the common law-第59节

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side；　if　it　be　possible。　For　the　requirement　of　security　shows　that　the　party　requiring　it　was　not　content　to　rely　on　the　simple　promise　of　the　other　side；　which　he　would　be　compelled　to　do　if　he　had　to　perform　before　the　security　was　given；　and　thus　the　very　object　of　requiring　it　would　be　defeated。　/1/

This　last　case　suggests　what　is　very　forcibly　impressed　on　any　one　who　studies　the　cases；that；　after　all；　the　most　of　decision　is　not　any　technical；　or　even　any　general　principle　of　contracts；　but　a　consideration　of　the　nature　of　the　particular　transaction　as　a　practical　matter。　A　promises　B　to　do　a　day's　work　for　two　dollars；　and　B　promises　A　to　pay　two　dollars　for　a　day's　work。　There　the　two　promises　cannot　be　performed　at　the　same　time。　The　work　will　take　all　day；　the　payment　half　a　minute。　How　are　you　to　decide　which　is　to　be　done　first；　that　is　to　say；　which　promise　is　dependent　upon　performance　on　the　other　side？　It　is　only　by　reference　to　the　habits　of　the　community　and　to　convenience。　It　is　not　enough　to　say　that　on　the　principle　of　equivalency　a　man　is　not　presumed　to　intend　to　pay　for　a　thing　until　he　has　it。　The　work　is　payment　for　the　money；　as　much　as　the　＇338＇　money　for　the　work；　and　one　must　be　paid　in　advance。　The　question　is；　why；　if　one　man　is　not　presumed　to　intend　to　pay　money　until　he　has　money's　worth；　the　other　is　presumed　to　intend　to　give　money's　worth　before　he　has　money。　An　answer　cannot　be　obtained　from　any　general　theory。　The　fact　that　employers；　as　a　class；　can　be　trusted　for　wages　more　safely　than　the　employed　for　their　labor；　that　the　employers　have　had　the　power　and　have　been　the　law…　makers；　or　other　considerations；　it　matters　not　what；　have　determined　that　the　work　is　to　be　done　first。　But　the　grounds　of　decision　are　purely　practical；　and　can　never　be　elicited　from　grammar　or　from　logic。

A　reference　to　practical　considerations　will　be　found　to　run　all　through　the　subject。　Take　another　instance。　The　plaintiff　declared　on　a　mutual　agreement　between　himself　and　the　defendant　that　he　would　sell；　and　the　defendant　would　buy；　certain　Donskoy　wool；　to　be　shipped　by　the　plaintiff　at　Odessa；　and　delivered　in　England。　Among　the　stipulations　of　the　contract　was　one；　that　the　names　of　the　vessels　should　be　declared　as　soon　as　the　wools　were　shipped。　The　defence　was；　that　the　wool　was　bought；　with　the　knowledge　of　both　parties；　for　the　purpose　of　reselling　it　in　the　course　of　the　defendant's　business；　that　it　was　an　article　of　fluctuating　value；　and　not　salable　until　the　names　of　the　vessels　in　which　it　was　shipped　should　have　been　declared　according　to　the　contract；　but　that　the　plaintiff　did　not　declare　the　names　of　the　vessels　as　agreed。　The　decision　of　the　court　was　given　by　one　of　the　greatest　technical　lawyers　that　ever　lived；　Baron　Parke；　yet　he　did　not　dream　of　giving　any　technical　or　merely　logical　reason　for　the　decision；　but；　after　stating　in　the　above　words　the　facts　which　were　deemed　material　to　the　question　＇339＇　whether　declaring　the　names　of　the　vessels　was　a　condition　to　the　duty　to　accept；　stated　the　ground　of　decision　thus：　〃Looking　at　the　nature　of　the　contract；　and　the　great　importance　of　it　to　the　object　with　which　the　contract　was　entered　into　with　the　knowledge　of　both　parties；　we　think　it　was　a　condition　precedent。〃　/1/

＇340＇　LECTURE　X。

SUCCESSIONS　AFTER　DEATH。

In　the　Lecture　on　Possession；　I　tried　to　show　that　the　notion　of　possessing　a　right　as　such　was　intrinsically　absurd。　All　rights　are　consequences　attached　to　filling　some　situation　of　fact。　A　right　which　may　be　acquired　by　possession　differs　from　others　simply　in　being　attached　to　a　situation　of　such　a　nature　that　it　may　be　filled　successively　by　different　persons；　or　by　any　one　without　regard　to　the　lawfulness　of　his　doing　so；　as　is　the　case　where　the　situation　consists　in　having　a　tangible　object　within　one's　power。

When　a　right　of　this　sort　is　recognized　by　the　law；　there　is　no　difficulty　in　transferring　it；　or；　more　accurately；　there　is　no　difficulty　in　different　persons　successively　enjoying　similar　rights　in　respect　of　the　subject…matter。　If　A；　being　the　possessor　of　a　horse　or　a　field；　gives　up　the　possession　to　B；　the　rights　which　B　acquires　stand　on　the　same　ground　as　A's　did　before。　The　facts　from　which　A's　rights　sprang　have　ceased　to　be　true　of　A；　and　are　now　true　of　B。　The　consequences　attached　by　the　law　to　those　facts　now　exist　for　B；　as　they　did　for　A　before。　The　situation　of　fact　from　which　the　rights　spring　is　continuing　one；　and　any　one　who　occupies　it；　no　matter　how；　has　the　rights　attached　to　it。　But　there　is　no　possession　possible　of　a　contract。　The　＇341＇　fact　that　a　consideration　was　given　yesterday　by　A　to　B；　and　a　promise　received　in　return；　cannot　be　laid　hold　of　by　X；　and　transferred　from　A　to　himself。　The　only　thing　can　be　transferred　is　the　benefit　or　burden　of　the　promise；　and　how　can　they　be　separated　from　the　facts　which　gave　rise　to　them？　How；　in　short；　can　a　man　sue　or　be　sued　on　a　promise　in　which　he　had　no　part？

