the common law-第57节

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they　can　be　material　is　that　a　belief　in　their　being　true　is　likely　to　have　led　to　the　making　of　the　contract。

It　is　not　then　true；　as　it　is　sometimes　said；　that　the　law　does　not　concern　itself　with　the　motives　for　making　contracts。　On　the　contrary；　the　whole　scope　of　fraud　outside　the　contract　is　the　creation　of　false　motives　and　the　removal　of　true　ones。　And　this　consideration　will　afford　a　reasonable　test　of　the　cases　in　which　fraud　will　warrant　rescission。　It　is　said　that　a　fraudulent　representation　must　be　material　to　have　that　effect。　But　how　are　we　to　decide　whether　it　is　material　or　not？　If　the　above　argument　is　correct；　it　must　be　by　an　appeal　to　ordinary　experience　to　decide　whether　a　belief　that　the　fact　was　as　represented　would　naturally　have　led　to；　or　a　contrary　belief　would　naturally　have　prevented；　the　making　of　the　contract。

If　the　belief　would　not　naturally　have　had　such　an　effect；　either　in　general　or　under　the　known　circumstances　of　the　particular　case；　the　fraud　is　immaterial。　If　a　man　is　induced　to　contract　with　another　by　a　fraudulent　representation　of　the　latter　that　he　is　a　great…grandson　of　Thomas　Jefferson；　I　do　not　suppose　that　the　contract　would　be　voidable　unless　the　contractee　knew　that；　for　special　reasons；　his　lie　would　tend　to　bring　the　contract　about。

The　conditions　or　grounds　for　avoiding　a　contract　which　have　been　dealt　with　thus　far　are　conditions　concerning　the　conduct　of　the　parties　outside　of　the　itself。　＇327＇　Still　confining　myself　to　conditions　arising　by　construction　of　law；that　is　to　say；　not　directly　and　in　terms　attached　to　a　promise　by　the　literal　meaning　of　the　words　in　which　it　is　expressed；I　now　come　to　those　which　concern　facts　to　which　the　contract　does　in　some　way　refer。

Such　conditions　may　be　found　in　contracts　where　the　promise　is　only　on　one　side。　It　has　been　said　that　where　the　contract　is　unilateral；　and　its　language　therefore　is　all　that　of　the　promisor；　clauses　in　his　favor　will　be　construed　as　conditions　more　readily　than　the　same　words　in　a　bilateral　contract；　indeed；　that　they　must　be　so　construed；　because；　if　they　do　not　create　a　condition；　they　do　him　no　good；　since　ex　hypothesi　they　are　not　promises　by　the　other　party。　/1/　How　far　this　ingenious　suggestion　has　had　a　practical　effect　on　doctrine　may　perhaps　be　doubted。

But　it　will　be　enough　for　the　purposes　of　this　general　survey　to　deal　with　bilateral　contracts；　where　there　are　undertakings　on　both　sides；　and　where　the　condition　implied　in　favor　of　one　party　is　that　the　other　shall　make　good　what　he　on　his　part　has　undertaken。

The　undertakings　of　a　contract　may　be　for　the　existence　of　a　fact　in　the　present　or　in　the　future。　They　can　be　promises　only　in　the　latter　case；　but　in　the　former；　they　be　equally　essential　terms　in　the　bargain。

Here　again　we　come　on　the　law　of　representations；　but　in　a　new　phase。　Being　a　part　of　the　contract；　it　is　always　possible　that　their　truth　should　make　a　condition　of　the　contract　wholly　irrespective　of　any　question　of　fraud。　And　it　often　is　so　in　fact。　It　is　not；　however；　every　representation　embodied　in　the　words　used　on　one　side　which　will　＇328＇　make　a　condition　in　favor　of　the　other　party。　Suppose　A　agrees　to　sell；　and　B　agrees　to　buy；　〃A's　seven…year…old　sorrel　horse　Eclipse；　now　in　the　possession　of　B　on　trial；〃　and　in　fact　the　horse　is　chestnut…colored；　not　sorrel。　I　do　not　suppose　that　B　could　refuse　to　pay　for　the　horse　on　that　ground。　If　the　law　were　so　foolish　as　to　aim　at　merely　formal　consistency；　it　might　indeed　be　said　that　there　was　as　absolute　a　repugnancy　between　the　different　terms　of　this　contract　as　in　the　ease　of　an　agreement　to　sell　certain　barrels　of　mackerel；　where　the　barrels　turned　out　to　contain　salt。　If　this　view　were　adopted；　there　would　not　be　a　contract　subject　to　a　condition；　there　would　be　no　contract　at　all。　But　in　truth　there　is　a　contract；　and　there　is　not　even　a　condition。　As　has　been　said　already；　it　is　not　every　repugnancy　that　makes　a　contract　void；　and　it　is　not　every　failure　in　the　terms　of　the　counter　undertaking　that　makes　it　voidable。　Here　it　plainly　appears　that　the　buyer　knows　exactly　what　he　is　going　to　get；　and　therefore　that　the　mistake　of　color　has　no　bearing　on　the　bargain。　/1/

