the common law-第56节

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　their　being　performed　in　fact。　Hence　A　could　not　simply　wait　till　the　end　of　his　term；　and　then　recover　the　full　amount　which　he　would　have　had　if　the　employment　had　continued。　Nor　is　he　any　more　entitled　to　do　so　from　＇321＇　the　fact　that　it　was　B's　fault　that　the　services　were　not　rendered。　B's　answer　to　any　such　claim　is　perfect。　He　is　only　liable　upon　a　promise；　and　he　in　his　turn　only　promised　to　pay　in　a　case　which　has　not　happened。　He　did　promise　to　employ；　however；　and　for　not　doing　that　he　is　liable　in　damages。

One　or　two　more　illustrations　will　be　useful。　A　promises　to　deliver；　and　B　promises　to　accept　and　pay　for；　certain　goods　at　a　certain　time　and　place。　When　the　time　comes；　neither　party　is　on　hand。　Neither　would　be　liable　to　an　action；　and；　according　to　what　has　been　said；　each　has　done　all　that　he　promised　to　do　in　the　event　which　has　happened；　to　wit；　nothing。　It　might　be　objected　that；　if　A　has　done　all　that　he　is　bound　to　do；　he　ought　to　be　able　to　sue　B；　since　performance　or　readiness　to　perform　was　all　that　was　necessary　to　give　him　that　right；　and　conversely　the　same　might　be　said　of　B。　On　the　other　hand；　considering　either　B　or　A　as　defendant；　the　same　facts　would　be　a　complete　defence。　The　puzzle　is　largely　one　of　words。

A　and　B　have；　it　is　true；　each　performed　all　that　they　promised　to　do　at　the　present　stage；　because　they　each　only　promised　to　act　in　the　event　of　the　other　being　ready　and　willing　to　act　at　the　same　time。　But　the　readiness　and　willingness；　although　not　necessary　to　the　performance　of　either　promise；　and　therefore　not　a　duty；　was　necessary　in　order　to　present　a　case　to　which　the　promise　of　action　on　the　other　side　would　apply。　Hence；　although　A　and　B　have　each　performed　their　own　promise；　they　have　not　performed　the　condition　to　their　right　of　demanding　more　from　the　other　side。　The　performance　of　that　condition　is　purely　optional　until　one　side　has　brought　it　within　the　＇322＇　scope　of　the　other's　undertaking　by　performing　it　himself。　But　it　is　performance　in　the　latter　sense；　that　is；　the　satisfying　of　all　conditions；　as　well　as　the　keeping　of　his　own　promises；　which　is　necessary　to　give　A　or　B　a　right　of　action。

Conditions　may　be　created　by　the　very　words　of　a　contract。　Of　such　cases　there　is　nothing　to　be　said；　for　parties　may　agree　to　what　they　choose。　But　they　may　also　be　held　to　arise　by　construction；　where　no　provision　is　made　in　terms　for　rescinding　or　avoiding　the　contract　in　any　case。　The　nature　of　the　conditions　which　the　law　thus　reads　in　needs　explanation。　It　may　be　said；　in　a　general　way；　that　they　are　directed　to　the　existence　of　the　manifest　grounds　for　making　the　bargain　on　the　side　of　the　rescinding　party；　or　the　accomplishment　of　its　manifest　objects。　But　that　is　not　enough。　Generally　speaking；　the　disappointment　must　be　caused　by　the　wrong…doing　of　the　person　on　the　other　side；　and　the　most　obvious　cases　of　such　wrong…doing　are　fraud　and　misrepresentation；　or　failure　to　perform　his　own　part　of　the　contract。

Fraud　and　misrepresentation　thus　need　to　be　considered　once　more　in　this　connection。　I　take　the　latter　first。　In　dealing　with　it　the　first　question　which　arises　is　whether　the　representation　is；　or　is　not；　part　of　the　contract。　If　the　contract　is　in　writing　and　the　representation　is　set　out　on　the　face　of　the　paper；　it　may　be　material　or　immaterial；　but　the　effect　of　its　untruth　will　be　determined　on　much　the　same　principles　as　govern　the　failure　to　perform　a　promise　on　the　same　side。　If　the　contract　is　made　by　word　of　mouth；　there　may　be　a　large　latitude　in　connecting　words　of　representation　with　later　words　of　promise；　but　when　they　are　determined　to　be　a　part　of　the　contract　＇323＇；　the　same　principles　apply　as　if　the　whole　were　in　writing。

The　question　now　before　us　is　the　effect　of　a　misrepresentation　which　leads　to；　but　is　not　a　part　of；　the　contract。　Suppose　that　the　contract　is　in　writing；　but　does　not　contain　it；　does　such　a　previous　misrepresentation　authorize　rescission　in　any　case？　and　if　so；　does　it　in　any　case　except　where　it　goes　to　the　height　of　fraud？　The　promisor　might　say；　It　does　not　matter　to　me　whether　you　knew　that　your　representation　was　false　or　not；　the　only　thing　I　am　concerned　with　is　its　truth。　If　it　is　untrue；　I　suffer　equally　whether　you　knew　it　to　be　so　or　not。　But　it　has　been　shown；　in　an　earlier　Lecture；　that　the　law　does　not　go　on　the　principle　that　a　man　is　answerable　for　all　the　consequences　of　all　his　acts。　An　act　is　indifferent　in　itself。　It　receives　its　character　from　the　concomitant　facts　known　to　the　actor　at　the　time。　If　a　man　states　a　thing　reasonably　believing　that　he　is　speaking　from　knowledge；　it　is　contrary　to　the　analogies　of　the　law　to　throw　the　peril　of　the　truth　upon　him　unless　he　agrees　to　assume　that　peril；　and　he　did　not　do　so　in　the　case　supposed；　as　the　representation　was　not　made　part　of　the　contract。

