the common law-第6节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


was　sound　policy　to　encourage　them　to　save　all　they　could。　If　we　consider　that　the　sailors　were　regarded　as　employed　by　the　ship；　we　shall　under…　stand　very　readily　both　the　rule　and　the　exception。　〃The　ship　is　the　debtor；〃　as　was　said　in　arguing　a　case　decided　in　the　time　of　William　III。　/2/　If　the　debtor　perished；　there　was　an　end　of　the　matter。　If　a　part　came　ashore；　that　might　be　proceeded　against。

Even　the　rule　in　its　modern　form；　that　freight　is　the　mother　of　wages；　is　shown　by　the　explanation　commonly　given　to　have　reference　to　the　question　whether　the　ship　is　lost　or　arrive　safe。　In　the　most　ancient　source　of　the　maritime　law　now　extant；　which　has　anything　about　the　matter；　so　far　as　I　have　been　able　to　discover；　the　statement　is　that　the　mariners　will　lose　their　wages　when　the　ship　is　lost。　/3/　In　like　manner；　in　what　is　said　by　its　English　＇32＇　editor；　Sir　Travers　Twiss；　to　be　the　oldest　part　of　the　Consulate　of　the　Sea；　/1/　we　read　that　〃whoever　the　freighter　may　be　who　runs　away　or　dies；　the　ship　is　bound　to　pay：　the　mariners。〃　/2/　I　think　we　may　assume　that　the　vessel　was　bound　by　the　contract　with　the　sailors；　much　in　the　same　way　as　it　was　by　the　wrongs　for　which　it　was　answerable；　just　as　the　debtor's　body　was　answerable　for　his　debts；　as　well　as　for　his　crimes；　under　the　ancient　law　of　Rome。

The　same　thing　is　true　of　other　maritime　dealings　with　the　vessel；　whether　by　way　of　contract　or　otherwise。　If　salvage　service　is　rendered　to　a　vessel；　the　admiralty　court　will　hold　the　vessel；　although　it　has　been　doubted　whether　an　action　of　contract　would　lie；　if　the　owners　were　sued　at　law。　So　the　ship　is　bound　by　the　master's　contract　to　carry　cargo；　just　as　in　case　of　collision；　although　she　was　under　lease　at　the　time。　In　such　cases；　also；　according　to　our　Supreme　Court；　the　master　may　bind　the　vessel　when　he　cannot　bind　the　general　owners。　/4/　〃By　custom　the　ship　is　bound　to　the　merchandise；　and　the　merchandise　to　the　ship。〃　/5/　〃By　the　maritime　law　every　contract　of　the　master　implies　an　hypothecation。〃　/6/　It　might　be　urged；　no　doubt；　with　force；　that；　so　far　as　the　usual　maritime　contracts　are　concerned；　the　dealing　must　be　on　the　security　of　the　ship　or　merchandise　in　many　cases；　and　therefore　＇33＇　that　it　is　policy　to　give　this　security　in　all　cases；　that　the　risk　to　which　it　subjects　ship…owners　is　calculable；　and　that　they　must　take　it　into　account　when　they　let　their　vessels。　Again；　in　many　cases；　when　a　party　asserts　a　maritime　lien　by　way　of　contract；　he　has　improved　the　condition　of　the　thing　upon　which　the　lien　is　claimed；　and　this　has　been　recognized　as　a　ground　for　such　a　lien　in　some　systems。　But　this　is　not　true　universally；　nor　in　the　most　important　cases。　It　must　be　left　to　the　reader　to　decide　whether　ground　has　not　been　shown　for　believing　that　the　same　metaphysical　confusion　which　naturally　arose　as　to　the　ship's　wrongful　acts；　affected　the　way　of　thinking　as　to　her　contracts。　The　whole　manner　of　dealing　with　vessels　obviously　took　the　form　which　prevailed　in　the　eases　first　mentioned。　Pardessus；　a　high　authority；　says　that　the　lien　for　freight　prevails　even　against　the　owner　of　stolen　goods；　〃as　the　master　deals　less　with　the　person　than　the　thing。〃　/2/　So　it　was　said　in　the　argument　of　a　famous　English　case；　that　〃the　ship　is　instead　of　the　owner；　and　therefore　is　answerable。〃　/3/　In　many　cases　of　contract；　as　well　as　tort；　the　vessel　was　not　only　the　security　for　the　debt；　but　the　limit　of　the　owner's　liability。

The　principles　of　the　admiralty　are　embodied　in　its　form　of　procedure。　A　suit　may　be　brought　there　against　a　vessel　by　name；　any　person　interested　in　it　being　at　liberty　to　come　in　and　defend；　but　the　suit；　if　successful；　ending　in　a　sale　of　the　vessel　and　a　payment　of　the　plaintiff's　claim　out　of　the　proceeds。　As　long　ago　as　the　time　of　James　I。　it　was　said　that　〃the　libel　ought　to　be　only　＇34＇　against　the　ship　and　goods；　and　not　against　the　party。〃　/1/　And　authority　for　the　statement　was　cited　from　the　reign　of　Henry　VI。；　the　same　reign　when；　as　we　have　seen；　the　Admiral　claimed　a　forfeiture　of　ships　for　causing　death。　I　am　bound　to　say；　however；　that　I　cannot　find　such　an　authority　of　that　date。

