　estate；　is　in　of　a　new　fee；　although　the　land　is　the　same；　and　much　technical　reasoning　is　based　upon　this　doctrine。

In　the　matter　of　prescription；　therefore；　buyer　and　seller　were　identified；　like　heir　and　ancestor。　But　the　question　＇369＇　remains　whether　this　identification　bore　fruit　in　other　parts　of　the　law　also；　or　whether　it　was　confined　to　one　particular　branch；　where　the　Roman　law　was　grafted　upon　the　English　stock。

There　can　be　no　d