It　is　very　different　when　there　is　fraud。　Fraud　may　as　well　lead　to　the　making　of　a　contract　by　a　statement　outside　the　contract　as　by　one　contained　in　it。　But　the　law　would　hold　the　contract　not　less　conditional　on　good　faith　in　one　case　than　in　the　other。

To　illustrate；　we　may　take　a　somewhat　extreme　case。　A　says　to　B；　I　have　not　opened　these　barrels　myself；　but　they　contain　No。　1　mackerel：　I　paid　so　much　for　them　to　so　and　so；　naming　a　well…known　dealer。　Afterwards　A　writes　B；　I　will　sell　the　barrels　which　you　saw；　and　their　＇324＇　contents；　for　so　much；　and　B　accepts。　The　barrels　turn　out　to　contain　salt。　I　suppose　the　contract　would　be　binding　if　the　statements　touching　the　contents　were　honest；　and　voidable　if　they　were　fraudulent。

Fraudulent　representations　outside　a　contract　can　never；　it　would　seem；　go　to　anything　except　the　motives　for　making　it。　If　outside　the　contract；　they　cannot　often　affect　its　interpretation。　A　promise　in　certain　words　has　a　definite　meaning；　which　the　promisor　is　presumed　to　understand。　If　A　says　to　B；　I　promise　you　to　buy　this　barrel　and　its　contents；　his　words　designate　a　person　and　thing　identified　by　the　senses；　and　they　signify　nothing　more。　There　is　no　repugnancy；　and　if　that　person　is　ready　to　deliver　that　thing；　the　purchaser　cannot　say　that　any　term　in　the　contract　itself　is　not　complied　with。　He　may　have　been　fraudulently　induced　to　believe　that　B　was　another　B；　and　that　the　barrel　contained　mackerel；　but　however　much　his　belief　on　those　points　may　have　affected　his　willingness　to　make　the　promise；　it　would　be　somewhat　extravagant　to　give　his　words　a　different　meaning　on　that　account。　〃You〃　means　the　person　before　the　speaker；　whatever　his　name；　and　〃contents〃　applies　to　salt；　as　well　as　to　mackerel。

It　is　no　doubt　only　by　reason　of　a　condition　construed　into　the　contract　that　fraud　is　a　ground　of　rescission。　Parties　could　agree；　if　they　chose；　that　a　contract　should　be　binding　without　regard　to　truth　or　falsehood　outside　of　it　on　either　part。

But；　as　has　been　said　before　in　these　Lectures；　although　the　law　starts　from　the　distinctions　and　uses　the　language　of　morality；　it　necessarily　ends　in　external　standards　not　dependent　on　the　actual　consciousness　of　the　individual。　＇325＇　So　it　has　happened　with　fraud。　If　a　man　makes　a　representation；　knowing　facts　which　by　the　average　standard　of　the　community　are　sufficient　to　give　him　warning　that　it　is　probably　untrue；　and　it　is　untrue；　he　is　guilty　of　fraud　in　theory　of　law　whether　he　believes　his　statement　or　not。　The　courts　of　Massachusetts；　at　least；　go　much　further。　They　seem　to　hold　that　any　material　statement　made　by　a　man　as　of　his　own　knowledge；　or　in　such　a　way　as　fairly　to　be　understood　as　made　of　his　own　knowledge；　is　fraudulent　if　untrue；　irrespective　of　the　reasons　he　may　have　had　for　believing　it　and　for　believing　that　he　knew　it。　/1/　It　is　clear；　therefore；　that　a　representation　may　be　morally　innocent；　and　yet　fraudulent　in　theory　of　law。　Indeed；　the　Massachusetts　rule　seems　to　stop　little　short　of　the　principle　laid　down　by　the　English　courts　of　equity；　which　has　been　criticised　in　an　earlier　Lecture；　/2/　since　most　positive　affirmations　of　facts　would　at　least　warrant　a　jury　in　finding　that　they　were　reasonably　understood　to　be　made　as　of　the　party's　own　knowledge；　and　might　therefore　warrant　a　rescission　if　they　turned　out　to　be　untrue。　The　moral　phraseology　has　ceased　to　be　apposite；　and　an　external　standard　of　responsibility　has　been　reached。　But　the　starting…　point　is　nevertheless　fraud；　and　except　on　the　ground　of　fraud；　as　defined　by　law；　I　do　not　think　that　misrepresentations　before　the　contract　affect　its　validity；　although　they　lead　directly　to　its　making。　But　neither　the　contract　nor　the　implied　condition　calls　for　the　existence　of　the　facts　as　to　which　the　false　representations　were　made。　They　call　only　for　the　absence　of　certain　false　representations。　The　condition　is　not　that　the　promisee　shall　be　a　certain　other　B；　or　that　the　contents　of　the　barrel　shall　be　mackerel；　＇326＇　but　that　the　promisee　has　not　lied　to　him　about　material　facts。

Then　the　question　arises；　How　do　you　determine　what　facts　are　material？　As　the　facts　are　not　required　by　the　contract；　the　only　way　in　which　they　can　be　material　is　that　a　belief　in　their　being　true　is　likely　to　have　led　to　the　making　of　the