We　have　now　followed　the　development　of　the　chief　forms　of　liability　in　modern　law　for　anything　other　than　the　immediate　and　manifest　consequences　of　a　man's　own　acts。　We　have　seen　the　parallel　course　of　events　in　the　two　parents；the　Roman　law　and　the　German　customs；　and　in　the　offspring　of　those　two　on　English　soil　with　regard　to　servants；　animals；　and　inanimate　things。　We　have　seen　a　single　germ　multiplying　and　branching　into　products　as　different　from　each　other　as　the　flower　from　the　root。　It　hardly　remains　to　ask　what　that　germ　was。　We　have　seen　that　it　was　the　desire　of　retaliation　against　the　offending　thing　itself。　Undoubtedly；　it　might　be　argued　that　many　of　the　rules　stated　were　derived　from　a　seizure　of　the　offending　thing　as　security　for　reparation；　at　first；　perhaps；　outside　the　law。　That　explanation；　as　well　as　the　one　offered　here；　would　show　that　modern　views　of　responsibility　had　not　yet　been　attained；　as　the　owner　of　the　thing　might　very　well　not　have　been　the　person　in　fault。　But　such　has　not　been　the　view　of　those　most　competent　to　judge。　A　consideration　of　the　earliest　instances　will　show；　as　might　have　been　expected；　that　vengeance；　not　compensation；　and　vengeance　on　the　offending　thing；　was　the　original　object。　The　ox　in　Exodus　was　to　be　stoned。　The　axe　in　the　Athenian　law　was　to　be　banished。　The　tree；　in　Mr。　Tylor's　instance；　was　to　be　chopped　to　pieces。　The　＇35＇　slave　under　all　the　systems　was　to　be　surrendered　to　the　relatives　of　the　slain　man；　that　they　might　do　with　him　what　they　liked。　/1/　The　deodand　was　an　accursed　thing。　The　original　limitation　of　liability　to　surrender；　when　the　owner　was　before　the　court；　could　not　be　accounted　for　if　it　was　his　liability；　and　not　that　of　his　property；　which　was　in　question。　Even　where；　as　in　some　of　the　cases；　expiation　seems　to　be　intended　rather　than　vengeance；　the　object　is　equally　remote　from　an　extrajudicial　distress。

The　foregoing　history；　apart　from　the　purposes　for　which　it　has　been　given；　well　illustrates　the　paradox　of　form　and　substance　in　the　development　of　law。　In　form　its　growth　is　logical。　The　official　theory　is　that　each　new　decision　follows　syllogistically　from　existing　precedents。　But　just　as　the　clavicle　in　the　cat　only　tells　of　the　existence　of　some　earlier　creature　to　which　a　collar…bone　was　useful；　precedents　survive　in　the　law　long　after　the　use　they　once　served　is　at　an　end　and　the　reason　for　them　has　been　forgotten。　The　result　of　following　them　must　often　be　failure　and　confusion　from　the　merely　logical　point　of　view。

On　the　other　hand；　in　substance　the　growth　of　the　law　is　legislative。　And　this　in　a　deeper　sense　than　that　what　the　courts　declare　to　have　always　been　the　law　is　in　fact　new。　It　is　legislative　in　its　grounds。　The　very　considerations　which　judges　most　rarely　mention；　and　always　with　an　apology；　are　the　secret　root　from　which　the　law　draws　all　the　juices　of　life。　I　mean；　of　course；　considerations　of　what　is　expedient　for　the　community　concerned。　Every　important　principle　which　is　developed　by　litigation　is　in　fact　and　at　bottom　the　result　of　more　or　less　definitely　understood　views　of　public　policy；　most　generally；　to　be　sure；　＇36＇　under　our　practice　and　traditions；　the　unconscious　result　of　instinctive　preferences　and　inarticulate　convictions；　but　none　the　less　traceable　to　views　of　public　policy　in　the　last　analysis。　And　as　the　law　is　administered　by　able　and　experienced　men；　who　know　too　much　to　sacrifice　good　sense　to　a　syllogism；　it　will　be　found　that；　when　ancient　rules　maintain　themselves　in　the　way　that　has　been　and　will　be　shown　in　this　book；　new　reasons　more　fitted　to　the　time　have　been　found　for　them；　and　that　they　gradually　receive　a　new　content；　and　at　last　a　new　form；　from　the　grounds　to　which　they　have　been　transplanted。

But　hitherto　this　process　has　been　largely　unconscious。　It　is　important；　on　that　account；　to　bring　to　mind　what　the　actual　course　of　events　has　been。　If　it　were　only　to　insist　on　a　more　conscious　recognition　of　the　legislative　function　of　the　courts；　as　just　explained；　it　would　be　useful；　as　we　shall　see　more　clearly　further　on。　/1/

What　has　been　said　will　explain　the　failure　of　all　theories　which　consider　the　law　only　from　its　formal　side；　whether　they　attempt　to　deduce　the　corpus　from　a　priori　postulates；　or　fall　into　the　humbler　error　of　supposing　the　science　of　the　law　to　reside　in　the　elegantia　juris；　or　logical　cohesion　of　part　with　part。　The　truth　is；　that　the　law　always　approaching；　and　never　reaching；　consistency。　It　is　forever　adopting　new　principles　from　life　at　one　end；　and　it　always　retains　old　ones　from　history　at　the　other；　which　have　not　yet　been　absorbed　or　sloughed　off。　It　will　be　come　entirely　consistent　only　when　it　ceases　to　grow。

The　study　upon　which　we　have　been　engaged　is　necessary　both　for　the　knowledge　and　for　the　revision　of　the　law。　＇37＇　However　much　we　may　codify　the　law　into　a　series　of　seemingly　self…sufficient　propositions；　those　propositions　will　be　but　a　phase　in　a　continuous　growth。　To　understand　their　sc