If；　on　the　other　hand；　a　contract　contained　a　representation　which　was　fraudulent；　and　which　misled　the　party　to　whom　it　was　made；　the　contract　would　be　voidable　on　the　same　principles　as　if　the　representation　had　been　made　beforehand。　But　words　of　description　in　a　contract　are　very　frequently　held　to　amount　to　what　is　sometimes　called　a　warranty；　irrespective　of　fraud。　Whether　they　do　so　or　not　is　a　question　to　be　determined　by　the　court　on　grounds　of　common　sense；　looking　to　the　meaning　of　the　words；　the　importance　in　the　transaction　of　the　facts　＇329＇　which　the　words　convey；　and　so　forth。　But　when　words　of　description　are　determined　to　be　a　warranty；　the　meaning　of　the　decision　is　not　merely　that　the　party　using　them　binds　himself　to　answer　for　their　truth；　but　that　their　truth　is　a　condition　of　the　contract。

For　instance；　in　a　leading　case　/1/　the　agreement　was　that　the　plaintiff's　ship；　then　in　the　port　of　Amsterdam；　should；　with　all　possible　despatch；　proceed　direct　to　Newport；　England；　and　there　load　a　cargo　of　coals　for　Hong　Kong。　At　the　date　of　the　charter…party　the　vessel　was　not　in　Amsterdam；　but　she　arrived　there　four　days　later。　The　plaintiff　had　notice　that　the　defendant　considered　time　important。　It　was　held　that　the　presence　of　the　vessel　in　the　port　of　Amsterdam　at　the　date　of　the　contract　was　a　condition；　the　breach　of　which　entitled　the　defendant　to　refuse　to　load；　and　to　rescind　the　contract。　If　the　view　were　adopted　that　a　condition　must　be　a　future　event；　and　that　a　promise　purporting　to　be　conditional　on　a　past　or　present　event　is　either　absolute　or　no　promise　at　all；　it　would　follow　that　in　this　case　the　defendant　had　never　made　a　promise。　/2/　He　had　only　promised　if　circumstances　existed　which　did　not　exist。　I　have　already　stated　my　objections　to　this　way　of　looking　at　such　cases；　/2/　and　will　only　add　that　the　courts；　so　far　as　I　am　aware；　do　not　sanction　it；　and　certainly　did　not　in　this　instance。

There　is　another　ground　for　holding　the　charter…party　void　and　no　contract；　instead　of　regarding　it　as　only　voidable；　which　is　equally　against　authority；　which　nevertheless　I　have　never　been　able　to　answer　wholly　to　my　satisfaction。　In　the　case　put；　the　representation　of　the　lessor　of　the　vessel　＇330＇　concerned　the　vessel　itself；　and　therefore　entered　into　the　description　of　the　thing　the　lessee　agreed　to　take。　I　do　not　quite　see　why　there　is　not　as　fatal　a　repugnancy　between　the　different　terms　of　this　contract　as　was　found　in　that　for　the　sale　of　the　barrels　of　salt　described　as　containing　mackerel。　Why　is　the　repugnancy　between　the　two　terms；first；　that　the　thing　sold　is　the　contents　of　these　barrels；　and；　second；　that　it　is　mackerelfatal　to　the　existence　of　a　contract？　It　is　because　each　of　those　terms　goes　to　the　very　root　and　essence　of　the　contract；　/1/because　to　compel　the　buyer　to　take　something　answering　to　one；　but　not　to　the　other　requirement；　would　be　holding　him　to　do　a　substantially　different　thing　from　what　he　promised；　and　because　a　promise　to　take　one　and　the　same　thing　answering　to　both　requirements　is　therefore　contradictory　in　a　substantial　matter。　It　has　been　seen　that　the　law　does　not　go　on　any　merely　logical　ground；　and　does　not　hold　that　every　slight　repugnancy　will　make　a　contract　even　voidable。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　when　the　repugnancy　is　between　terms　which　are　both　essential；　it　is　fatal　to　the　very　existence　of　the　contract。　How　then　do　we　decide　whether　a　given　term　is　essential？　Surely　the　best　way　of　finding　out　is　by　seeing　how　the　parties　have　dealt　with　it。　For　want　of　any　expression　on　their　part　we　may　refer　to　the　speech　and　dealings　of　every　day；　/2/　and　say　that；　if　its　absence　would　make　the　subject…matter　a　different　thing；　its　presence　is　essential　to　the　existence　of　the　agreement。　But　the　parties　may　agree　that　anything；　however　trifling；　shall　be　essential；　as　well　＇331＇　as　that　anything；　however　important；　shall　not　be；　and　if　that　essential　is　part　of　the　contract　description　of　a　specific　thing　which　is　also　identified　by　reference　to　the　senses；　how　can　there　be　a　contract　in　its　absence　any　more　than　if　the　thing　is　in　popular　speech　different　in　kind　from　its　description？　The　qualities　that　make　sameness　or　difference　of　kind　for　the　purposes　of　a　contract　are　not　determined　by　Agassiz　or　Darwin；　or　by　the　public　at　large；　but　by　the　will　of　the　parties；　which　decides　that　for　their　purposes　the　characteristics　insisted　on　are　such　and　such。　/1/1　Now；　if　this　be　true；　what　evidence　can　there　be　that　a　certain　requirement　is　essential；　that　without　it　the　subject…matter　will　be　different　in　kind　from　the　description；　better　than　that　one　party　has　required　and　the　other　given　a　warranty　of　its　presence？　Yet　the　contract　description　of　the　specific　vessel　as　now　in　the　port　of　Amsterdam；　although　held　to　be　an　implied　warranty；　does　not　seem　to　have　been　regarded　as　making　the　contract　repugnant　and　void；　but　only　as　giving　the　defendant　the　option　of　avoiding　it。　/2