Hitherto　it　has　been　assumed；　in　dealing　with　any　special　right　or　obligation；　that　the　facts　from　which　it　sprung　were　true　of　the　individual　entitled　or　bound。　But　it　often　happens；　especially　in　modern　law；　that　a　person　acquires　and　is　allowed　to　enforce　a　special　right；　although　that　facts　which　give　rise　to　it　are　not　true　of　him；　or　are　true　of　him　only　in　part。　One　of　the　chief　problems　of　the　law　is　to　explain　the　machinery　by　which　this　result　has　been　brought　to　pass。

It　will　be　observed　that　the　problem　is　not　coextensive　with　the　whole　field　of　rights。　Some　rights　cannot　be　transferred　by　any　device　or　contrivance；　for　instance；　a　man's　right　a　to　bodily　safety　or　reputation。　Others　again　are　incident　to　possession；　and　within　the　limits　of　that　conception　no　other　is　necessary。　As　Savigny　said；　〃Succession　does　not　apply　to　possession　by　itself。〃　/1/

But　the　notion　of　possession　will　carry　us　but　a　very　little　way　in　our　understanding　of　the　modern　theory　of　transfer。　That　theory　depends　very　largely　upon　the　notion　of　succession；　to　use　the　word　just　quoted　from　Savigny；　and　accordingly　successions　will　be　the　subject　of　this　and　the　following　Lecture。　I　shall　begin　by　explaining　the　theory　of　succession　to　persons　deceased；　and　after　that　is　done　shall　pass　to　the　theory　of　transfer　between　living　＇342＇　people；　and　shall　consider　whether　any　relation　can　be　established　between　the　two。

The　former　is　easily　shown　to　be　founded　upon　a　fictitious　identification　between　the　deceased　and　his　successor。　And　as　a　first　step　to　the　further　discussion；　as　well　as　for　its　own　sake；　I　shall　briefly　state　the　evidence　touching　the　executor；　the　heir；　and　the　devisee。　In　order　to　understand　the　theory　of　our　law　with　regard　to　the　first　of　these；　at　least；　scholars　are　agreed　that　it　is　necessary　to　consider　the　structure　and　position　of　the　Roman　family　as　it　was　in　the　infancy　of　Roman　society。

Continental　jurists　have　long　been　collecting　the　evidence　that；　in　the　earlier　periods　of　Roman　and　German　law　alike；　the　unit　of　society　was　the　family。　The　Twelve　Tables　of　Rome　still　recognize　the　interest　of　the　inferior　members　of　the　family　in　the　family　property。　Heirs　are　called　sui　heredes；　that　is；　heirs　of　themselves　or　of　their　own　property；　as　is　explained　by　Gaius。　/1/　Paulus　says　that　they　are　regarded　as　owners　in　a　certain　sense；　even　in　the　lifetime　of　their　father；　and　that　after　his　death　they　do　not　so　much　receive　an　inheritance　as　obtain　the　full　power　of　dealing　with　their　property。　/2/

Starting　from　this　point　it　is　easy　to　understand　the　＇343＇　succession　of　heirs　to　a　deceased　paterfamilias　in　the　Roman　system。　If　the　family　was　the　owner　of　the　property　administered　by　a　paterfamilias；　its　rights　remained　unaffected　by　the　death　of　its　temporary　head。　The　family　continued；　although　the　head　died。　And　when；　probably　by　a　gradual　change；　/1/　the　paterfamilias　came　to　be　regarded　as　owner；　instead　of　a　simple　manager　of　the　family　rights；　the　nature　and　continuity　of　those　rights　did　not　change　with　the　title　to　them。　The　familia　continued　to　the　heirs　as　it　was　left　by　the　ancestor。　The　heir　succeeded　not　to　the　ownership　of　this　or　that　thing　separately；　but　to　the　total　hereditas　or　headship　of　the　family　with　certain　rights　of　property　as　incident；　/2/　and　of　course　he　took　this　headship；　or　right　of　representing　the　family　interests；　subject　to　the　modifications　effected　by　the　last　manager。

The　aggregate　of　the　ancestor's　rights　and　duties；　or；　to　use　the　technical　phrase；　the　total　persona　sustained　by　him；　was　easily　separated　from　his　natural　personality。　For　this　persona　was　but　the　aggregate　of　what　had　formerly　been　family　rights　and　duties；　and　was　originally　sustained　by　any　individual　only　as　the　family　head。　Hence　it　was　said　to　be　continued　by　the　inheritance；　/3/　and　when　the　heir　assumed　it　he　had　his　action　in　respect　of　injuries　previously　committed。　/4/

Thus　the　Roman　heir　came　to　be　treated　as　identified　with　his　ancestor　for　the　purposes　of　the　law。　And　thus　it　is　clear　how　the　impossible　transfers　which　I　seek　to　explain　were　accomplished　in　that　instance。　Rights　to　which　B　＇344＇　as　B　could　show　no　title；　h